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1INTRODUCTION
This study examines aspects of the structure, conduct 
and performance of the Australian fruit and vegetable pro­
cessing industry. As it is not possible to discuss every 
facet of the industry, interest is centred upon corporate 
logistics decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. 
Such a focus differs from traditional industrial geography 
in that the emphasis is upon corporate decision-making, 
logistics and uncertainty.
Geographers have been concerned with describing the 
locational patterns of manufacturing plants and inter­
preting their dispositions in terms of transfer cost 
(Estall and Buchanan, 1961). An alternative interpretation 
was prompted by a concern with how locational decisions are 
made in the real world (Pred, 1967; 1969). This alternative 
was developed by describing and explaining locational 
patterns from the viewpoint of the corporation rather than 
the individual plant. The change stresses that locational 
influences are only part Of the corporate decision-makers' 
concern and then not necessarily the most important part 
(Steed, 1971; Wadley, 1974). Indeed, if we are to under­
stand how the corporation makes decisions we need to 
appreciate the interactions between Managing Director and 
the finance, production, marketing, logistics and management 
service divisions (see Fig. 0.1). But rather than grapple
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3with all interactions within the companies in the industry 
our attention focusses upon one segment, corporate logistics.
The logistics division of the corporation encompasses 
the procurement of supplies and the distribution of the 
finished product to the consumer (Fig. 0.1). This study 
emphasizes the reaction of corporate decision-makers to 
variations, and the causes of such variations, in the flow 
of materials through their plants. In contrast to the usual 
concern of geographers with describing and interpreting 
either location patterns per se or movements as location 
patterns, this study considers locational processes (Fig. 0.2).
While the macro-analysis of static location or static 
movement patterns in the processing industry is interesting, 
a concentration upon flows at a micro-level explains more 
fully the locational decision processes. These are the 
explanatory relationships that underpin the location and 
movement patterns. Concern with logistics alone is not a new 
venture; it has attracted attention from workers in operations 
research and a variety of other disciplines, including 
geography. This interest in logistics developed into the 
sub-discipline of physical distribution which incorporates 
all the facets of the firm shown in Figure 0.1. Invariably 
these have been applied to major corporations in the United 
States such as Johnson and Johnson Limited and the H.J. Heinz 
Company. Programmes developed by Bowersox et al. (1972) to
assist physical distribution management took many man-years
4Movement of fruit and vegetablesMovement as
location processes as location patterns
CORPORATE
UNCERTAINTY
DECISION-MAKING
Location contextLocation patterns
Figure 0.2 The context of location and
movement patterns, decision-making 
and uncertainty (Source:
Adapted from Cox, 1972:11 )
5to complete. As they are not available without a considerable 
fee, we must be content with applying simpler models to 
examine material flows through the smaller physical distribu­
tion networks of Australia's fledgling corporations. Concern 
with material flowing through fruit and vegetable processing 
plants involves corporate decision-making under conditions 
of uncertainty; uncertainty arising from variations in supply 
and prices, stemming from seasonal conditions, and changing 
demand.
Decision-making under conditions of uncertainty has not 
been a major concern of industrial geographers; they have 
described and interpreted location patterns assuming rational 
economic man endowed with perfect knowledge. The influence 
of uncertainty on location patterns has been discussed by 
Webber (1972) but its impact upon commodity flows escaped 
his attention. Hence the emphasis upon commodity flows in 
this study.
Overview
Uncertainty in the Australian fruit and vegetable pro­
cessing industry is examined in terms of the conduct and 
performance of the member firms. As Scherer (1971) indicates 
in Figure 0.3, performance depends upon conduct, and conduct 
in turn, depends upon market structure. Part I discusses 
this market structure and the basic conditions that underlie
6Government
intervention
Pricing behaviour 
Product strategy 
Research and innovation 
Advertising 
Legal tactics
CONDUCT
Production and allocative efficiency 
Progress 
Full employment 
Equity
Number of sellers and buyers
M A R K E T  STR U C T U R E
Barriers to entry
Vertical integration
Cost structures
Conglomerateness
SUPPLY
Factor prices 
Raw materials 
Technology 
Product durability 
Value/weight 
Business attitudes
B A SIC C O N D I T I O N S
DEMAND
Income elasticity 
Price elasticity 
Rate of growth 
Substitutes 
Marketing type 
Cyclical and
seasonal character
Figure 0.3 A model of industrial organization analysis 
(Source: Adapted from Scherer, 1971:5 )
7both structure and performance (Fig. 0.4). The industry's 
location pattern is described and interpreted (Chapter 1) 
and then analysed using some conventional economic measures 
(Chapter 2). While considerable heterogeneity is revealed 
in the industry some order is identified by applying a 
classification procedure. This reveals four groups of firms 
for which group performance profiles are derived (Chapter 3).
Their performance varies considerably which prompts an 
examination of conduct in Part II. Rather than analyse each 
group separately we will concentrate on the members of the 
group showing the best financial performance in the early 
1970s (Chapter 4). Such an analysis provides lessons about 
this group's logistics conduct, explaining their better per­
formance. Logistics conduct in this instance, is defined as 
inventory, purchasing and transport management. The lessons 
may be used to improve the performance of the other groups. 
The conduct of firms in this group is assessed within the 
framework of two simple decision-making models to determine 
whether their observed performance could be improved given 
better information. The logistics environment based upon 
the experience of three processors is modelled using 
Decision Theory (Chapter 5) and a combination of the Out-of- 
Kilter algorithm and Decision Theory (Chapter 6).
Once the selected group of firms has been examined 
general findings on their logistics conduct are applied in
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Figure 0.4 An overview of the study
9Part III, both to the other groups and to the industry as 
a whole. The lessons derived from this examination are used 
to look at the conduct of the other three groups of pro­
cessors (Chapter 7). From this comparison it is clear that 
industry performance cannot be improved without some 
structural alterations. Changes offering a minimum of dis­
ruption to the industry and leading to increased certainty 
in the logistics sector are discussed together with the 
policy implications of these changes (Chapter 8).
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PART I
Before focusing on the relationships between market 
structure and conduct and performance. Chapter 1 highlights 
the diversified spatial structure of the industry and some 
of its underpinning determinants. The diversified market 
structure of the processing industry is represented by the 
number, size and location of firms. As the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) does not identify individual 
firms we are forced to outline two versions of the industry; 
the first derived from official statistics and the second 
based upon a number of firms that were identified in a survey 
undertaken as part of this study. In this survey, the 
geographer's traditional view of location patterns is con­
sidered in the light of both the industry's recent history 
and supply and demand influences. In Chapter 2 we move from 
the spatial perspective of the firm to that of the 
traditional economist and identify other elements of market 
structure. These elements are ownership of firms, barriers 
to entry and cost structures. Although we have a diverse 
set of processors, a simplified model is nevertheless 
introduced in Chapter 3. Thus we can observe reactions to 
uncertainty through the industry's performance.
11
CHAPTER ONE
A SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE OF A DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRY
THE 'OFFICIAL' AUSTRALIAN FRUIT AND VEGETABLE 
PROCESSING INDUSTRY
In 1975 the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
showed that the Australian fruit and vegetable processing 
industry comprised 140 enterprises operating 180 
establishments. As indicated in Figure 1.1 the 'industry 
straddles several manufacturing classes. The two main 
classes are canned and preserved fruit products (ASIC class 
2131) and preserved, quick frozen, dehydrated and canned 
vegetable products (ASIC class 2132). Some firms also manu­
facture soft drinks and cordials (ASIC class 2191) as well 
as alcoholic beverages (ASIC class 2194).
The diversity of production is paralleled by a diversity 
of location. An analysis of location by state (the smallest 
accounting unit) shows the industry diffused throughout 
Australia (Table 1.1). Victoria and New South Wales have 
61 per cent of all establishments leaving the remainder 
almost equally divided between the other four states. In 
terms of per capita distribution, Tasmania has a dispropor­
tionately large number of establishments and Queensland a 
disproportionately small number.
12
THE AUSTRALIAN FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PROCESSING INDUSTRY
Australian Standard Industry Classification
SUB-DIVISION
GROUP
21
I
Food and Beverages
213 218 219
CLASS 2131
Canned and 
Preserved 
Fruit Products
Fruit juices
Preserves
Jam
Crystallized
fruit
Crystallized
peel
Canned cakes 
Canned fruit
2132
Canned and 
Preserved 
Vegetable 
Products
2184
Food
Products, 
not else­
where 
classified
Quick 
frozen, 
dehydrated 
and canned
Potato
crisps
Vegetables
Soup
Sauces
Pickles
Baby foods
Mixed meat, 
vegetable 
and cereal 
products
2191 2194
Soft Drinks, Wine and
Cordials and 
Syrups
Brandy
Aerated
Carbonated
Cordials
Syrups
Non-alcoholic
Cider
cider
Figure 1.1 Structure of the fruit and vegetable 
processing industry (Source: CBCS 
1973:146-148, 155-158)
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Financial turnover, however, shows quite a different 
situation. Victorian firms had a larger turnover than those 
in New South Wales, 53 per cent of the total compared with 
22 per cent. Of the other states only Queensland had a 
greater percentage turnover than indicated by its percentage 
share of establishments. We gain little understanding of 
location processes from this official information.
TABLE 1.1: POPULATION, LOCATION OF
ESTABLISHMENTS AND FINANCIAL TURNOVER
Percentage
NSW Vic. Qld SA WA Tas. ACT & NT
Population 36 28 14 9 8 3 2
ASIC Group 213 
Number of 
establishments
28 33 7 11 10 11 -
Turnover 22 53 11 6 1 7 -
Source: Ruthven, 1975; ABS, 1975a.
Another element of the industry's structure is its degree 
of concentration. In 1972-73 the top twenty firms (or 
14 per cent of enterprises) controlled 81 per cent of turnover 
and employed 78 per cent of the workforce (Table 1.2). This 
high degree of concentration within the processing industry 
is exceeded by only ten other industry groups in all Australian 
manufacturing (ABS, 1976). Again, this information provides 
little notion about the history of such concentration.
14
TABLE 1.2: CONTROL EXERCISED BY THE TOP TWENTY ENTERPRISES
Turnover Employment Establishments
per cent per cent per cent number
ASIC Group 213: 
Fruit and 
Vegetable 
Processors
1968-69 83 78 33 59
1972-73 81 78 31 58
ASIC Sub­
division 21: 
Food and 
Beverage 
Industries
1968-69 33 31 6 321
1972-73 35 34 8 337
Note: ASIC Australian Standard Industrial Classification:
CBCS: 1973.
Source: Ruthven, 1975; ABS, 1976.
Because of shortcomings in the ABS data, no attempt is 
made to explain industry structure within the Bureau of 
Statistics' framework. An enterprise processing both fruit 
and vegetables at a single location with an annual turnover 
from each class exceeding $1.8 million is counted as two 
establishments. It is possible, therefore, for one multi­
product factory to be counted in each of the five ASIC 
classes shown in Figure 1.1 (ABS, 1975b:l; ABS, pers. com.). 
For these, and other reasons, a field survey of the industry
was undertaken.
15
THE FIELD SURVEY
The list of processors was derived from Brotherson 
(1967), Isaacson (1973) and assorted press and radio reports. 
Forty firms were contacted and thirty-one indicated interest 
in co-operating in the survey. Preliminary field investiga­
tions were undertaken in 1975. Four firms were excluded from 
further analysis; one had been taken over, two had ceased 
processing activity and the fourth principally whole­
saled fresh produce. Interest centres on explaining the 
collective spatial structure of the twenty-seven firms listed 
in Table 1.3 in terms of the industry's history, the location 
of buyers and sellers and in the basic conditions of supply 
and demand.
History of the industry
The location of the twenty-seven firms in 1975 shown 
in Figure 1.2 highlights the rural-metropolitan dichotomy.
This stems from the early location of orchards. At the 
beginning of this century Australian horticulture was located 
close to the coastal cities —  the principal centres of 
demand. Processing developed originally to use surplus 
fresh fruit. Jam, the principal product, was a staple in 
the Australian diet and provided a constant demand.
Processors had a choice of two locations: at the source of
raw material ten to twenty miles from the city centre, or
16
TABLE 1.3: FIRMS PARTICIPATING IN THE FIELD SURVEY
Processor Head office location
Country of 
ownership
1 Golden Circle Cannery Brisbane Australia
2 R.M. Gow Pty Ltd Brisbane Australia
3 Cottees General Foods Ltd Sydney United States
4 Pick-Me-Up Food Products Pty Ltd_ Sydney Australia
5 P. Methven and Sons Pty Ltd St Marys Australia
6 The Nestle Company (Australia) Ltd Sydney Switzerland
7 Cerebos (Australia) Ltd Sydney United Kingdom
8 Edgell Division of Petersville Sydney Australia
9 Bulmer Australia Limited Campbelltown United Kingdom
10 Masterfoods of Australia Pty Ltd Sydney United Kingdom
11 Letona Co-operative Limited Grif fith Australia
12 Jusfrute Limited Sydney Australia
13 Mountain Maid Foods Co-operative Ltd Batlow Australia
14 Henry Jones (IXL) Limited Melbourne Australia
15 Rosella Foods Pty Ltd Melbourne United Kingdom
16 H.J. Heinz Company Australia Ltd Dandenong United States
17 Kraft Holdings Limited Melbourne United States
18 Wattie-Pict Limited Melbourne United Kingdom/ New Zealand
19 Unigate Australia Pty Ltd Dandenong United Kingdom
20 Westernport Canneries Pty Ltd Tyabb Australia
21 SPC Limited Shepparton Australia
22 Campbell's Soups (Aust.) Pty Ltd Shepparton United States
23 Kyabram Preserving Co. Ltd Shepparton Australia
24 Ardmona Fruit Products Co-operative Co. Ltd Shepparton Australia
25 Derri Fruit Juices Co-operative Ltd Berri Australia
26 Riverland Fruit Products Co-operative Co. Ltd Berri Australia
27 Clements and Marshall Pty Ltd Launceston Australia
Note: Methven ceased operations in mid-1976.
17
kilometres
GOLDEN
CIRCLE
EDGELL 
HENRY JONES
COTTEES G F 
WATTIE-PICT 
JUSFRUTE
WATTIE-PICT O
NSW.
LETONADERRI JUSFRUTE
COTTEES G F
ROSELLA
METHVEN
EDGELLJUSFRUTECOTTEESRIVERLAND1
EDGELLKYABRAI BULMERKYABRAM
IOUNTAIN 
I MAID/-H
P M U 
CEREBOSROSELLA
CAMPBELL
ROSELLA MASTERFOODS'ARDMONA
UNIGATE \
-  KRAFTCO
,^ -N N E S T L E --------- '
7  W  WESTERN PORT
WATTIE-PICT
HENRY JONES COTTEES G.F. 
WATTIE-PICT 
ROSELLA
H J HEINZ 2 000 tonnes 
6 0002 001
EDGELL
6 001 -  10 000
WATTIE-PICTHENRY
JONES 10 001 -  20 000
20 001 -  40 000
HENRY
JONES 40 001 -6 0  000CLEMENTS & 
MARSHALL
60 001 -100  000
Figure 1.2 Location and annual requirements of fruit
and vegetables for twenty-seven processors, 
1975 (Source: Fieldwork, 1975)
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close to the source of labour, now the inner city suburbs. 
Several firms still manufacture on the original site at 
either location.
In the 1920s the development of government financed 
soldier-settlement schemes in the inland irrigation areas of 
New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia changed the 
emphasis in location of raw material sources. When supply 
outstripped demand, grower organizations agitated for 
governments to finance co-operative canneries and develop 
export markets. In 1914 the New South Wales Government had 
pioneered the move by financing a factory at Leeton to can 
the then small local output (Brotherson, 1967:12). By 1922 
the nearby Griffith Co-operative was in operation together 
with the Shepparton Preserving Company and Ardmona and 
Kyabram Co-operatives in the Goulburn Valley. The irrigation 
areas quickly became the principal sources of supply for 
fruit. Thus the rural-metropolitan dichotomy had been 
firmly established by the early 1920s —  the main determinants 
being location of orchards and sources of labour (Fig. 1.3).
As domestic demand could not absorb the excess fruit, 
new markets were sought in Europe. Export operations were 
barely successful, despite the price advantage from tariff 
preference in the United Kingdom and Commonwealth Government 
financial support.
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HENRY
JONES EDGELL
BRISBANE ■
N S W
SYDNEY
P M U
HENRY 
JONES •
MELBOURNE
HENRY l, 
JONESHENRY
JONES*/
Figure 1.3 The 1920 location of firms operating in 1975 
(Source: Fieldwork, 1975)
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The Second World War gave the industry a considerable 
boost. Farmers on the Tasmanian north coast were encouraged 
to grow vegetables for three Commonwealth-owned canning and 
dehydration plants built at Smithton, Ulverstone and 
Scottsdale (Farrer, 1972:126). In New South Wales the Batlow 
Packing House built a vegetable processing operation under 
government supervision while the Edgell family business, 
founded at Bathurst in 1926, expanded (Fig. 1.4).
Changes since 1945 were reflected in the increasing size 
of processing companies and in the number of companies.
After 1945 Edgell penetrated interstate markets, and the 
Batlow Packing House -- renamed Mountain Maid -- built up a 
successful export business. Processing of both fruit and 
vegetable products switched from dehydration to canning.
In 1947 a significant development occurred in Brisbane.
The Golden Circle Cannery -- a co-operative -- began operating 
as a result of grower resentment against established pineapple 
processors. This resentment stemmed from wide fluctuations 
in the demand for processing pineapples. When Golden Circle 
opened, the State Canneries Board in Queensland introduced 
a manufacturing quota giving the co-operative the major 
portion. With this control of supply consolidated by 
aggressive marketing, Golden Circle now operates as a monopolist.
The post-war period also saw the growth in size of 
companies from mergers. Figures compiled by Bushnell (1961:123)
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suggest that between 1946 and 1956 food processors accounted 
for 8 per cent of all mergers in secondary industry. In the 
following three-year period (1956-59), the food industry 
accounted for 22 per cent of all mergers in secondary industry 
(Bushnell, 1961:193).
The location of the industry, 1975
The 1975 location pattern in Figure 1.5 reflects, in 
part, the pattern of ownership among the twenty-seven 
companies. These may be classified as co-operatives, private 
firms, Australian public and foreign public firms specifically 
shown in Figure 1.6. More foreign-owned firms have recently 
located themselves in Melbourne than Sydney. Melbourne has 
such locational advantages as proximity to the principal 
growing areas, cheap industrial water supply and waste 
disposal, and until recently, attractive rates and taxes.
The older Australian-owned corporations exhibit a different 
pattern; nine of their seventeen factories have been located 
close to the supply of raw materials. With only three 
private firms, no pattern exists. Finally, the co-operatives 
by the nature of their ownership are principally located at 
the source of the raw material.
The pattern of firms in 1975 shows little change from 
that in 1945. Growth in demand has occured within the 
existing population centres and the sources of supply have
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suggest that between 1946 and 1956 food processors accounted 
for 8 per cent of all mergers in secondary industry. In the 
following three-year period (1956-59), the food industry 
accounted for 22 per cent of all mergers in secondary industry 
(Bushnell, 1961:193).
The location of the industry, 1975
The 1975 location pattern in Figure 1.5 reflects, in 
part, the pattern of ownership among the twenty-seven 
companies. These may be classified as co-operatives, private 
firms, Australian public and foreign public firms specifically 
shown in Figure 1.6. More foreign-owned firms have recently 
located themselves in Melbourne than Sydney. Melbourne has 
such locational advantages as proximity to the principal 
growing areas, cheap industrial water supply and waste 
disposal, and until recently, attractive rates and taxes.
The older Australian-owned corporations exhibit a different 
pattern; nine of their seventeen factories have been located 
close to the supply of raw materials. With only three 
private firms, no pattern exists. Finally, the co-operatives 
by the nature of their ownership are principally located at 
the source of the raw material.
The pattern of firms in 1975 shows little change from 
that in 1945. Growth in demand has occured within the 
existing population centres and the sources of supply have
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remained unaltered. Apart from the three irrigation areas 
in Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia other 
principal fruit-growing regions are the Queensland coastal 
strip from Brisbane to Cairns and Tasmania's Huon Valley. 
Vegetables for processing are grown in Southern Queensland, 
Victoria's Gippsland and Northern Tasmania. Collectively, 
these areas provide the bulk of fruit and vegetables in 
Australia of which the industry processes 40 per cent 
(Table 1.4).
The relatively static pattern of the industry contrasts 
with the changing location and concentration amongst buyers 
of the industry's products. Exports fell following the 
United Kingdom's entry into the European Economic Community.
This loss of preferential tariff left Australia's products 
facing international price competition which created new 
marketing problems for the industry's fruit canners. Within 
Australia the number of food wholesalers and retailers has 
diminished. In New South Wales for example, the food market 
consists of eight wholesaler-retailers based in Sydney with 
some regional support facilities, and a similar situation exists 
in other states^. Independent country retailers find that prices
The eight New South Wales wholesaler-retailers are 
Woolworths Limited, G.J. Coles Pty. Ltd, Davids Holdings, 
Franklin's Stores, Jewel Food Stores Pty. Ltd., Permewan 
Wright Ltd., A.G. Campbell Pty. Ltd. and Australian Safeway 
Stores Pty. Ltd.
TABLE 1.4: VARIETIES AND VOLUMES OF PROCESSING
FRUIT AND VEGETABLES 
(Ranked by tonnes of processed product)
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Variety
Tonnes
harvested
1971-72
Tonnes k) 
accepted for 
processing 
1971-72
Proportion 
of variety 
processed 
per cent
Tonnes a 
of
product
Rank
Grapes 813 300 790 000 97.1 310 327 1
Peaches 117 240 105 114 89.7 97 679 2
Pears 180 520 80 000 44.3 80 000 3
Tomatoes 186 176 n. a . - 71 680 4
Pineapples 124 000 105 000 84.7 62 800 5
Green Peas 116 478 n . a . - 51 600 6
Apples 360 000 89 000 24.7 51 000 7
Oranges c)Potatoes
291 000 65 232 22.4 36 000 8
783 800 94 200 12.0 35 235 9
Beetroot 23 000 23 000 100.0 29 000 10
Apricots 37 040 33 928 91.6 28 142 11
Green Beans 37 500 n . a . - 24 700 12
Navy Beans n a . n . a . - 21 050 13
Sweet Corn 22 210 n . a . - 17 170 14
Carrots 87 800 n . a . - 12 900 15
Lemons 30 170 15 530 51.5 6 700 16
Split Peas n . a . n . a . - 5 570 17
Mushrooms n . a . n . a . - 5 550 18
Asparagus 6 600 6 600 100.0 5 130 19
Cucumber 13 580 n . a . - 3 510 20
Grapefruit 16 100 6 900 42.9 2 800 21
Cabbage 82 060 n . a . - 2 680 22
Onions 98 770 n . a . - 2 230 23
Cauliflower 77 345 n . a . - 2 000 24
Total 3 504 689 1 414 504 >40.0 965 453
Note'. Tonnes of potatoes accepted and processed excludes 
canned product.
Sources: a) BAE,1973
b) ABS,1972a
c) BAE,1973 ABS,1972b
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offered by these intermediaries reflect enticing buyer 
economies. Such wholesaler-retailer concentration was 
encouraged by processors, for they were able to reduce the 
cost of distribution and marketing services. Gains in dis­
tribution efficiency have, however, been offset by decreasing 
independence and it is common for a single buyer to purchase 
regularly up to 20 per cent of a manufacturer's output. Sales 
for the twenty-seven processors are listed in Table 1.5, 
together with state population proportions and the state 
distribution of establishments operated by processors. Unlike 
factory locations, product demand is more evenly distributed 
in proportion to population.
TABLE 1.5: PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION FOR TWENTY-SEVEN PROCESSORS
Sales 
per cent
Population 
per cent
Establishments 
per cent
Exports 17.3 - -
New South Wales 32.4 38 a) 28
Victoria 27.6 28 35
Queensland 11.2 14 14
South Australia 4.8 9 7
Western Australia 4.8 8 -
Tasmania 1.9 3 16
Note: a) Includes A.C.T.
Source: Fieldwork, 1975; ABS,1975a.
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RESUME
Although conventional locational factors described in 
this chapter have helped explain the existing pattern of 
location, location per se adds little knowledge to our 
understanding of corporate decision-making, logistics and 
response to uncertainty. An examination of the industry's 
economic structure will help to illuminate some of the 
fundamental causes of the uncertainties it must face.
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CHAPTER TWO
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE OF A DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRY
Our understanding of the fruit and vegetable processing 
industry's organization is furthered by analysing components 
of market structure,as featured in Scherer's model of 
industrial organization (Fig. 0.3). The key components of 
market structure and in turn, performance and conduct, are 
ownership and inter-firm linkages, barriers to entry, manu­
facturing cost structure, vertical integration and conglomer­
ateness. These components are examined in this chapter and 
the relationships between them and corporate decision-making 
are considered in subsequent chapters.
Ownership and inter-firm linkages
There is a wide range of ownership among the twenty- 
seven processors. Eight are co-operatives principally 
owned by local growers. Only three firms are privately-owned. 
Of the remainder, six are Australian-owned public companies 
with operations extending in size from the small apple­
processing factory of Clements and Marshall, to Edgells, a 
multi-factory firm with a wide ranging involvement in the 
food industries. Ten firms are predominantly foreign-owned 
and, with the exception of Bulmer, are the Australian branches 
of trans-national corporations.
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The inter-firm linkages between the twenty-seven 
enterprises are complex and in no way inhibited by the 
form of ownership. These linkages are shown in Figure 2.1. 
Co-operatives are connected with public companies (Kyabram- 
Henry Jones) and Australian public companies with foreign- 
owned companies (Henry Jones-Cottees General Foods).
Linkages also occur among foreign-owned firms (New Zealand's 
James Wattie-Amatil's Piet) and among co-operatives 
(Riverland-Ardmona-SPC). Such linkages are more often 
forced upon the participants in an effort to fend off 
bankruptcy rather than from any perception of greater profit 
opportunities. They mark an important move towards further 
concentration within the industry.
BARRIERS TO ENTRY
Concentration is encouraged by barriers to the entry 
of new firms. Four types of barriers are discernible.
These are distance, product differentiation, economies of 
scale and absolute cost barriers.
Distance as a barrier
The susceptibility of fruit and vegetables to damage 
if carried long distances restricts entry into the industry. 
For example, in deciduous fruit canning the manufacturing 
and distribution disadvantages from rural locations are
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Figure 2.1 Corporate linkages within the fruit and
vegetable processing industry (Source: Company
reports and fieldwork, 1975)
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partially compensated for by better quality fruit giving 
higher rates of recovery. Letona estimate that there is 
a cumulative 0.8 per cent loss of fruit for every thirty 
kilometres travelled under optimum conditions (Letona,
1975:pers.com.). Any processor expanding into deciduous 
fruit canning -- for whatever reason -- must either process 
inferior fruit or locate a facility close to the source of 
supply. What has recently happened is that several firms 
have closed their metropolitan fruit canning operations and 
contracted with co-operatives to package with their own 
label. Hence distance has encouraged withdrawal from the 
industry.
Distance also restricts the entry of new firms where 
existing firms have established a strong local image. For 
instance, Gold Crest, Fountain and White Crow tomato sauces 
each have healthy markets in Queensland, New South Wales 
and Victoria respectively. Recently a combination of 
retailing power and economies of scale affected some cost 
components and helped demolish this provincial barrier to 
the marketing of national brands.
Product differentiation as a barrier
Product differentiation is prominent in the industry 
as indicated in Table 2.1. While its effect as a barrier 
to entry is quantitatively untested it probably acts as a
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TABLE 2.1: FIRMS PARTICIPATING IN THE PROCESSING INDUSTRY, 1975
A u s t r a l i a n
S U B - D I V I S I O N
S t a n d a r d  I n d u s t r y  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
2 1
F o o d  a n d  B e v e r a g e s
1
G R O U P 2 1 3 2 i 9
C L A S S 2 1 3 1 2 1 3 2 2 1 9 1 2 1 9 4
F i r m
C a n n e d  a n d  
P r e s e r v e d  
F r u i t  P r o d u c t s
C a n n e d  a n d  
P r e s e r v e d  
V e g e t a b l e  
P r o d u c t s
S o f t  D r i n k s ,  
C o r d i a l s  a n d  
S y r u p s
W i n e  a n d  
C i d e r
G o l d e n  C i r c l e X X X
R . M .  G o w X X
C o t t e e s  G . F . X X X
P i c k - M e - U p  F o o d s X
M e t h v e n  a n d  S o n s X X
N e s t l e X
C e r e b o s X
E d g e l l X X
B u l m e r  A u s t r a l i a X X
M a s t e r f o o d s X
L e t o n a X X
J u s f r u t e X
M o u n t a i n  M a i d X X X
H e n r y  J o n e s  (IXL) X X X
R o s e l l a  F o o d s X X
H . J .  H e i n z X X X
K r a f t X
W a t t i e - P i c t X
U n i g a t e X
W e s t e r n p o r t X
S P G X X
C a m p b e l l 's X X
K y a b r a m X X
A r d m o n a X X
B e r r i X X
R i v e r l a n d X
C l e m e n t s  a n d  
M a r s h a l l
X
Source: Fieldwork, 1975
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deterrent to new firms. Most canners market premium and 
second quality products; an efficient practice because both 
processor and consumer gain from greater choice of quality 
and price. For example, Mountain Maid promote small 
quantities of special peaches while Edgell market three 
distinct brands of vegetables. Heinz manufacture a ketchup 
made to the parent company's recipe and also produce a 
tomato sauce considered more to the taste of the Australian 
consumer. Both Wattie-Pict and Cottees General Foods 
package several brands of frozen vegetables. This practice 
is extended by processors packaging 'own brand' products 
for retailers.
As a marketing strategy, product differentiation is 
an effective method of maintaining a share of supermarket 
shelf space. When a processor aggressively promotes several 
brands of the same product competing brands will often be 
allocated less space and hence have less visual attraction 
accompanied by a fall in sales (P.A. Management Consultants, 
1970). A brand will only be maintained within a retailer's 
range if it returns a profit on space used; so that brand 
differentiation squeezes can cause product deletions.
Economies of scale as a barrier
Economies of scale represent the potential reduction 
in average unit costs. These are associated with higher 
levels of productive capacity and probably deter new entrants.
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This observation cannot be confirmed because, unlike the 
British evaluations of manufacturing industry (Pratten,
1971) and retailing (Tucker, 1975), economies of scale have 
yet to be studied in the Australian processing industry. 
Economies of scale in the primary producer sector are 
suggested by tomato growers extending areas under cultivation 
to make use of chemical ripening and mechanical harvesting 
facilities offered by several large processors. The cultiva­
tion of small plots continues with the total cost of 
production rarely being established (BAE, 1971).. Large 
tomato processors —  Heinz, Edgell, Rosella and Campbell's -- 
have encouraged the increased size of growing areas. With 
mechanization they can contain their unit costs and control 
fruit quality. But this increase in scale acts as a barrier 
to smaller processors,, for they must continue buying at a cost 
disadvantage from the remaining small scale growers or pur­
chasing part-processed material from the large processors.
Absolute cost barriers
Availability of capital is a significant barrier.
Rising labour costs, and, more recently, the acute shortage 
of workers, have altered attitudes to traditional processing 
methods. Firms are seeking ways of lessening their 
dependence on semi-skilled labour, as well as taking 
advantage of new technology. In an industry where the 
slightest paring of costs can significantly influence
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profits the supply of capital becomes vital. For example, 
Edgell have considered changing from canning to quick 
freezing vegetables. Frozen vegetables have a lower 
production cost but this is negated by capital required for 
new storage and distribution facilities and the cost of 
energy to store frozen materials. Such changes require 
the replacement of canning lines, conventional warehouses, 
fork-lift trucks and vehicles by new packaging and 
freezing plant and materials-handling equipment. A shortage 
of capital has inhibited Edgell from gaining any. perceived 
advantage (Fieldwork interviews, 1975). Its initiatives 
have been countered by the merger of the frozen food 
divisions of Cottees General Foods and Henry Jones (IXL).
In the case of co-operative fruit canners capital 
grants and guarantees from the Commonwealth Government has 
encouraged serious over-capitalization. There are now too 
many co-operative canners,which acts as a barrier to the 
entry of any smaller, more efficient processors. Existing 
plant has an annual processing capacity of 200 000 tonnes 
of fresh fruit while current demand is for less than half 
this amount. Expansion had been gradual in a period of 
steadily rising demand in a protected market, but this 
protection was removed when the United Kingdom entered the 
European Economic Community. Respective Commonwealth and 
State Governments now provide financial support to enable 
growers to withdraw from the industry and processors to
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rationalize production capacity. This excess capacity is 
evidence of a peak load pricing problem; product prices 
have been held too high combined with a lack of alternative 
products enabling marginal costs to equal fixed costs.
OTHER COMPONENTS OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
In addition to barriers to entry, there are three 
other economic measures which increase our understanding 
of the industry. These are manufacturing cost structure, 
vertical integration and conglomerateness.
Industry manufacturing cost structure
Manufacturing costs for the industry were difficult 
to obtain. Different accounting methods meant that some 
firms could not arrange their data in the desired groupings 
of packaging, freight, production, wages, administration/ 
and raw material costs. Mean costs for twenty-two pro­
cessors are shown in Table 2.2 and they highlight an 
interesting paradox. All processors consistently believe 
that control of labour costs will most benefit the industry. 
Yet the largest cost component, at 33 per cent, is raw 
materials which includes ingredients such as sugar, salt 
and spices. The next highest is packaging, accounting for 
20 per cent of costs and includes advertising when this
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information was made available. Cost minimization in these 
two items offers incremental benefits greater than a simple, 
yet expensive, replacement of workers by machines. It 
would be more useful for processors to look to the problems 
contributing to shortages of semi-skilled seasonal workers 
rather than to simplistically and ritually blame rising wages.
TABLE 2.2: INDUSTRY MANUFACTURING COSTS
Packaging
Per cent 
19.9
Freight 7.5
Production 15.5
Labour 12.9
Administration 10.8
Raw materials 33.4
Total 100.0
Source: Fieldwork, 1975.
Freight, the lowest cost component at 7.5 per cent is 
not an accurate estimate of all movements. Many raw material 
prices include freight into the processing factory so that 
precise freight costs cannot be readily derived. This 
7.5 per cent is more a measure of the cost of warehousing 
and distributing the final products. Ruthven (1975) has 
estimated that all freight on raw and finished materials, 
all stock movements and related storage, interest and labour 
costs, comprise up to 28 per cent of total manufacturing
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costs. The low estimate supplied by the industry may 
reflect the lack of interest shown by management in the 
logistics and costs of physical procurement and final 
distribution.
Vertical integration
Vertical integration is practiced to control both 
costs and the quality of service by expanding into a supply 
or customer industry. It is an important part of an 
industry's structure but often difficult to identify and 
measure. To date, there is not a lot of evidence on the 
amount of corporate vertical integration but Gort (1962) 
and Marris and Wood (1971:428-453) delve into these aspects 
of manufacturing industries in the U.S.A. The practice 
may take two forms: backward integration into the pro­
duction of raw materials and semi-fabricated inputs, or 
forward integration into marketing, distribution, whole­
saling or retailing.
Vertical integration is important in the fruit and 
vegetable processing industry. Edgell Division of Petersville 
and Mountain Maid have considerable growing resources but 
these are from the raw material production origins of both 
firms. The fledgling Edgell operation integrated forward 
from vegetable growing into processing and the company's 
current status is shown in Figure 2.2. Other examples are
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the part-production of packaging requirements by Golden 
Circle, Letona, Kyabram and SPC. All have can-making 
plant integrated into their production lines while 
R.M. Gow manufactures plastic bottles.
An example of partial forward integration is the SPC- 
Ardmona-Riverland marketing link; a move forced upon the 
first two firms by low demand for deciduous canned fruit.
One firm exhibiting both forward and backward integration is 
Henry Jones (IXL) (see Fig. 2.3). Early in the company's 
history, can-making, printing, carton-making and, timber 
milling were carried out. In a recent rationalization pro­
gramme, Henry Jones moved much of its Sydney factory to the 
Kyabram Co-operative in Victoria and Kyabram is now its 
principal mainland processing plant. This integration has 
allowed Henry Jones to market a more complete range of products.
Conglomerateness
Conglomerateness —  or diversification -- can take two 
forms: broad spectrum between a processor and a different 
industry, and narrow spectrum where a firm expands into 
allied industries.^ Henry Jones (IXL) is an example of
1 Marris and Wood (1971:429) in their review of empirical 
studies of conglomerateness use the following definitions 
for narrow and broad spectrum diversification:
Narrow spectrum diversification is defined as expansion, 
other than vertical, outside a four digit industry 
but within a two digit industry; and
Broad spectrum diversification is, other than vertical, 
expansion into a different two digit industry.
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broad spectrum diversification. After the firm's 1973 
restructuring it gained control of Tom Piper, a manufacturer 
of fruit-based cordials and prepared foods, in addition to 
forging the links with the Kyabram Co-operative. The latest 
association is General Jones, a company equally owned by 
Henry Jones and Cottees General Foods. As a result 
Henry Jones is now a widely diversified corporation although 
it still has 85 per cent of its sales in one ASIC group,
Canned and Preserved Fruit and Vegetable Products. The 
remainder of Henry Jones sales revenue, as shown -in Figure 2.3, 
comes from a broad spectrum of diverse interests ranging 
from shipping and stevadoring to orcharding. While this fits 
Marris and Wood's (1971) definition of broad spectrum diversifi­
cation, the expansion is integrated vertically into both 
supply and customer services.
Another instance of broad spectrum diversification is 
provided by Petersville Australia, the conglomerate owner 
of Edgell. But in this example the breadth of the spectrum 
is more definitional than actual and serves to demonstrate 
the complexity of the processing industry. Petersville's 
corporate links are shown in Figure 2.4 and with the 
exception of Gourlay Cabinets Pty. Ltd. and Socomin Pty.
Ltd., the other divisions remain within one ASIC sub-division.
Such complexity is compounded when we look at all 
twenty-seven participating processors in Figure 2.5.
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Nine processors, or their conglomerate owners, are operating 
in a broad spectrum environment, and nine others have 
diversified within the narrow spectrum of the food and 
beverage industries. The remaining nine firms have not 
diversified outside the ASIC definition of the processing 
industry.
RESUME
The economic and spatial features of the firms 
comprising the Australian fruit and vegetable processing 
industry are so diverse that the title 'industry' is 
simply an umbrella offering definitional convenience. 
Indeed, the firms appear so complex and diverse that it 
is necessary to apply a grouping procedure before analysing 
their conduct and performance.
CHAPTER THREE
THE ORDERING OF A DIVERSE INDUSTRY
The spatial and economic structure of the twenty-seven 
firms comprising the Australian fruit and vegetable 
processing industry is complex and diverse. Their apparent 
disparate nature provides an unsatisfactory foundation for 
discussing either the conduct and performance of the 
industry as a whole or of individual firms. This problem 
is overcome by subjecting the twenty-seven firms (represented 
by variables reflecting location, flows, manufacturing size, 
product differentiation and corporate structure) to a 
computer-based grouping technique. The resultant groups 
provide a base for discussing the performance of sets of 
firms before looking at their conduct under conditions of 
uncertainty in Part II.
CLASSIFYING DISPARATE FIRMS
As it is difficult to group manually twenty-seven 
firms described by the thirty-nine attributes in Table 3.1, 
a decision was made to use computer-based classification 
techniques. These grouping techniques were developed by 
the CSIRO Division of Computing Research and used by 
Fisher et al. (1967), Rimmer (1969, 1972) and Wadley (1974).
The battery of techniques included:
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TABLE 3.1: MULTBET INPUT FOR CLASSIFYING TWENTY-SEVEN 
FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PROCESSORS
Type V a r i a b l e M easu re  and P o s s i b l e  S t a t e s R e p r e s e n t i n g
Qual i t a 1 1ve
1. O r i g i n  o f  c a p i t a l  f u n d s
2 .  Government  f i n a n c e
3.  Growing l a n d  owned
4 .  Gove rnm ent f r e i g h t  r e b a t e s
5.  Excha ng e  p r o d u c t s  w i t h  o t h e r  p r o c e s s o r s
6.  F a c t o r y  l o c a t i o n s :  r u r a l / m e t r o p o l i t a n
B i n a r y
C o r p o r a t e  s t r u c t u r e
M a n u f a c t u r i n g  s i z e  
C o r p o r a t e  s t r u c t u r e
L o c a t i o n  and  f lo w
Q u a n t i t a t l v e
7 .  O p e r a t i n g  f a c t o r i e s
8 .  P r o d u c in g  in  number o f  A u s t r a l i a n  s t a t e s
9 .  F a c t o r i e s  c l o s e d
10. Raw m a t e r i a l  i n p u t ,  1974
11. P r o p o r t i o n a l  i n v o lv e m e n t  i n  p r o c e s s i n g  i n d u s t r y
12. Employe es
13. P r o d u c t i o n  o u t p u t ,  1974
14. P r o d u c t  i n v e n t o r y  a t  f a c t o r y
15. E x p o r t s :  f r u i t  p r o d u c t s
16. E x p o r t s :  v e g e t a b l e  p r o d u c t s
17. D i s t r i b u t i o n  c e n t r e s  owned
18. D i s t r i b u t i o n  c e n t r e s  o p e r a t e d
19. P r o p o r t i o n  o f  d i r e c t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  from f a c t o r y
to  c u s to m e r
20 . C o s t s  p a c k a g i n g
21 . " f r e i g i l t
22 .  " p r o d u c t i o n
2 3 .  " wages
2 4 .  " a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
25 . " raw m a t e r i a l s
26 . S a l e s  New S o u th  Wales
27 " Q u e e n s la n d
28 . " V i c t o r i a
29 . " S o u th  A u s t r a l i a
30. " W e ste rn  A u s t r a l i a
31. " Tasmania
32 . " N o r t h e r n  T e r r i t o r y
N u m er ica l
M a n u f a c t u r i n g  s i z e  
L o c a t i o n  and  f lo w  
M a n u f a c t u r i n g  s i z e
P r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
M a n u f a c t u r i n g  s i z e
L o c a t i o n  and  f lo w
C o r p o r a t e  s t r u c t u r e  
L o c a t i o n  and f lo w
D i s o r d e r e d  
m u l t i - s t a t e
33 . Type o f  f i r m
34 . C o u n t r y  o f  o w n e r s h ip
35 . C o n t r o l
36. Raw m a t e r i a l  o r i g i n s
37. P r o d u c t  r a n g e
C o - o p / p u b l 1 c / p r i v a t e  
A u s t /U S A /U K /S w i tz e r l a n d /N Z
A u s t r a l i a n / i m p o r t e d  
Canned f r u i t / c a n n e d  v e g / f r o z e n  
v e g / j a m / j u i c e / s a u c e / s o u p /  
d e h y d r a t e d  veg
C o r p o r a t e  s t r u c t u r e
L o c a t i o n  and  f lo w  
P r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
O r d e r e d  
m u l t i - s t a t e
38 . S e a s o n a l  f l u c t u a t i o n s
39 . C o n t r o l  o f  m a r k e t i n g
N o / s l i g h t / m o d e r a t e / s e v e r e  
N o / p a r t i a l / y e s
P r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
L o c a t i o n  and  f lo w
S o u r c e Fieldwork, 1975
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i) MULTBET - an agglomerative-polythetic procedure 
which measures the degree of similarity between 
every pair of firms and generates a hierarchy 
of fusions from which groups of firms can be 
synthesized;
ii) GROUPER - a diagnostic program which dissects 
the relationships between the groups, and 
states for each comparison the attribute means 
and the contribution of the similarity measure 
used; and
iii) GOWER - a principal components analysis.
Attention here is focused upon discussing the results of the 
classification and further details of the attributes and 
techniques are given in Appendix One.
Interest is centred on the hierarchy computed by 
MULTBET which can be conveniently summarized in the 
dendogram shown in Figure 3.1. The fusion process begins 
with link number twenty-eight and by the fifty-third link 
the twenty-seven firms are connected in ascending order of 
lessening similarity. We can see at fusion twenty-eight 
that Riverland and Ardmona are the two most similar firms; 
a remarkable result, for these two firms have strongly 
related features which are not evident in the data.
Fisher et al. (1967) reported a similar result when
classifying the Australian chemical industry. By fusion 
fifty-three, four distinct groups are evident and have been 
delineated in Figure 3.1 by divisions within the dendogram 
and given nominal initials of convenience, A to D.
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GOWER
An important counterpoint to the discrete grouping 
is performed by GOWER which displays firms in a continuum. 
These results emphasize the heterogenous nature of the 
firms, for the common variance explained by the first three 
eigen-vectors is only 29 per cent. Vector One, with a 
variance of 13 per cent, differentiates between ownership 
and diversification. The second vector explains a further 
9 per cent of variance and delineates between small and 
large firms. As the third vector, accounting for only 
7 per cent of the variance, is not obviously interpretable, 
consideration of further vectors is not pursued.
The loadings on Vectors One and Two have been plotted 
in Figure 3.2. Each firm is symbolized by its group identity 
and size, defined here as tonnes input in 1974. A clear 
clustering of firms is apparent with Group A, a relatively 
tight arrangement in the first quadrant. Group B firms 
present a somewhat looser arrangement in the second quadrant. 
The remaining two groups are not so neatly distributed but 
a pattern is apparent in the third and fourth quadrants.
These findings support the classification results and when 
we examine the MULTBET and GROUPER computations the value 
of classifying seemingly diverse observations is apparent.
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Small Seasonal Problems Large
Vector One
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9  WESTERN PORT
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□
Figure 3.2 Component loadings on eigen-vectors one and 
two (Source: GOWER analysis of MULTBET
similarity matrix )
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MULTBET and GROUPER
More information is gleaned from the nature of the 
discrete groups provided by MULTBET especially as GROUPER 
provides a convenient basis for discussing group 
differences. The GROUPER values, shown in Table 3.2, are 
the attribute means for each of the four groups of firms.
In describing each group, attention is focused upon the 
major differences between them before examining each group 
in terms of location and flow, manufacturing size, product 
differentiation and corporate structure.
Group A - Rural Co-operatives
The six firms in this group are all rural co-operatives 
engaged solely in processing fruit and vegetables and 
largely dependent upon export sales (see Fig. 3.3). In 
this group seasonality of inputs is a serious problem, 
manufacturing concentrates heavily upon canning deciduous 
fruit. Other products simply occupy under-utilized plant: 
Mountain Maid is the exception with its emphasis upon 
processed vegetables for the domestic market. Its output 
(predominantly canned goods) is easily moved and 75 per cent 
of products are distributed direct to customers. The most 
outstanding feature of this group is that product marketing 
is very much in the hands of other processors or manu­
facturers' agents. In summary, therefore, the strong
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TABLE 3.2: GROUPER DIAGNOSIS OF
(variables listed by order of
MULTBET CLASSIFICATION 
entry into MULTBET)
Groups
Variables A B C D
Rural Diversified Minor Major
Co-operatives Conglomerates Specialists Specialists
QUALITATIVE:
1 Origin of capital Local 87% local Local 38% local
2 Government finance Significant Moderate Minor Minor
6 Factory locations All rural 75% metrop. 60% rural 75% metrop.
QUANTITATIVE:
7 Factories operating 1.3 3.9 2.6 1.0
8 Production in no. of states 1.2 2.3 2.0 1.0
9 Factories closed 0. 3 2.6 0. 4 1.0
10 Fresh fruit & veg. input 35 093t 58 6651 9 7 6 21 16 300t
11 Proportion of production in 
fruit and vegetables 100% 63 100% 59%
12 Employees 1 053 1 315 50 353
13 Total tonnes fruit & veg. • 30 452 48 575 2 276 14 830products output
14 Inventory at factory 83% 70% 54% 92%
15 Fruit products exported 35.1% 8. 3% 2.9% 2.9%
17 Distribution centres owned 0.2 4 . 3 2.2 1.5
18 " operated 2.5 5.5 5.6 3.5
19 direct from 75% 67% 56% 71%factory to customer
20 Costs: Packaging 19.5% 25. 4% 16.1% 18.6%
21 Freight 8 . 2% 10.0% 2.8% 8 . 8%
22 Production 19.2% 6.0% 10.0% 26.8%
23 Wages 11. 3% 14.2% 14 . 3% 11.9%
24 Administration 10.2% 7. 4% 11.0% 14.5%
25 Raw materials 31.6% 37.0% 45. 8% 19.4%
26 Sales: N .S.W . 25.5% 36.3% 40.5% 35.2%
27 Qld 9.9% 12.2% 7.4% 17.4%
28 Vic. 21. 4% 22. 2% 46.9% 27.1%
29 S. A. 2.5% 9.4% 1.7% 7.1%
30 W. A. 4.5% 8.1% 0 7.3%
31 Tas. 1.1% 3.5% 0.6% 3.0%
DISORDERED MULTI-STATE
33 Type of company Co-op's 87% public 40% private 75% public
34 Ownership Australian 50% foreign 80% Aust. 75% foreign
35 Control Australian 30% foreign 100% Aust. 42% foreign
36 Imports of fruit & vegs No Minor qty No Minor qty
37 Range of products Specialised Diverse Specialised Specialised
ORDERED MULTI-STATE
38 Seasonality problems Severe Moderate Slight Moderate
39 Controls own marketing 50% 100% 20% 63%
n = 6 8 5 8
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Figure 3.3 Group A -- The Rural Co-operatives 
{ N o t e : Size based upon tonnes
input, 1974 )
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group similarities are rural location, product specializa­
tion and lack of marketing facilities under their own 
control.
Group B - Diversified Conglomerates
This group consists of eight firms that are predominantly 
large public corporations located principally in metropolitan 
areas (see Fig. 3.4). Four firms have foreign ownership and 
four have more than one operating factory. Raw material 
input is the highest of the four groups. The mean of 
58 000 tonnes masks a considerable range; from 2 200 up to 
110 000 tonnes.
Processing involvement, measured from the fruit and 
vegetable products sold as a proportion of total sales, is 
also wide-ranging; from 10 per cent for Nestle to 100 per 
cent for Golden Circle with an average of 64 per cent. 
Consequently, the group's total production spans most of 
the food industries. Processing covers freezing, canning 
and dehydrating as well as manufacturing prepared foods.
The group's markets are principally in the cities of the 
Eastern States and competition is brisk; marketing tactics 
heavily emphasize packaging and product differentiation.
Golden Circle, the co-operative exception, maintains a 
market hegemony with pineapple products.
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Group C - Minor Specialists
The group of five specialist processors comprising 
Group C has a dispersed location pattern (see Fig. 3.5). 
However, group sales data (variables 26-31, Table 3.2) 
show that 87 per cent of sales are in Victoria and New 
South Wales. This two-state concentration of sales is the 
result of the group's specialized processing of fruit and 
vegetables for other processors, and retailers' 'own brand' 
merchandise. Hence group members control marketing of 
only 20 per cent of their output.
The inclusion of Wattie-Pict in this group is anomalous, 
borne out by its late entry into the fusion hierarchy 
(in Fig. 3.1) and its outlying position in the principal 
components analysis (see Fig. 3.2). Wattie-Pict's size 
and location attributes suggest that the firm should be 
classified with larger processors but its specialization in 
frozen food, plus a reluctance to divulge any information 
on activities, has led to its erroneous inclusion in 
Group C.
Group D - Major Specialists
This group is composed of a heterogeneous residual of 
eight specialists ranging from Kraft with its miniscule 
output of jam to H.J. Heinz. Factory locations are complex 
but significantly each member of the group operates on a
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single site (Fig. 3.6). The range of involvement in the 
fruit and vegetable processing industry is extreme;
1 per cent of Kraft's total sales to 100 per cent for Heinz, 
Campbell's and Berri. The latter's inclusion within the 
group presents a paradox for it is a large co-operative 
specializing in fruit juices. Berri shows up as a distinct 
outlier in the ordination results in Figure 3.2. It is 
drawn toward the cluster of Group A co-operatives but 
exhibits a strong commonality with Heinz in the MULTBET 
dendogram (see Fig. 3.1). The significance of this residual 
group and the delineation of the other three groups becomes 
apparent when we examine the GROUPER diagnosis in the light 
of location and demand flow, manufacturing size, product 
differentiation, corporate structure, and in particular, 
group performance (Table 3.2).
Location and distribution
Group differences in location and distribution between 
Rural Co-operatives, Minor Specialists, the Diversified 
Conglomerates and Major Specialists are shown in Table 3.3. 
While the rural-metropolitan dichotomy is evident, attention 
is centred on differences between group distribution 
methods. These are of critical importance in distinguishing 
between groups. Average sales expressed as a percentage 
for each group are shown in Table 3.3 (see variables 26-31) ,
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together with a percentage distribution of state 
populations which serves as a guide to sales and product 
distribution in Australia. We can see that both Diversified 
Conglomerates and Major Specialists have their principal 
markets in New South Wales and Victoria with sales propor­
tions similar to the population of these states. The Rural 
Co-operatives diverge from this pattern with a high group 
reliance upon export sales.
It is with the Minor Specialists that we see a marked 
difference from the other groups. These firms sell 87 per 
cent of their products in Victoria and New South Wales.
As indicated, this striking divergence is a result of manu­
facturing for other processors and retailers' 'own brand' 
merchandise.
Another distinction between groups is in the control 
of marketing. This ranges from only 20 per cent for the 
Minor Specialists -- a result of processing for other 
companies -- to total control for the Diversified 
Conglomerates. The Rural Co-operatives only market 50 per 
cent of their output because they rely heavily upon other 
processors and manufacturers' agents —  the result of 
paying too much attention to supply and demand. However, 
there are benefits from this attention. The supply and 
production components of manufacturing cost amount to 50.8 
per cent of the total (see Table 3.2). By concentrating
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upon containing the costs of these components, benefits 
may well compensate for less control over marketing. In 
aggregate, the Major Specialists control 63 per cent of 
their marketing activity but between firms this varies 
considerably. For example, Bulmer following traditional 
liquor distribution practice, relies heavily upon brewery 
and hotel marketing channels whereas Heinz have always 
placed heavy emphasis upon their own control of marketing. 
These marketing differences between groups are not reflected 
in distribution activities. While the Minor Specialists 
market only 20 per cent of their output they distribute 
more than 50 per cent direct from factory to customer.
In addition the Minor Specialists operate an average of 
5.6 distribution centres (see variables 17-19, Table 3.3). 
Such a paradox stems from using small distribution centres 
to supply urgent or small orders.
Manufacturing size
The Diversified Conglomerates are clearly the largest 
processors as measured by the number of operating factories, 
employees, and tonnes moving into and out of their plants 
(see variables 7, 12, 10 and 13, Table 3.4). The next 
largest group is the Rural Co-operatives followed by the 
Major Specialists and Minor Specialists. Little discussion 
of these results is necessary but where measures of pro­
ductivity and recovery have been calculated, interesting
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TABLE 3.4: GROUP DIFFERENCES IN MANUFACTURING SIZE
Variables Groups
No. Description
A
Rural Co­
operatives
B
Diversified
Conglomerates
C
Minor
Specialists
D
Major
Specialists
7 Factories
operating 1.3 3.7 2.6 1.0
9 Factories
closed 0.3 2.6 0.4 1.0
12 Employees 1 053 1 315 50 353
10 Tonnes 
fruit and 
vegetables 
input
35 093 58 665 9 762. 16 300
13 Tonnes of
product
output
30 452 48 575 2 276 14 830
n = 6 8 5 8
Tonnes of 
product per 
employee
28.9 36.9 45.5 42.0
Recovery 
(output: 
input)
0.87 0.83 0.23 0.91
Note: a) Employees and tonneage information not supplied by
Wattie-Pict in Group C - Minor Specialists.
b) Recovery for Group C - Four members 0.23
Jusfrute 0.08
Three members q ^2
excluding Jusfrute
comparisons can be made. The Minor and Major Specialists 
have the highest productivity ratios, expressed as tonnes 
produced per employee (see Table 3.4). While this is a simple
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measure of efficiency of labour to capital utilization, 
it does show distinctions between the two groups of 
Specialists and the Rural Co-operatives. The difference 
of sixteen tonnes of product per employee between the Minor 
Specialists and the Co-operatives reflects the latter 
group's heavy reliance upon labour.
The recovery ratios in Table 3.4 show that the Minor 
Specialists have a high rate of wastage. Group recovery 
ranges from 0.91 for the Major Specialists down to 0.23 
for the Minor Specialists. This is misleading. If Jusfrute 
is excluded from the Minor Specialists' recovery ratio the 
figure rises to 0.72. Jusfrute, specialist citrus juicers, 
reduce one hundred tonnes of fruit to eight tonnes of 
highly concentrated liquid, a technique offering considerable 
storage and transport benefits. The concentrate is later 
reconstituted and packaged at the points of demand giving 
large freight savings.
Product differentiation
This corporate function is measured by such variables 
as product range, manufacturing activity in fruit and 
vegetable processing and the effects of seasonal fluctuations 
of raw material input. The group results are shown in 
Table 3.5. Of the four groups of firms, only the Diversified 
Conglomerates have a wide range of products based upon
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fruit and vegetables. The other three groups manufacture 
a narrower product range. Indeed, the Rural Co-operatives 
and the Minor Specialists have all of their output within 
the fruit and vegetable sectors. The Major Specialists, 
while offering a 'specialized' range of products, have only 
60 per cent of their manufacturing capacity in fruit or 
vegetables. Consequently, this group and the Diversified 
Conglomerates have less problems with seasonal fluctuations 
of raw materials than the Rural Co-operatives. The Minor 
Specialists avoid the problem of seasonality by developing 
more flexible manufacturing operations allowing the manage­
ment rapid reaction to supply and demand pressures. However, 
seasonality is a problem for all firms. Some have lessened 
the problem by diversification and some via technological 
changes. Others have no choice but to over-capitalize on 
plant to process the large volume in a short period.
Corporate Structure
The diversity between the four groups of processors is 
reflected in the quantification of such variables as owner­
ship, source of funds, and relative cost structure (see 
Table 3.6). The only similarity between groups is the 
100 per cent Australian control of the Rural Co-operatives 
and the Minor Specialists, and the public ownership of the 
Diversified Conglomerates and the Major Specialists. In 
all other respects the groups are dissimilar. Ownership
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ranges widely from total Australian dominance, as with the 
Co-operatives, to 75 per cent foreign ownership of the 
Major Specialists. But control is generally in the hands 
of Australian executives. Capital sources have been pre­
dominantly Australian although the Major Specialists received 
42 per cent of their finance from abroad (see variable 1, 
Table 3.6). The Commonwealth Government has provided signi­
ficant support for the Co-operatives. This included loans 
from the Australian Industries Development Commission and 
the Rural Credits Department of the Reserve Bank.of 
Australia, devaluation and compensation for Australian 
dollar revaluations. Direct government financial assistance 
has been negligible for the other groups. General assistance 
to the industry has been confined to tariffs on imported 
material and there is continual lobbying by growers and 
processors to extend this assistance. State Government 
help has mainly been limited to payroll tax exemptions for 
Victorian country firms.
Inter-group comparisons of relative manufacturing 
costs in Table 3.6 show that the specialized Rural 
Co-operatives pay slightly less for their raw materials 
than all the processors, and slightly more in production 
costs. However, the Diversified Conglomerates diverge from 
the mean industry costs. Raw materials, freight and 
packaging are greater while production cost is lower -- a 
situation that may indicate the higher costs of metropolitan
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locations and marketing competition. For the Minor 
Specialists, raw materials represent almost 46 per cent of 
all costs. This is accompanied by a relative decrease in 
packaging, freight and production costs; a reflection of 
the group's reliance on a small number of customers. The 
Major Specialists have a different cost structure from the 
other groups. There is a greater outlay for actual 
production but raw materials constitute a smaller proportion 
of the total (see variables 22 and 25, Table 3.6). This 
group of firms has greater control over, and knowledge about, 
their costs than the balance of the industry.
When the difference between industry cost and the 
group mean for each cost component is examined, some 
interesting observations can be made (see Table 3.7). The 
Diversified Conglomerates put more emphasis into packaging 
and is, therefore, the only group above the mean. By com­
bining cost variables 20 and 24, Packaging and Administration, 
we gain some idea of the cost of product differentiation. 
Apart from conventional fixed administration and packaging 
costs, this amalgamation contains sales force wages and 
salaries, and expenditure on advertising and promotion.
Of the four groups, the Major Specialists lead with 2.4 
percentage points above the industry mean. They are closely 
followed by the Diversified Conglomerates with 2.1 percentage 
points. Both the Rural Co-operatives and Minor Specialists 
are below the mean. This information confirms the earlier
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Observation that the Major Specialists and the Diversified 
Conglomerates place more emphasis on marketing than the 
other two groups.
Some order to the industry's structure has now been 
introduced by classifying the twenty-seven processors into 
four groups. Distinct structural differences are now 
evident, particularly in relative costs. This difference 
becomes more pronounced in the examination of group 
performance.
GROUP PERFORMANCE
Performance, according to Scherer (1971:3-4), should 
embody the degree of attainment of a set of goals. These 
revolve about efficiency, progress, full employment and 
equitable income distribution. An exploration of whether 
the Australian fruit and vegetable processing industry 
has achieved these goals would entail looking at performance 
in all corporate profit centres shown in Gilmour and 
Rimmer's schema (Fig. 0.1). A thorough examination is not 
possible but a measure of performance can be made through 
return on investment. 'this can be measured in several ways 
but two conventional methods are:
i) a firm's return on total shareholders' funds; and
ii) the return on total assets.
74
Although the age of each firm's capital is not readily 
available we can still use the measures for inter-group 
comparisons of performance.
Rates of return on shareholders' funds have been 
calculated for groups based upon the annual reports of 
sixteen processors (see Table 3.8). Assuming that factor 
prices rise at the same rate as product prices and that the 
value of stocks is constant at the end of each accounting 
period, no adjustment for inflation is required. Hence 
shareholders can expect a return of 10 per cent to reflect 
the reward for having their funds invested. Only the Minor 
and Major Specialists have returns in excess of this amount.
The rate of return on total assets measures how well 
a firm is managing its financial resources. This rate should 
be in excess of 10 per cent so that the firm can effectively 
repay interest on loans and add to the value of its assets. 
Again only the Minor and Major Specialists achieved a high 
rate for 1973 (see Table 3.8). For the same period the 
average rate of return on total assets for all Australian 
enterprises was 7 per cent (Ruthven, pers. com.), whereas 
the overall average for the processing industry was 10 per 
cent. In relative terms the industry's performance has been 
creditable. But when we compare inter-group averages both 
the Rural Co-operatives and the Diversified Conglomerates 
have returns below 7 per cent (see Total Assets, Table 3.8).
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TABLE 3.8: MEASURES OF PROCESSING GROUPS' FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE: 1973
Groups
Rates of 
return on: ARural Co­
operatives
B
Diversified
Conglomerates
C
Minor
Specialists
D
Major
Specialists
Shareholders' 
funds 4.6 7.2 12.0 13.9
Total assets 5.6 6.7 18.0 15.0
Note: a) The rate of return on total shareholders' funds is
calculated from Net profit x 100
Total shareholders' funds.
Net profit is the operating profit less taxation, 
depreciation provision, interest payments, 
directors' fees and interest paid to outside 
bodies. It includes income from investments but 
in some cases excludes what is usually termed 
extraordinary income where this has come from 
currency revaluation compensation or the sale of 
a substantial asset. It is considered here that 
such forms of extraordinary income are not 
continuous income and do not reflect a company's 
management philosophy. Total shareholders' funds 
includes paid-up capital, and reserves such as 
accumulated unappropriated profits.
b) The rate of return on total assets is calculated 
from Operating Profit x 100
Total assets Operating profit is
the firm's profit before interest and tax payments 
are deducted but before extraordinary income such 
as revaluation compensation or the sale of a sub­
stantial asset is included. The reasons are given 
in Note a) „ Total assets is the accumu­
lation of total shareholders' funds, total current 
liabilities and total long term liabilities, but 
excludes intangible items such as goodwill.
Source: Company reports.
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It is believed that some of the reasons for this lower level 
of performance can be found in the area of logistics.
RESUME
Through the use of classification techniques, we have 
shifted attention within an heterogenous industry from 
twenty-seven firms to four reasonably coherent groups.
Part of the reason for differences in group performance 
stems from variations in corporate logistics. We cannot 
examine the logistics conduct of each group in turn, hence 
attention is concentrated upon the Major Specialists in 
Part II -- the group with the best return on shareholders' 
funds. This group affords the opportunity to investigate 
in depth the range of attributes and conduct most likely to 
provide the greatest insight into the acquired strengths of 
the industry as a whole. In many ways the Major Specialists 
may be likened to the leader group. An examination of 
how they have coped with uncertainty should be more 
instructive than a study of how poorly other groups have
fared.
PART II
We have so far examined a complex industry in terms of 
the basic features of market structure and group performance. 
Different results between the four groups of processors 
prompt an examination of the conduct of that group with the 
best performance. No attempt will be made to examine all 
aspects of this group's conduct; we will simply focus upon 
its corporate logistics. The rationale for this strategy is 
that logistics, comprising the freight on raw and finished 
goods, storage, labour and interest charges, accounts for 
almost one third of the value of sales in the Australian 
food and beverage industries. Despite its obvious importance, 
logistics has been a neglected facet of corporate concern.
Yet, improvements to the logistical efficiency of the 
Australian fruit and vegetable processing industry promises 
to lessen uncertainty. Key components of logistics -- 
inventories, transport and purchasing —  are discussed with 
reference to the Major Specialists (Chapter 4). This serves 
as the basis for a deeper investigation into the conduct of 
two processors by using decision theory (Chapter 5). The 
inquiry is then extended by combining decision theory with 
the Out-of-Kilter algorithm (Chapter 6). Lessons derived 
from these studies are applied to the industry as a whole 
in Part III.
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CHAPTER FOUR
INDUSTRY LOGISTICS AND GROUP CONDUCT
Until the 1970s logistics attracted little attention 
from corporate management. Such neglect stemmed from a pre­
occupation with the obvious cost centres of the corporation 
—  financial control, marketing, and production. Yet the con­
tinued neglect of logistics has left many processors at a 
disadvantage with respect to moving materials into plants 
and distributing products to customers. Logistics is an 
area where loss of control can lead to high costs which are 
hard to detect because they are easily masked in the corpora­
tion's accounting procedures.
As shown in Figure 4.1 corporate logistics can be 
divided into administrative and physical activity. Both 
functions are, in essence, those of obtaining supplies and 
servicing demand, and interactions between them have been 
placed into a systems framework in Figure 4.2. While this 
system appears to be closed, external influences play a 
strong role,as information from both immediate demand and 
supply affects outcomes. In Figure 4.2, these influences 
are amalgamated in the auxiliary node 'expected future', 
and provide the initial impulse for annual planning procedures 
that are generally known as budgeting. These short-term 
forward estimates are vital to all corporate enterprises 
because they form the basis for all purchasing and
Managing
Director
Physical
Supply Distribution
Physical
Corporate
Logistics
Other
Corporate
Activity
Transportation
Warehousing
Inventory
Logistics
Action
Purchasing
Packaging
Materials Handling
Order Processing
Customer Service
Administration
Logistics
Figure 4.1 The components of corporate logistics 
(Source: Adapted from Gilmour and Rimmer,
1976: 64)
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promotional activity. The accuracy of the budget as an 
estimate of activity is reflected in the size of inventories 
and the ability to service demand. If demand expectations 
are over optimistic inventories may be too high, if over 
pessimistic then demand may not be met. At regular intervals 
during the year most processors compare their estimates with 
actual results and make necessary adjustments. Used in this 
manner and shaped by corporate philosophy, the budget becomes 
the operations guide for the logistics decision-maker. We 
will observe how differences between expected and actual out­
comes influenced the logistics conduct of three processors 
drawn from the Major Specialists.
As the Major Specialists had the best results in terms 
of returns on shareholders' funds, they were chosen for the 
micro-study. Of the eight firms in this group three were 
excluded from further study because of the small size of 
their operations. While it may have been interesting to 
examine the effect of size as a barrier to entry, from the 
logistics viewpoint these three firms were of little interest. 
Another two processors, Berri Fruit Juices Co-operative and 
Campbell's Soups were reluctant to be involved because of 
their concern about the confidentiality of data. This 
narrowed the study to three processors, H.J. Heinz Company 
Australia, Bulmer Australia Limited and R.M. Gow and 
Company —  a choice that benefited from the quality of 
information available and by the fact that they distributed
few products.
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Eight components of corporate logistics are listed in 
Figure 4.1. All of them contribute to flows but in the 
context of the processing industry, transport, inventories 
and purchasing are of critical importance as they provide 
the key to an understanding of decision-making under 
uncertainty. Of the three components, transport is discussed 
in general terms because no processor has any advantage, 
other than volume discounts on freight rates. Inventory 
management is considered briefly in terms of R.M. Gow's 
conduct and experience. Purchasing is observed by examining 
the practices of Bulmer Australia and H.J. Heinz.
TRANSPORT
Transport is needed to move material into production 
processes and final products out to buyers. The key require­
ment of transport is reliability. Rarely can it be used as 
a competitive marketing or distribution strategy. Unlike the 
other logistics components outlined in Figure 4.1, the pro­
cessors have little control over transport. No member of the 
four groups of firms operates more than a token ancillary 
transport fleet. For line-haul movements, they rely on the 
facilities of freight forwarders. The reasons for this low 
involvement are not clear. One suspects that the relative 
advantages of their own transport have never been thoroughly
evaluated.
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The transport of raw material is road-oriented because 
of the dispersed location of growing areas. Transport of 
products to domestic customers is, however, shared by road 
and rail modes. Canned product is sought by freight for­
warders because of its high density which makes it ideal 
freight for those expert in blending loads for rail haulage. 
Road hauliers on the other hand offer door-to-door service 
and their transport rates are competitive with rail.
The transport task is further divisible into conventional 
vehicles for canned goods, or refrigerated vehicles, with 
each having a different rate schedule (Rimmer, 1970:108-127). 
Developments in palletization have meant that products 
moving off the canning line may be manually handled for the 
first time in the retail outlet. The transport of frozen 
products is more restricted. Many refrigerated pantechnicons 
and containers used in Australia are too narrow for two 
pallets. This makes materials handling methods heavily 
labour intensive. The number of wider vehicles is gradually 
increasing but entry into refrigerated transport for new 
firms is limited by the barrier of capital requirements.
Frozen fruit and vegetable processors face an oligopolistic 
transport situation. But the processors themselves form an 
oligopoly within the processing industry. The volume of 
output is so significant in terms of total frozen food move­
ments, that they can command lower rates relative to smaller
firms.
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Consequently, no group of processors has a clear 
advantage with transport techniques. Freight rate gains 
from large volumes of high density canned products are 
absorbed by processing costs. Frozen products are expensive 
to store and transport because of poor handling facilities 
and high energy consumption. For both types of product, any 
innovation developed by a processor or transport agency is 
quickly adopted by the industry.
INVENTORIES
Inventories are maintained to smooth out supply 
fluctuations. In terms of management control, uncertainty 
is reflected in inventory size which affects physical stocks 
in all phases of processing. From Figure 4.2 we can see 
where physical delays occur in the processing stream. At 
each delay point there is an increase to material 
cost from interest on money invested in the stock. The Major 
Specialists are very aware of these costs hence inventory 
management and innovation play a critical role in the over­
all performance of these corporations. Other groups have 
attempted to hold down logistics costs by cost-cutting rather 
than system improvement. This approach results in deterio­
rating customer service and may lead to decreasing sales
revenue.
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Inventory size is a function of seasonal supply and 
lagged demand. The short harvest period requires heavy 
investment in processing equipment. The Major Specialists 
have initiated changes in inventory management by developing 
intermediate processing techniques. These help overcome the 
peak-load problem by 'de-seasonalising' inventories. As 
they are able to manufacture final products just prior to 
sale, funds invested in final packaged products are minimized.
R.M. Gow's inventory problem
As inventories rise so storage space becomes critical.
Any increase in the delay between processing and sale, or 
sudden fall in demand, causes serious storage problems as 
instanced by R.M. Gow. This firm made a purchasing decision 
which resulted in an unexpected over-stock of tomato-based 
product.
The supply of tomato concentrates and the demand for 
Gow's tomato sauce between 1972 and 1975 are shown in Figure 4.3. 
The important feature is the erratic supply of tomato 
concentrates. All of Gow's requirements were in part- 
processed paste form purchased through a manufacturers' and 
importers' agent. In 1972 and 1973, paste came from 
Melbourne-based processors with some supplementary material 
imported from Israel and the U.S.A. However, in 1975 
Australian paste was unavailable and supplies were imported 
from the U.S.A. and Greece (Fig. 4.3).
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The demand for tomato sauce exhibited a relatively 
smooth pattern until January 1974. It then began to 
fluctuate. Sales rose sharply in January 1974 then fell, 
rose again in April 1974 and fell, lifted to a secondary 
peak in September 1974, equivocated, then declined from 
January 1975 to May 1975. The rapid initial increase and 
fall in sales was caused by customers hedging against the 
anticipated shortage, then becoming overstocked with sauce.
The decline between May 1974 and August 1974 came from a 
shortage of raw material which, as we can see from Figure 4.3, 
arrived in July. The final fall in demand was caused by an 
increase in the price of sauce. This was considered necessary 
to recover some of the unexpected cost of imported tomato 
paste and had been timed to coincide with the anticipated 
seasonal increase in demand. Unexpectedly, Gow's sales 
fell and their inventory of both paste and product rapidly 
rose. The problem of falling sales was compounded by the 
need to process their imported paste stocks before the 
31 January 1975 because the paste was imported under by-law 
regulations. Such regulations allow the normal tariff of 
$1.06 per kilogramme of dry weight or an ad valorem duty of 
50 per cent to be varied in times of domestic shortage. The 
variations lower the landed price of paste to that which 
would prevail if Australian product was available. When the 
by-law operates paste must be landed by the 31 December and 
processed by the 31 January. The intent of the by-law is to
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stabilize the Australian price for future crops by 
inhibiting imports while not penalizing consumers by 
charging the full tariff until after January 1975. As we 
can see from Figure 4.3 a sizable shipment in January 1975 
caught Gow unawares.
The paste imported by Gow and other manufacturers in 
October-November 1974 could not be physically processed in 
time because of the cumulative effect of shipping and steva- 
doring delays. The time provisions, aimed at minimizing 
stocks of imported paste to ensure demand for the following 
season's domestic product, were then extended to April 1975. 
However, the 1975 Australian crop confounded the industry 
by giving a much higher yield than expected. This not only 
compounded the problem of over-stocks of the costly imported 
paste, but affected many growers who were unable to have 
all their crop processed. The high price paid for imported 
paste led to the increase in the price of sauce. Many manu­
facturers believed that such an increase would have little 
effect on demand. But as shown by Gow's performance between 
January and May 1975 the decrease in sales was dramatic 
(Fig. 4.3).
The overstocks and falling sales created a serious 
shortage of cash for Gow (and other processors) and bridging 
finance was sought. Yet the Australian Department of Customs 
refused further exemptions of the by-law time provision and
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Gow (and other processors) were unable to convert imported 
paste to product by April 1975. As indicated, the plant 
could not physically process the paste within the required 
time and Gow had to pay the full tariff. Further penalties 
were incurred by Gow. As stocks of sauce rose additional 
storage had to be rented at premium rates, and a large order 
for sauce was cancelled. This was prompted by the price- 
induced drop in demand and accounted for nearly 10 per cent 
of anticipated sales.
Gow's executive learned a bitter lesson. In mid-1974 
when the decision was made to import paste and overcome 
the expected domestic shortage, it was the best strategy 
in their range of choices. The results of this purchasing 
decision, manifested in the large inventory of sauce, 
severely strained Gow’s resources. Such a result was 
not confined to Gow, or to tomato products. Bulmer Australia 
found that their planned control of apple purchases led to 
an unexpected financial strain.
PURCHASING
Logistics administration involves the purchasing of 
raw materials and other processing material including 
packaging, the development of materials handling systems, and 
conventional order processing (Fig. 4.1). All contribute
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to buyer service. Apart from purchasing, there is little 
difference between the fruit and vegetable processors and 
other manufacturing and distributing industries.
Purchasing skills are critical, despite the much-vaunted 
attention given to marketing, because they are quickly 
reflected in company performance. It also covers price 
negotiations, estimating quantities required and locating 
scarce supplies. The aim is to match marketing forecasts 
with actual requirements and to respond rapidly to changes 
in demand.
Figure 4.2 shows that marketing exerts a strong influence 
on purchasing by its impact upon the annual budget procedures. 
Such an influence does not affect the Rural Co-operatives 
who often have to accept the amount of fruit offered by 
their grower members. Because the price for most varieties 
of processing fruit is established by the Fruit Industry 
Sugar Concessions Committee, the combination of set price 
and over-supply has forced the Rural Co-operatives to act 
outside the conventional supply-demand framework. However, the 
practices of the Major Specialists show how marketing exerts 
a strong influence on purchasing and helps balance supply 
with demand. The Major Specialists purchase most of their 
fruit input from growers on a contractual basis which is 
supplemented by buying on the open market. We shall see 
from Bulmer's experience, however, that contract buying can 
lead to over-supply and the absorption of funds needed for 
plant expansion.
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Bulmer Australia's purchasing expectations and experience
Bulmer's monthly juice supply and product demand between 
1972 and 1975 are shown in Figure 4.4. The apparent fluctua­
tions in supply were not as erratic as anticipated. Much of 
Bulmer's juice intake is concentrated and arrives by container. 
The simultaneous arrival of two containers is sufficient to 
cause substantial peaks in supply as instanced in July 1974 
(Fig. 4.4). Such fluctuations do not imply random receival 
because the concentrate arrives as required. Demand in 
Figure 4.4 also appears to fluctuate but follows, a seasonal 
pattern —  the highest consumption coinciding with the onset 
of surrimer .
In anticipation of such fluctuations in supply and demand 
Bulmer offered growers five-year contracts when it estab­
lished its manufacturing operation in Campbelltown (N.S.W.) 
and developed the associated apple crushing and juice concen­
tration plant near Hobart. This move allowed Bulmer access 
to a larger, cheaper and more reliable supply of quality 
processing fruit than was available on the mainland. Para­
doxically, when the Hobart plant was being built with a low 
interest loan from the Tasmanian Government, the supply of 
Tasmanian fruit was declining as a consequence of the 
Commonwealth and State Governments' Fruitgrowing 
Reconstruction Scheme introduced in 1972. However, Bulmer's 
executive was confident that the contracts and the prospect 
of premium prices would attract regular supplies of fruit to 
meet the increasing demand for apple juice products.
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Of the Tasmanian output, 20 per cent was sent to 
Campbelltown and the balance exported to the United Kingdom 
parent. This not only offered Bulmer a third source of 
juice -- in addition to juice processed at Campbelltown and 
imported from the United Kingdom -- but allowed them to blend 
what they considered to be a superior product. Of equal 
importance, the exports gave the Tasmanian plant an initially 
high throughput yielding economies of scale. Allied with the 
plant's opening was a distribution innovation which gave 
Bulmer cheap transport rates. The concentrated juice was 
pumped into 13 500 litre rubber bags fitted inside a standard 
six metre container. When emptied, the bags are rolled into 
a smaller volume for return and refilling.
Bulmer Australia began to increase both their export 
sales of concentrated juice and the local sales of both cider 
and juice. But in 1974, the juice markets collapsed. Bulmer, 
both in Australia and the United Kingdom, appear to have been 
surprised by the effects of the increasing European Economic 
Community tariffs. By late 1974 these had reached a level where 
the United Kingdom factory could no longer afford to purchase 
its 80 per cent share of the Tasmanian output. But a second 
and more serious blow came when the Commonwealth Government 
removed the sales tax exemption on foods containing less than 
25 per cent pure juice. Apple juice had been used in many 
processed foods and beverages as a bland filler which 
exempted them from sales tax. In the 1975 season, Bulmer
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honoured their contracts with the Tasmanian growers. When 
casting about for new export markets, Bulmer Australia 
found that they could not compete on price against 
Argentinian and South African suppliers. Consequently, at 
the conclusion of the 1975 Tasmanian season the stock-holding 
at Claremont was enormous. The executive could see only two 
broad choices: break the contracts with growers or continue
crushing for the final year of the contracts' term. The 
first alternative would rupture the company-grower relation­
ship. Bulmer were uncertain about the duration of the world­
wide glut in juice and if export demand should lift then a 
potential source of revenue would be lost. However, if they 
crushed fruit in 1976 they would have to borrow bridging 
funds to finance the crushing and the inventory.
The overall results of Bulmer Australia's activity were 
two-fold. Apple juice supplies exceeded the company's 
initial expectations; the absolute decline in total fruit 
supply was offset by the rapid fall in export and Australian 
demand for concentrated juice. Domestic sales of cider pro­
ducts followed growth expectations but did not supply 
sufficient funds to overcome a shortage of capital. Funds 
earmarked for processing extensions at Campbelltown were 
tied up in the Tasmanian juice stocks. Bulmer may have 
fared better if they had the information resources to match 
H.J. Heinz's purchasing practice.
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H.J. Heinz's purchasing experience
Heinz provides an example of the systematic use of 
information to help balance supply and demand. The general 
problem of the 1974 tomato shortage was discussed with Gow's 
inventory problem. Heinz's executive tackled the shortage 
problem from a more disciplined purchasing perspective.
Unlike Gow, Heinz has a heavy commitment to process 
Australian tomatoes and aim for an annual fresh fruit intake 
of 30 000 tonnes. This is processed partly into, final pro­
ducts such as sauce and soup, and partly into concentrated 
tomato paste for later use and occasional sale. We can see 
from Figure 4.5 the peaked seasonal nature of the fresh 
tomato input and its almost immediate effect upon stocks of 
concentrated tomato paste. The graph of this input over 
three seasons demonstrates how the shortage of tomatoes in 
1974 dramatically affected stocks of paste which had to be 
supplemented with imported material.
Since its inception, Heinz has always been a marketing 
oriented company. While most firms initiate estimates of 
future requirements from a budget originating in the 
marketing division, Heinz is particularly careful with 
these calculations. All divisions of the firm are involved 
in the final estimates,and during the operating year 
departmental estimates are measured against actual results. 
Such internal financial accountability fosters a desire
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for accuracy and creates an atmosphere where discipline 
prevails amongst the decision-makers.
Once the total annual supply requirements are determined 
the Agricultural Division converts quantities of fruit into 
a regional forecast of potential crop yields. Heinz has 
preferred their contract tomato growers to be close to the 
Dandenong factory but with the development of mechanical 
harvesting and the need for larger growing fields, close 
proximity is becoming less important. By spreading their 
contracts across Victoria from the Goulburn Valley to East 
Gippsland, Heinz also gains from different ripening periods 
which lessens the the chance of total pest or weather losses.
When the crop is planted, the agricultural advisers 
maintain continual monitoring to assess the potential yield. 
The consolidated information is reviewed each week at 
Dandenong and as harvesting draws near greater reliability 
can be attached to the forecasts. Purchasing, planning 
and agricultural personnel develop an informal set of 
probabilities for outcomes ranging from a shortage to over­
supply. Importing plans are developed and information on 
alternative supplies is sought even when crop yields appear 
high. This planning covers Heinz should part of the crop be 
lost. Import orders can be quickly placed once the 
Australian Department of Customs declares a shortage of the 
domestic product. Should the yield be above Heinz's
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requirements, the surplus concentrate is sold to other pro­
cessors such as Gow. By moving this surplus Heinz honour 
their contractual obligations. However, they do not maintain 
stocks of tomato concentrates as a hedge against future 
shortages. Maintenance of inventories diverts corporate 
resources from the marketing effort and in an extreme shortage 
Heinz can draw upon its trans-national affiliates. In addition, 
by remaining a major Australian buyer, the strong market 
position of Heinz must influence tomato prices.
Using this information network, Heinz managed to have 
sufficient concentrate at all times. Unlike Gow, they planned 
import arrivals more carefully so that the last shipment 
arrived in December 1974. Even with this late arrival,
Heinz acted to process the paste into product by 
31 January 1975, despite verbal assurances from the 
Department of Customs that the tariff by-law deadline had 
been extended. Following this large injection of concentrate, 
sales were boosted to cut stocks of product. It has not been 
substantiated whether this resulted from a strong marketing 
push, a price cut, or both. With stocks down, Heinz then 
had the capacity to store their contracted share of the 1975 
Australian tomato crop.
The scale of the Heinz decision-making process is beyond 
the resources of companies such as Bulmer and Gow. It is a 
disciplined operation where the best possible information is 
sought and used. Small processors rely heavily upon
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information filtered through agents and importers which may 
quickly become obsolete. But in the following chapters we 
shall see that by modelling decisions in an ex ante environ­
ment, Heinz could have improved its performance.
RESUME
In this chapter we have seen how three members of a 
successful group of fruit and vegetable processors coped 
with the uncertainties of supply (in purchasing activity) 
and demand (through fluctuating inventory levels). Gow mis­
judged the outcome of the 1975 Australian tomato crop with 
a resulting rapid increase in stocks of both part-processed 
paste and tomato sauce. Bulmer Australia were faced with 
the prospect of an over-supply of fruit offered under con­
tract, a problem caused by the sharp decline in exports. 
Heinz used an established information network to develop 
decisions offering a reasonable balance between expected and 
actual outcomes. We can now consider how practical modifi­
cations to this logistics conduct will improve the 
performance of the three firms.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DECISION THEORY AND UNCERTAINTY
In Chapter 4 three components of corporate logistics 
were isolated in the introductory discussion. They were 
transport, inventories and purchasing. While the movement 
of goods into factories and out to customers is vital, the 
control exercised by firms is never extensive. With inven­
tories and purchasing, however, managers can and do exert 
considerable influence. We have seen how the three processors, 
Gow, Bulmer and Heinz, acted over a three-year period and we 
have seen the differences between desired and actual results.
In this chapter, a simple normative decision theory model is 
used to investigate whether the outcome for Gow could have 
been improved and establish a decision-making framework for 
Bulmer.
DECISION THEORY
Given the limitations of information available to the 
decision-maker, decision theory offers an approach for 
achieving the best possible performance. It recognizes that 
in the face of uncertainty the decision-maker must take a 
gamble, hence decision theory establishes strategies for 
making the best possible choices.
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The principles of decision theory have been known for 
some time but application has lagged substantially behind 
theoretical advances. From the 1950s with the work of 
Savage (1954), Schlaifer (1959), Schlaifer and Raiffa 
(1961) and with further developments from Raiffa (1968) 
and Schlaifer (1969), among others, interest has grown in 
the theory and its use of subjective probabilities. A brief 
review of applications is contained in Newman (1971:205-207).
Agricultural economists have applied decision theory 
to test several aspects of decision-making by individuals 
under uncertainty. Lave (1963) established a decision 
process for sultana producers in California and a Bayesian 
analysis used by Baquet et al. (1976) refined this approach
for orchardists in Oregon facing frost hazard. In both 
examples the decision choice was to act at a 
penalty cost and save the crop, or to wait for peak yield 
and profit but risk total loss. In geography published 
discussion is rare. Curry (1966) has looked at a problem 
of seasonal programming by farmers and Berdoulay (1973) 
has reviewed the Bayesian variant of decision theory with 
specific reference to geographic applications.
The principle of decision theory is that the results 
of past observations, when combined with prior probabilities, 
yield a set of odds. These odds are weighted by calculated 
utilities (payoffs) for the evaluation of alternative strategies.
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Criticism of decision theory has been levelled at the use 
of subjective probabilities as a numerical measure of con­
fidence. However, this can be overcome by developing 
probability distributions based upon measured observation. 
Objective probabilities then replace subjective 'best' 
estimates. A brief example serves to describe the model.
An illustration of decision theory
In the following hypothetical example a decision must be 
made about what quantity of tomato paste a firm should import. 
The impending Australian crop has been assessed as shown in 
Table 5.1 together with the firm's import alternatives.
TABLE 5.1: RESULT OF THE AUSTRALIAN TOMATO CROP AND REQUIRED
IMPORTS
If The Australian Crop 
Result Is:
With A 
Probability 
Of:
Then Required Imports 
Will Be:
Normal yield and timing 0. 6 100 tonnes
Glut yield and. early 0.2 0
Short yield and late 0.2 200 tonnes
If the crop has a normal yield imported requirements will 
be 100 tonnes. This will make up the difference between the 
current shortage and the new season's crop. If the new crop 
is both late and low yielding then 200 tonnes should be 
imported. However, if any paste is imported and the yield is
high, imports will then cost more than the over-supplied 
local product and also increase inventory costs. The basic 
decision falls between:
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Strategy A -- import paste by 31 December, 
the tariff by-law deadline for receival, and 
before the new season's crop results are known; or
Strategy B -- import after the crop results are 
known but pay more because of increased demand 
if the Australian crop is short.
The alternative strategies together with possible outcomes 
and payoffs are shown in Table 5.2.
TABLE 5.2: EXAMPLE OF PAYOFFS FOR POSSIBLE OUTCOMES
Possible Payoffs
Strategy Australian Tomato Crop Results
Normal Glut Shortage
Import before 31 December $10 000 -$50 000 $50 000
Wait until April in 
following year $15 000 $5 000 -$25 000
This information is used to construct the decision tree 
in Figure 5.1 from which three decision criteria can be 
calculated:
i) the estimated monetary value (EMV) which is the
weighted average of the product of the probabilities 
and payoffs for each possible outcome;
ii) the monetary range in payoffs for each strategy
which gives an appreciation of the best and worst 
possible outcomes; and
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i ü ) the most likely payoff which is that with the 
highest probability of outcome.
The EMV for Strategy A is calculated as follows:
$6 000 = 0.6 ($ 10 000) - 0.2 ($50 000) + 0.2 ($50 000)
and for Strategy B is:
$5 000 = 0.6 ($ 15 000) + 0.2 ($5 000) - 0.2 ($25 000).
These measures and the other two decision criteria are shown 
in Table 5.3.
TABLE 5.3: EXAMPLE OF EXPECTED MONETARY VALUE (EMV) AND
EXPOSURE TO GAIN AND LOSS
EMV
$
Payoff
Strategy Range
$
Most Likely 
$
Import 6 000 +50 000 -50 000 10 000
Wait 5 000 15 000 -25 000 15 000
The EMV favours Strategy A (import before the crop 
results are known). But not only is the range in payoffs 
wider for this strategy, the most likely outcome is less than 
for Strategy B (wait until the results are known). At this 
stage in the analysis when EMV differences are marginal, the 
decision-maker must review his resources. A gain of $50 000 
can be made from importing paste,but should there be a glut 
of tomatoes the loss could be $50 000. Only a processor
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with sufficient financial resources could contemplate such 
a move. Therefore, the more cautious decision-maker will 
favour the minimum regret Strategy B, and wait until more 
information is gathered.
This example demonstrates how to establish a set of 
decision criteria with which the decision-maker can implement 
a strategy, or improve the information upon which the payoffs, 
or the probabilities of occurrence are based. By extending 
the procedure to R.M. Gow we can look at a more complex 
problem.
DECISION THEORY AND R.M. GOW
We shall begin by assuming that Gow is seeking an 
increased market share for the company's products. Growth 
in tomato sauce sales must come from such marketing activities 
as price competition, maintenance of quality, service and 
advertising, rather than from a general increase in demand.
To attain this objective, particularly in the Southern 
States, Gow must expand its processing and marketing 
facilities but because of the small resource base, this 
expansion must ultimately be financed from profits.
The growth objective restricts Gow's options. During 
periods of raw material shortage they cannot simply withdraw 
from the market because of high re-establishment costs.
Neither can they import large quantities of tomato paste
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concentrate to hedge against market shortages; apart from 
high inventory costs there are the import tariffs and manu­
facturing deadlines set by the Australian Department of 
Customs (Industries Assistance Commission, 1974). Thus to 
promote growth, a balanced continuity of supply must be 
achieved. This can only be accomplished by estimating future 
paste concentrate requirements and importing the difference 
between anticipated demand and expected Australian supply.
An important assumption must be made. Gow's objective 
is to minimize costs while expanding its market share for 
the product. If Gow import too much they will pay a penalty 
for excess inventories of both paste and product. Should 
they import too little, the penalty is lost sales and conse­
quent market re-establishment costs. To achieve cost 
minimization, within these expansionary market aims, we will 
model Gow's activities between 1973 and 1975. This procedure 
encompasses four steps.
Step 1: In May 1973, establish a decision tree
for possible outcomes in the coming year, 
1973-74;
Step 2: Delay any decision until July 1973, to
review the structure of the tree by gathering 
more information;
Step 3: Repeat the procedure for 1974-75 by con­
structing a tree in May 1974; and
Step 4: Partially implement a decision to gain time 
and revise the strategies in August 1974.
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Constructing the decision-tree; step one in Gow's decision 
process
The first move in developing a set of import strategies 
is to establish future paste needs using conventional 
budgeting procedures. Gow's target (our assumed target) is 
to increase their 1972-73 sales by 10 per cent to 1 710 tonnes 
of sauce. Estimated monthly sales together with the required 
paste are shown in Table 5.4. Sufficient paste from the 1973 
season is available to manufacture 680 tonnes of sauce, 
accounting for five months of Gow's marketing programme.
If the Australian harvest is normal, tomato paste will be 
available in March 1974, leaving a shortfall of 576 tonnes 
of sauce to be made up by imports. Because imports have a 
lower paste to sauce reconstitution ratio than the Australian 
concentrate, Gow needs to import 144 tonnes of paste compared 
with 108 tonnes of Australian paste were it available (see 
Table 5.4). As indicated, the receipt and processing dead­
lines set by Customs mean that Gow must import the paste 
before 31 December and process it before 31 January. Should 
Gow approach the deadline with a quantity of unprocessed 
paste, the only alternative to paying the tariff is to place 
the paste in bond until the next shortfall period is declared 
by Customs. While this is a smaller penalty than paying the 
tariff, storage costs will be high.
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TABLE 5.4: ASSUMED TARGET SAUCE SALES AND PASTE REQUIREMENTS
FOR GOW, 1973-74
Period
Target
Sauce
Sales
Tomato
Paste
Needs
Origin
Concen­
tration
Ratio
1973 July 132 25 Australian 1:5.3
August 121 23 I I II
September 123 23 II I t
October 166 31 I I I I
November 142 27 I I I I
December 157 39 Imported 1:4
1974 January 171 43 I I I I
February 123 30 I I II
March 122 31 I I I I
April 150 28 Australian 1:5.3
May 164 31 II I I
June 139 26 II I I
TOTAL 1 710 214 Australian
144 Imported
Note: Sufficient Australian paste is available to manufacture
680 tonnes of sauce required between July and November, 
1973.
Source: R.M. Gow (1975). The data has been altered to
maintain confidentiality.
Gow can consider many import strategies but, given the 
company's resources, only four are applicable:
Strategy A: Import 144 tonnes of paste, sufficient
for normal requirements (Table 5.4);
Strategy B: Import 194 tonnes of paste so that should
the 1974 Australian crop fail, the additional 
fifty tonnes can be taken out of bond when 
Customs declare a shortfall;
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Strategy C: Import only eighty-two tonnes of paste
so that if the Australian crop is early 
Gow gains from the higher domestic paste 
concentration, hence increased profit; 
or
Strategy D: Import no paste and withdraw from the
market until domestic paste is again 
available.
Strategy D opposes Gow's growth objectives but one of the 
benefits of decision theory is that a range of alternative 
strategies can be quickly evaluated. It will be useful to 
compare a withdrawal strategy (D) with three growth strategies 
(A, B , and C).
While the budget establishes the amount of paste to 
import during a normal year, we must consider events which 
influence the choice of strategy within the decision theory 
framework. Of the many events possible, only four have a 
strong influence upon the results. These are:
i) shipping delays which can cause loss of sales 
and incur tariff payments if imports are not 
received by mid-October and processed before 
31 January 19 74;
ii) the Australian crop which is usually harvested 
and processed into paste for sale by March 1974 
(but in May 1973 a pessimistic view is taken of 
both the timing and the yield);
iii) import activities which depend on the behaviour of 
competing processors:
a) if they import the minimum requirements there 
will be little impact upon Gow's sales;
b) if they are pessimistic and speculate by 
importing more, with Gow not following 
suit and the crop fails, Gow will be faced 
with an expensive marketing campaign to re­
establish their product after some months 
without sales; or
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c) if they import less than the normal require­
ments and the Australian crop fails, Gow can 
expect increased sales; and
iv) the elasticity of demand which Gow expects to be zero.
The anticipated effects of these events under Strategy A 
(import normal requirements) are shown in Figure 5.2. From 
this we can translate the events into financial terms, the 
generally accepted measure of success or failure.
By combining these events in Figure 5.3, each import 
strategy has eighty-one possible outcomes of which only one 
will occur. The calculation of each payoff is not shown 
but the basic approach is to calculate the profit or loss 
for each event. For some events the payoff may appear 
anomalous but this results from a combination of changes 
in a demand or import activity.
We have established a set of factors influencing a 
strategy's outcome -- summarized in Figure 5.2 -- and 
developed these into a preliminary decision tree (Fig. 5.3).
We can further develop the analysis by determining the 
probability of the events occurring. A summary of the 
1973-74 expectations, as could have been assessed in May 
1973, is listed in Table 5.5. These and other subsequent 
probabilities result from field observations and are assigned 
estimates. For a long-term analysis probability distribu­
tions could be calculated from historical records. Shipping 
and crop performance especially lend themselves to probability 
distributions.
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COURSE OF 
ACTION
STRATEGY A
Import suffi­
cient paste to 
produce up to 
March, 19/4
Imported paste $700/tonne 
sauce price will rise, 
____ inventory costs high
Profit margin is 
lower for sauce 
from imported paste
POSSIBLE EVENTS
Paste arrives or 
schedule 1 '_> Oct
—  ► Production 
on scheduleI
Arrives one 
month late
Lose one 
months sales -
Arrives
months
two
late .....
Lose two 
months sales
1.Harvest and 
yield normal
PAYOFF
Sales as expected
AUSTRALIANTOMATO
CROP
2. Parly with 
glut yield
3. Lute and 
poor yield
Paste & sauce 
prices fall
$Loss due to no sales and 
market re-establishment 
costs
..
No paste 
after Pei). '74 
Lose sales
Import only normal 
requirements
Lower profits from 
undue high cost of 
imported pas t e_____
1. Cow's sales as expected
2. Prices fall, loss
3. Competition strengthens
$ loss
COMPETITORS' Speculate and importBEHAVIOUR ... *. more paste
Import short believing that 
Australian crop will be 
early
1. Price falls as stocks
are cleared, $ loss
2. Price plummets, $ loss
3. Normal sales
__t___
CONSUMERS'
BEHAVIOUR
No reaction
1. .No effect upon Gow
2. GOW have higher
production costs
3. No sales, $ loss as re­
establishment. costs 
r i se
Demand falls ICH
Sales as ex pec: ted
Demand falls 20%
Sales fall, inventory 
costs rise
Figure 5.2 Possible events and the effect upon the payoff; 
Strategy A
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CONSUMERSAUSTRALIAN CROP 
PERFORMANCE
EVENTSHIPPING PERFORMANCESTRATEGY BEHAVIOURBEHAVIOUR
No reaction (0 .6)1*1.1.1 
1.1.1.210% (0.25)
Demand tails 1.1.1.320% (0.15)
No reaction (0.6)1.1.2.1 
I /^Demand falls 1.1.2.2 
10% (0.25)
Demand falls 1.1.2.3 .20% (OT 1 6) reaction (O.bjl.l .3.1 
Demand tails ltl ,3.2
L I . 2:
ipeculate,
w ± i _______% iX2§rnlof?^ 1.1.3.3
1.2.2
1.2 Glut and S peculate
early (0.2)
,1.2.3
1.3.1.1L3.1 1.3.1.2
1.3.1.3
Ipeculate
1.3.3.1
1.3.3 1.3.3.2Import
only
required 
amount 
of paste
1.3.3.3
2. Arrives one month
late (0.2)
F i g u r e  5 . 3  A  d e c i s i o n  t r e e  f o r  o n e  s t r a t e g y  a n d  f o u r  e v e n t s  
{ N o t e :  T r e e  n o t  c o m p l e t e d  a s  l o w e r  b r a n c h e s  a r e
d u p l i c a t e d  )
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TABLE 5.5: EXPECTATION OF POSSIBLE EVENTS OCCURRING TO
GOW'S IMPORT AND PRODUCTION PROGRAMME
MAY 1973
Possible Events Probability
SHIPPING:
Paste arrives on schedule 0.7
Paste arrives one month late 0.2
Paste arrives two months late 0.1
AUSTRALIAN CROP:
Normal yield and harvest by March 0.6
Glut and early harvest in January 0.2
Shortage and late harvest in May 0.2
COMPETITORS' BEHAVIOUR:
Import normal requirements 0.5
Speculate 0.25
Import less 0.25
CONSUMER REACTION:
None 0.6
Demand falls ten per cent 0.25
Demand falls twenty per cent 0.15
Note: These probabilities are assigned estimates and
not derived from more reliable probability 
distributions.
Source: Field survey.
The joint probability of one event occurring is the 
product of each individual probability assigned to the events 
in Table 5.5. In Figure 5.3 the joint unconditional 
probability of event 1.1.1.1 occurring is
P(l.1.1.1) = 0.7 x 0.6 x 0.5 x 0.6 = 0.126.
This is one of several formulae available but suits this 
particular problem best (Newman, 1971: 19-21). Its validity
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rests upon the independence of events. In the example of 
Gow such independence cannot be established without longer- 
term observations.
The decision trees for the three importing strategies 
-- A, B , and C -- are combined in Figure 5.4, and Strategy D, 
no import activity (thus having fewer possible outcomes), is 
set out in Figure 5.5. Individual joint probabilities and 
payoffs are listed in the right-hand columns of both trees 
and from this array the decision criteria are calculated.
In Figure 5.4 all relevant estimated monetary value (EMV) 
calculations are included to demonstrate not only their 
origins, but also the ease of calculation.
The three decision criteria -- EMV, payoff range and 
most likely payoff -- for the four strategies are shown in 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 and summarized in Table 5.6. A comparison 
of each EMV shows that Strategy B -- import 194 tonnes -- 
has the highest value. But upon examining other measures 
in Table 5.6 the resource base of the decision-maker must 
exert some influence. If seeking to maximize returns 
Strategy C offers a possible $105 600 profit. For the loss 
minimizer, Strategy B has the least possible loss of $8 000 
while Strategy A has a possible loss of $66 000. Finally, 
if seeking the highest most likely payoff, Strategy A has 
an attraction but as we have seen the possible loss is high.
If the decision must be made immediately then Strategy B
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rcTTMATny
MON H A R T  
VALUE 
( E H V )  t
A 44 395 
B 49 062 
C 45 320
S H I P P I N G  A U S T R A L I A N  COMTE T 1 T O R S ' CONSUMER J O I N T
AR R IVA L CROP BE HAVIOUR R E A C T IO N  P R O B A B I L I T Y
( 0 . 6 )
(0.50)0.21
( 0 . I S )
(0.60) 
(0.25) 
____ (0.15)
(0.60)
____  0.25
(0.15)
A 26 885
B 2 4  7 7 4
C 2 3  1 6 9
(0.60)
0.42
(0.25)0.105
(0.25)0.105
(0.70) 0.035
0.035
( 0 . 20)
0.14
0.035
0 . 0 3 5
0.065A 6 836
B 6 589
C 7 4 1 6
(0.60)
0.12
A 6  3 5 7
B 9 019
C 9 501 1 386
( 0 . 20 )
0.04
( 0 . 20 )
A -606
B 2 100
( 0 . 20 )
0.04
2 715
2 403
3 548
(0.60)
0.06
0.015
0.015
A 3 646
B 4 0 4 5
C 4 191
0.005
0.005
( 0 . 20 )
0. 02
0.005
0.005
0.1260
0.0525
0.0315
0.063
0.02625
0.01575
0.063
0.02625
0.01575
0.042
0.021
0.021
0.042
0.0175
0.0105
0.021
0.00875
0.00525
0.021
0.00875
0.00525
0.039
0.01625
0.00975
0.018
0.018
0.0075
0.0045
0.012
0.006
0.006
0.012
0.005
0.003
0.006
0.0025
0.0015
0.006
0.0025
0.0015
0.018
0.0075
0.0045
0.009
0.009
0.00375
0.00225
0.006
0.003
0.003
0.006
0.0025
0.0015
0.003
0.00125
0.00075
0.003
0.00125
0.00075
p a y o e f s
e v e n t  gy- t t r a t f g y
A l  B S C $
1 .1 .1 .1 pn non] 70 000 67 800
2 64 000 64 000 72 800
3 63 000 59 000 75 800
2.1 63 000 59 000 67 800
2 I I / / / /
3 / / / / / /
3.1 78 000 70 000 65 800
2 70 000 64 000 / /
3 63 000 59 000 I I
1.2.1.1 29 000 21 000 56 000
2 I I / / I I
3 I I / / I I
2.1 11 000 0 38 900
2 I I I I I I
3 I I I I I I
3.1 41 000 21 000
1
2 I I / / / /
3 I I / / / /
1 .3 .1 .1 43 000 71 000 24 000
2 37 000 64 000 23 000
3 31 000 57 000 21 000
2.1 38 000 71 000 19 000
2 31 000 64 000 17 000
3 27 000 57 000 15 000
3.1 43 000 p j io n j 24 000
2 37 000 78 000 23 000
3 31 000 69 000 21 000
2.1 .1 .1 65 800 63 000 67 800
2 59 500 57 000 67 800
3 58 200 51 000 65 000
2.1 50 800 51 000 67 800
2 I I / / I I
3 //• / / / /
3.1 65 800 63 000 63 000
2 59 500 57 000 58 000
3 53 200 51 000 55 000
2.2 .1 .1 28 800 21 000 51 140
2 / / / / / /
3 I I / / I I I
2.1 -15 200 E l i ! m 32 600
2 / / I I / /
3 / / I I / /
3.1 28 800 21 000 96 200
2 / / / / / /
3 / / I I / /
2 .3 .1 .1 -51 200 55 000 18 000
2 24 800 51 000 17 000
3 18 800 45 000 18 000
2.1 -55 200 55 000 18 000
2 19 800 51 000 15 000
3 13 800 45 000 14 000
3.1 -50 200 55 000 18 000
2 24 800 51 000 17 000
3 18 800 45 000 18 000
3.1 .1 .1 55 000 47 000 67 800
2 49 800 4  3 000 67 800
3 44 600 39 000 67 800
2.1 41 000 43 000 67 800
2 / / / / / /
3 / / I I / /
3.1 55 000 47 000 63 000
2 49 800 4  3 000 58 000
3 4 4  600 39 000 53 000
3.2 .1 .1 18 000 62 000 75 000
2 / / / / / /
3 / / / / / /
2.1 -26 000 56 000 32 000
2 / / / / / /
3 / / / / / /
3.1 18 000 62 000 55 000
2 I I I I / /
3 I I I I / /
3 .3 .1 .1 -61 000 49 600 0
2 1 4  000 45 000 0 000
3 8 000 41 000 6 000
2.1 PSTBÜÖI 49 600 n r n s
2 9 000 45 000 -8 000
3 0 41 000 -10 000
3.1 -61 000 4 4  000 -8 000
2 1 4  000 41 000 -8 000
3 8 000 35 000 -8 000
F i g u r e  5 . 4  D e c i s i o n  t r e e  f o r  S t r a t e g i e s  A,  B a n d  C,  May 1 9 7 3 .
( No t e  I a)  Th e  EMV f o r  e a c h  s t r a t e g y  i s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  
£ i  IS p a y o f f  ( j o i n t  p r o b a b 1 1 1 t y ) | .
1. 1
E a c h  s t r a t e g y  h a s  b e e n  s u b - t o t a l e d  u n d e r  t h e  c o l u m n  
A u s t r a l i a n  C r o p ,  a n d  a g a i n  u n d e r  S h i p p i n g  A r r i v a l .
b)  Ra n g e  i n  p a y o f f s  s h own t h u s ,  f ~ 78 QQQI
|~ T 6 ~ 0 0 0 ]
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EMV
$
AUSTRALIAN
CROP
COMPETITORS'
BEHAVIOUR
CONSUMER
REACTION
JOINT
PROBABILITY
EVENT PAYOFF
$
(0.06) 0.18 0.1.1.1 35 500
(0.50) ----  0.25) 0.075 2 32 000
(0.15) 0.045 3 29 000
13 725 2.1 //
(0.60) —  (0.25) 2 //
3 //
0.09 3.1 25 500
(0.25) 0.0375 2 23 000
0.0225 3 21 000
0.06 0.2.1.1 (78 000|
2 //
3 //
9 120 0.03 2.1 70 000
21 645 (0.20) 2 //
3 //
0.03 3.1 78 000
2 //
3 //
0.06 0.3.1.1 -5 000
2 //
3 //
■1 200 0.03 2.1 (-15 000|
(0.20) 2 //
3 //
0.03 3.1 -15 000
2 //| 3 //
Figure 5.5 The decision tree for Strategy D , May 1974
Note : Range in payoffs shown thus,
78 000
-15 000
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should be implemented. However, as time is available for 
additional information to be gathered a re-assessment of the 
decision probabilities can be made. One of the advantages 
from an application of decision theory is that a value for 
perfect information can be derived. This technique is not 
used for these examples but is discussed in Appendix Two.
TABLE 5.6: EXPECTED MONETARY VALUE AND EXPOSURE TO GAIN AND
LOSS, MAY 1974
T? 7
Payoff
Strategy Course of Action
$ Range
$
Most
Likely
$
A Import only the 
required amount 44 395
78
-66
000
000 78 000
B Anticipate a shortage in 
1974 and import an 
additional fifty tonnes
49 062 86-8
000
000 70 000
C Anticipate a glut in 
1974 and import only 
eighty-two tonnes
45 320 105-13
600
000 67 800
D Import nothing and with­
draw from the market 
for three to five 
months
21 645 78-15
000
000 35 500
Reappraising the 1973-74 tree; step two in Gow's decision 
process
We can assume that Gow have gathered more information and 
re-assessed the probabilities of outcomes. These are listed in
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Table 5.7. There is increased pessimism about the arrival 
on time of imported paste. This probability has been 
lowered from 0.7 to 0.65. The increasing unlikelihood of 
a glut in tomatoes is reflected in a change from 0.2 to 0.1 
accompanied by a firmer belief that the crop will be short. 
There is a lift from 0.25 to 0.3 in the probability that 
competitors will import more than their normal requirements. 
Finally, no change is considered likely in demand elasticity. 
Payoffs have also been adjusted. The cost of collecting 
necessary information -- assumed to be $3 000 has been 
subtracted from the original payoff tables. Consequently, 
we now have different decision trees for the four strategies 
(Fig. 5.6 and 5.7). The re-adjusted decision criteria are 
summarized in Table 5.8. A comparison of these results with 
those of May 1973 shows no change in the choice of Strategy 
B using the criteria of expected value (the EMV index) and 
exposure to gain and loss.
Gow's actual results differed from those considered in 
the decision context under Strategy B. The imported paste 
arrived on schedule but Gow's agents could only procure 
seventy tonnes instead of the desired 194 tonnes (under 
Strategy B). The 1974 Australian crop failed and of the 
214 tonnes of domestic paste required, only 165 tonnes could 
be purchased. This combined shortage led to Gow's actual 
sales of sauce being 470 tonnes below target. Competing pro­
cessors imported what they could get, which was also short
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Figure 5.7 T h e  d e c i s i o n  
Ho t e :  R a n g e
tree for Strategy D, July 1973
in payoffs shown thus, 75 000 
- 1 2  000
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of their requirements. Finally, there was no detectable 
consumer reaction because sauce supply was much lower than 
the anticipated demand. The estimated actual payoff was 
$53 000 rather than $68 000 using Strategy B, event 1.3.1.1 
(Fig. 5.6). We shall return to these results after looking 
at the continuing decision problem in 1974-75.
TABLE 5.7: EXPECTATIONS OF POSSIBLE EVENTS OCCURRING TO
GOW'S IMPORT AND PRODUCTION PROGRAMME
JULY 1973
Possible Events Probability
SHIPPING:
Paste arrives on schedule 0.65
Paste arrives one month late 0.25
Paste arrives two months late 0.10
AUSTRALIAN CROP:
Normal yield and harvest 0.60
Glut and early harvest 0.10
Shortage and late harvest 0.30
COMPETITORS' BEHAVIOUR:
Import normal requirements 0.50
Speculate 0. 30
Import Less 0.20
CONSUMER REACTION:
None 0.60
Demand falls ten per cent 0.25
Demand falls twenty per cent 0.15
The continuing problem, 1974-75; step three in the decision 
process
In this 1974-75 decision period the process is repeated 
aiming towards the same cost minimization - sales expansion
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TABLE 5.8: REAPPRAISED ESTIMATED MONETARY VALUE AND EXPOSURE
TO GAIN AND LOSS t JULY 1973
Payoff
Strategy Course of Action EMV
$ Range$
Most
Likely
$
A Import only the 
required amount 38 891
75
-63
000
000 75 000
B Import an additional 
fifty tonnes 44 164
83
-8
000
000 67 000
C Import only eighty- 
two tonnes 40 020
102
-10.
600
000 64 800
D Import nothing 14 835 75-12
000
000 32 500
objectives. In May 1974, the future of paste supplies 
appeared even more precarious than the previous year. Gow's 
supply of Australian paste from the poor 1974 crop had been 
exhausted with forty-seven tonnes delivered in June. In 
addition, paste prices on the world market rose $100 to $800 
per tonne for the increasingly scarce supply. The future of 
the 1975 Australian crop was uncertain but it was assumed 
that aggregate supply would be considerably less than aggre­
gate demand. Drawing upon the unattained sales target 
figures and expected paste supplies in Table 5.1 we can re­
develop the import strategies:
Strategy A: Import 285 tonnes of paste in expectation
of a normal Australian crop;
Strategy B: Import 430 tonnes in expectation of a
poor crop;
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Strategy C: Import 210 tonnes in expectation of
an early glut; and
Strategy D: Import no paste (to assess this
alternative).
The following considerations explain an increased pessimism 
concerning possible influences on future events 
(Table 5.9):
i) shipping delays are expected due to a combination 
of ship departure and stevadoring problems;
ii) the Australian crop yield is expected to be low 
and harvested late;
iii) competing processors are expected to import more 
than their immediate requirements; and
iv) consumer demand elasticity remains untested 
therefore is left at zero.
TABLE 5.9: EXPECTATIONS OF POSSIBLE EVENTS OCCURRING TO GOW'S
IMPORT AND PRODUCTION PROGRAMME
MAY 1974
Possible Events Probability
SHIPPING:
Paste arrives on schedule 0.50
Paste arrives one month late 0.30
Paste arrives two months late 0.20
AUSTRALIAN CROP:
Normal yield and harvest 0.50
Glut and early harvest 0.20
Shortage and late harvest 0.30
COMPETITORS' BEHAVIOUR:
Import normal requirements 0.50
Speculate 0.40
Import less 0.10
CONSUMER REACTION:
None 0.60
Demand falls ten per cent 0.25
Demand falls twenty per cent 0.15
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As with the 1973-74 analysis, the four strategies have 
been displayed in Figures 5.8 and 5.9. From these the 
EMVs have been calculated and together with the decision 
criteria, are summarized in Table 5.10. Of the four EMVs, 
Strategy B has the highest value but only marginally above 
that of Strategy C. The EMV for Strategy D is so low that 
it can be discarded. This leaves no clear choice of strategy. 
The most likely payoff for both Strategies A and C is 
financially greater than for Strategy B, as are the highest 
possible payoffs. Consequently, resource base and attitude 
to risk can again be expected to exert a strong influence. 
Because of the imminent shortage of paste we will assume 
that Gow should immediately implement Strategy A while 
gathering further information to reappraise the strategies.
This move will then ensure a supply of paste up to 
February 1975.
Another reappraisal; step four in the decision process
By August 1974, the changing situation can be re-assessed. 
Between May and July, the arrival of imports under Strategy 
A had been held back two months due to shipping and steva- 
doring problems. The yield of the coming Australian crop 
was even less certain due to further flooding in the Goulburn 
Valley but because more area might be planted in Gippsland 
mere was no change in crop yield probabilities. Gow's 
competitors, recognizing an aggrevated shortage of paste were,
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MONl I  ARY 
VA LUE
S H H ’ I ’ IN G
PERFORMANCE
A U S T R A L I A N
CROP
C O M I ' t  T [ T O R S '  
BLMAVIOUR
C O N S I IM l  R 
R L A C T I O N
( 0 . 5 0 )
0 .2 5
( 0 . 5 )
A 51 781 
B 53 435 
C 52 367
( 0 . 3 )
(0. 2)
( 0 . 20 )
0.10
0 .1 5
( 0 . 2 )
0 .0 6
( 0 . 3 )
0 .0 9
( 0 . 5 )
0.1
( 0 . 02 )
0 .0 4
( 0 . 3 )
0 .0 6
A 18 690 ( 0 . 5 )  0 .1 2 5  
B 12 822 
C 14 997
A 3 415 
B 5 045 
C 9 450
( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 1 0
( 0 . 1 0 ) 0 . 0 2 5
0 .0 5
0 .0 4
0.01
A 3 377 
B 5 825 
C 3 492
A 5 150 
B 3 933 
C 3 682
A 724 
B 1 450 
C 2 926
A 7 151 0 .0 7 5
B 10 644
C 5 520
( 0 . 3 0 )
0 .0 6
0 .1 5
0 .0 1 5
A 9 817 0 .0 7 5
B 7 696
C 6 097
( 0 . 5 )
0 .0 1 5
A 1 636 0 .0 3
B 2 607
C 4 509
0 .0 2 4
0 .0 0 6
0 .0 4 5
0 .0 3 6
0 .0 0 9
0 .0 5
0 .0 4
0.01
0.02
0 .0 1 6
0 .0 0 4
A 1 821 0 .0 3
B 3 513
C 894
0 .0 2 4
0 .0 0 6
( 0 . 6 0 )
0 .2 5
( 0 . 1 5 )
J O I N T
PROBABILITY
PA YO I  r
STRATEGY STRATEGY STRATEGY
A \ B S C \
0 .0 7 5 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 Km 60 000 69 000
0 .0 3 12 5 2 78 000 54 000 62 000
0 .0 1 8 7 5 3 67 000 4 7 000 55 000
0 .0 6 2.1 67 000 46 000 55 000
0 .0 2 5 2 60 000 41 000 50 000
0 .0 1 5 3 54 000 37 000 45 000
0 .0 1 5 3.1 87 000 60 000 69 000
0 .0 0 6 2 5 2 87 000 54 000 62 000
0 .0 0 3 7 5 3 78 000 4 7 000 55 000
0 .0 3 1 . 2 . 1 . 1 37 000 54 000
0 .0 1 2 5 2 33 000 49 000 90 000
0 .0 0 7 5 3 30 000 44 000 80 000
0 .0 2 4 2.1 35 000 52 000 100 000
0 .0 1 0 2 31 000 4 7 000 90 000
0 .0 0 6 3 28 000 4 2 000 80 000
0 .0 0 6 3.1 37 000 54 000 100 000
0 .0 0 2 5 2 33 000 49 000 90 000
0 .0 0 1 5 3 30 000 44 000 80  000
0 .0 4 5 1 . 3 . 1 . 1 53 000 39 000
0 .0 1 8 7 5 2 48 000 68 000 35 000
0 .0 1 12 5 3 4 2 000 60 000 31 000
0 .0 3 6 2.1 48 000 75 000 39 000
0 .0 1 5 2 43 000 68 000 35 000
0 .0 0 9 3 38 000 60 000 31 000
0 .0 0 9 3.1 48 000 75 000 39 000
0 .0 0 37 5 2 4 3 000 67 000 35 000
0 .0 0 2 2 5 3 38 000 59 000 31 000
0 .0 4 5 2 . 1 . 1 . 1 75 000 53 000 53 000
0 .0 1 8 7 5 2 67 000 47 000 48 000
0 .0 1 1 2 5 3 60 000 42 000 42 000
0 .0 3 6 2.1 60 000 40 000 42 000
0 .0 1 5 2 •54 000 36 000 38 000
0 .0 0 9 3 48 000 31 000 34 000
0 .0 0 9 3.1 75 000 53 000 53 000
0 .0 0 3 7 5 2 75 000 4 7 000 48 000
0 .0 0 2 2 5 3 68 000 42 000 42 000
0 .0 1 8 2 . 2 . 1 . 1 30 000 4 7 000 88 000
0 .0 0 7 5 2 27 000 4 2 000 79 000
0 .0 0 4 5 3 24 000 37 000 70 000
0 .0 1 44 2.1 27 000 45 000 88 000
0 .0 0 6 2 24 000 40 000 79 000
0 .0 0 3 6 3 22 000 35 000 70 000
0 .0 0 3 6 3.1 30 000 4 7 000 88 000
0 .0 0 1 5 2 27 000 42 000 79 000
0 .0 0 0 9 3 24 000 37 000 70 000
0 .0 2 7 2 . 3 . 1 . 1 42 000 68 000 41 000
0 .0 1 12 5 2 38 000 63 000 37 000
0 .0 0 6 7 5 3 36 000 64 000 33 000
0 .0 2 1 6 2.1 37 000 68 000 41 000
0 .0 0 9 2 33 000 63 000 37 000
0 .0 0 5 4 3 30 000 54 000 33 000
0 .0 0 54 3.1 37 000 68 000 41 000
0 .0 0 2 2 5 2 33 000 64 000 37 000
0 .0 0 1 3 5 3 30 000 57 000 33 000
0 .0 3 3 . 1 . 1 . 1 59 000 4 7 000 42 000
0 .0 1 2 5 2 53 000 42 000 38 000
0 .0 0 7 5 3 48 000 37 000 34 000
0 .0 2 4 2.1 47 000 34 000 34 000
0 .0 1 0 2 42 000 30 000 31 000
0 .0 0 6 3 38 000 27 000 28 000
0 .0 0 6 3.1 59 000 4 7 000 42 000
0 .0 0 25 2 59 000 42 000 38 000
0 .0 0 1 5 3 53 000 37 000 34 000
0 .0 1 2 3 . 2 . 1  .1 20 000 40 000 77 000
0 .0 0 5 2 18 000 36 000 70 000
0 .0 0 3 3 16 000 h 00T| 63 000
0 .0 0 9 6 2.1 18 000 38 000 77 000
0 .0 0 4 2 16 000 34 000 70 000
0 .0 0 2 4 3 O a j i q o ) 30 000 63 000
0 .0 0 24 3.1 20 000 40 000 7 7 000
0 .001 2 18 000 36 000 70 000
0 .0 0 0 6 3 16 000 32 000 63 000
0 .0 1 8 3 . 3 . 1 . 1 32 000 62 000 16 000
0 .0 0 7 5 2 29 000 56 000 14 000
0 .0 0 4 5 3 26 000 49 000 12 000
0 .0 1 44 2.1 32 000 62 000 16 000
0 .0 0 6 2 29 000 56 000 14 000
0 .0 0 3 6 3 26 000 49 000 12 000
0 .0 0 3 6 3.1 32 000 62 000 16 000
0 .0 0 1 5 2 29 000 56 000 14 000
0 .0 0 0 9 3 26 000 49 000 IT 2 ÖÖ3
FIGURE 5 . 8 :  D e c i s i o n  t r e e  f o r  S t r a t e g i e s  A , 8 and C, May 1974.
El
N o t e :  Range I n  p a y o f f s  shown t h u s ,  P~4 000|
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E M V A U S T R A L I A N C O M P E T I T O R S ' C O N S U M E R J O I N T E V E N T P A Y O r F
$ C R O P B E H A V I O U R R E A C T I O N P R O B A B I L I T Y $
( 0 . 6 0 ) 0 . 1 5 0 0 . 1 . 1 . 1 2 0 0 0
( 0 . 5 0 ) ( 0 . 2 5  0 . 0 6 2 5 2 1 0 0 0
0 . 2 5 ( 0 . 1 5 ) 0 . 0 3 7 5 3 0
0 . 1 2 2 . 1 2  0 0 0
( 0 . 5 0 ) ( 0 . 4 ) 0 . 0 5 2 1 0 0 0
0 . 2 0 0 . 0 3 3 0
0 . 0 3 3 . 1 2 0 0 0
( 0 . 1 ) 0 . 0 1 2 5 2 1 0 0 0
0 . 0 5 0 . 0 0 7 5 3 0
0 . 0 6 0 . 2 . 1 . 1 123 0001
0 . 0 2 5 2 21 0 0 0
0 . 1 0 0 . 0 1 5 3 19  0 0 0
0 . 0 4 8 2 . 1 2 3  0 0 0
( 0 . 2 0 ) 0 . 0 2 0 2 21 0 0 0
0 . 0 8 0 . 0 1 2 3 19  0 0 0
0 . 0 1 2 3 . 1 2 3  0 0 0
0 . 0 0 5 2 21  0 0 0
0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 3 3 19  0 0 0
0 . 0 9 0 . 3 . 1 . 1 H O  0001
0 . 0 3 7 5 2 / /
0 7 1 5 0 . 0 2 2 5 3 / /
0 . 0 7 2 2 . 1 - 1 0  0 0 0
( 0 . 3 0 ) 0 . 0 3 2 / /
0 . 1 2 0 . 0 1 8 3 / /
0 . 0 1 8 3 . 1 - 1 0  0 0 0
0 . 0 0 7 5 2 / /
0 . 0 3 0 . 0 0 4 5 3 / /
Figure 5.9 The decision 
N o t e : Range
tree for Strategy D, May 1974.
in payoffs shown thus
23 000
-10 000
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TABLE 5.10: THE ESTIMATED MONETARY VALUE AND EXPOSURE TO
GAIN AND LOSS
MAY 1974
Payoff
Strategy Course of Action EMV
$ Range$
Most
Likely
$
A Import 285 tonnes in 
expectation of a 
normal Australian 
crop
51 781 8714
000
000 87 000
B Import 430 tonnes in 
expectation of a 
poor crop
53 435 7522
000 .
000 60 000
C Import 210 tonnes in 
expectation of an 
early glut
52 367 10012
000
000 69 000
D Import no paste 3 305 23-10
000
000 2 000
according to 'trade' information, speculating by importing 
more than their immediate requirements. Expected consumer 
behaviour remained unchanged; sales had begun to fall early 
in 1974 due to the shortage of paste but by July they were 
above budget expectations. In August, with paste again in 
short supply because of delayed shipping, sales had fallen 
away but tnere was no firm indication of any consumer 
reaction which would cause Gow to alter these probabilities. 
The new range of expectations is shown in Table 5.11.
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TABLE 5.11: EXPECTATIONS OF POSSIBLE EVENTS OCCURRING
TO GOW'S IMPORT AND PRODUCTION PROGRAMME
AUGUST 1974
Probability
SHIPPING:
No longer of interest 
AUSTRALIAN CROP:
Normal yield and harvest 0.50
Glut and early harvest 0.20
Shortage and late harvest 0.30
COMPETITORS' BEHAVIOUR:
Import normal requirements 0.20
Speculate 0.70
Import less 0.10
CONSUMER REACTION:
None 0.60
Demand falls ten per cent 0.25
Demand falls twenty per cent 0.15
Because Strategy A has been implemented the arrival of 
additional shipments is no longer critical. Consequently 
shipping performance can be removed from the analysis. New 
payoffs for the modified importing strategy were calculated 
by subtracting $6 000 for additional information and supply 
option costs from the May 1974 payoffs. These amounts 
and the recalculated joint probabilities are shown in the 
decision tree in Figure 5.10 with the revised decision 
criteria listed in Table 5.12. The results from this 
revision offer little additional guidance. The EMVs for 
both strategies are lower because of altered payoff vectors 
and joint probabilities, and because of this, there is a
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FSTTMÄTÜT 
MONETARY 
VALUE $
AUSTRALIAN
CROP
COMPETITORS'
BEHAVIOUR
CONSUMERS
REACTION
EVENT PAYOFF
STRATEGY A STRATEGY B
0 . 1 . 1 . 1
2
3
2.1
2
3
3 .1  
2 
3
0 . 2.1 .1 
2 
3
2.1 
2 
3
3 . 1  
2 
3
0 . 3 . 1 . 1  
2 
3
2 . 1  
2 
3
3 .1
2
3
E>5 0001
50
44
43 
39 
34
55
50
44
16
14
12
14
12
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
[10 pool
16 000 
14 0 0 0  
12 000
28
25
23
28
25
23
28
25
23
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
41 0 0 0  
36  0 0 0  
31 0 0 0
2 8  0 0 0  
24 0 0 0  
IToTlÖ] 
41 0 0 0  
36 0 0 0  
31 0 0 0
34
30
26
32
28
24
34
30
26
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
gTöööl
50
43
56
50
43
56
50
43
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
F i g u r e  5 . 1 0  D e c i s i o n  t r e e s  r e v i s e d  S t r a t e g i e s  A a n d  B , 
A u g u s t  1 974
[~55 PCM)
Note'. R a n g e  i n  p a y o f f s  sh o w n  t h u s ,
10 000
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bias towards Strategy B. The range in payoffs is similar 
but a considerable difference exists between the respective 
'most likely' payoffs. The choice rests between the safer 
course of Strategy B or the greater risk but higher payoff 
in Strategy A.
TABLE 5.12: THE REVISED ESTIMATED MONETARY VALUES AND
EXPOSURE TO GAIN AND LOSS
AUGUST 1974
Strategy Course of Action EMV
$
Payoff
Range
$
Most
Likely
$
A Implemented but paste 32 692 55 000 43 000two months late 10 000
B Import an additional 56 000145 tonnes - total 36 665 w / v_/ w  v  U21 000 28 000430 tonnes
C No longer considered - - -
D No longer considered - - -
Decision Theory and Gow; what value?
Gow actually followed a course of action similar to 
Strategy B and imported 436 tonnes, six more than required 
by the calculated strategy. The first shipment was two 
months late and the final shipment arrived in December.
At this time the 1975 crop prospects were still poor and 
Gow moved the imported paste into the manufacturing area
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rather than to bond storage. While the Australian harvest 
was somewhat late the yield was exceptionally high and Gow 
were unable to take advantage of the lower priced domestic 
paste. This was compounded by the large inventory charge 
for the manufactured sauce, the result of a 30 per cent 
fall in expected demand. The estimated actual payoff for 
Gow was calculated at $35 000 while the result from the 
decision analysis -- Strategy B.0.2.2.3 -- when adjusted 
down for the greater fall in demand and up due to no bond 
charges was $38 000.
Both actual and modelled flows for the two years have 
been set out in Table 5.13. In the 1974-75 decision period, 
Gow appears to have responded in a lagged fashion to the 
previous year's shortage. In a subjective 'rule of thumb' 
manner the 1974-75 import programme coincided with that 
developed from the decision model and while both results 
were far from the best attainable, considerable value has 
been gained from the modelling. Clearly this simple norma­
tive approach has not improved upon the decisions made by 
experienced purchasing personnel although the model estab­
lishes a framework within which to tackle the problem of 
uncertainty. Given more development it holds promise of 
a guide to better results. It is important to stress that 
such an improvement cannot be made without recognition of 
the decision-maker's skills and experience. We shall
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return to this topic after observing how decision analysis 
can be used with the inventory problem of Bulmer Australia.
DECISION THEORY AND BULMER AUSTRALIA
Unlike Gow who faced uncertain supply in the years 
1973-75, Bulmer Australia's supply was assured by their 
operations in Tasmania. But because the demand for concen­
trated apple juice fell unexpectedly in 1974, stocks rose to 
270 000 litres when the 1975 crushing season ended. This 
volume would diminish through Bulmer's own cider needs and 
other small orders, but only to a level where a small 
portion of the 1976 apple intake would be needed. We have 
seen in Chapter Four that Bulmer had two alternatives -- 
accept the 1976 apple crop or break the grower contracts.
The problem environment can be modelled within the decision 
theory framework to evaluate alternative strategies: a
process which rests upon supply and demand data supplied 
by Bulmer.
This problem is an extension of that experienced by 
Gow where only supply variations were modelled. For Bulmer, 
the decision to break the contract or purchase all fruit 
offered in the 1976 season hinges upon inventory levels 
over the years 1975-76 and 1976-77. These can be estimated 
from anticipated supply and demand volumes for the two years. 
Expected results are shown in Table 5.14 together with the
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TABLE 5.14: BULMER AUSTRALIA'S
EXPECTATIONS
DEMAND AND SUPPLY
Possible Events Probability
1975-76
Supply:
Tasmanian apple crop: Normal 445 000 litres 0.6
Glut 550 000 IV 0.2
Short 330 000 II 0.2
Demand: 345 000 IV 0.6
380 000 II 0.3
415 000 II 0.1
1976-77
Supply:
Tasmanian apple crop: Normal 445 000 II 0.5
Glut 550 000 II 0.25
Short 330 000 II 0.25
Demand: 300 000 IV 0.6
375 000 II 0.3
450 000 II 0.1
Note: a) These probabilities are assigned estimates and not
derived from more reliable probability distributions.
b) Quantities are equivalent litres of 7.5:1 juice 
concentrate available to Bulmer.
Source: Field survey.
assigned estimates of outcome probabilities. Supply can range 
between shortage and glut, the equivalent in concentrated 
juice of 330 000 litres to 550 000 litres. Although shrouded 
in greater uncertainty, possible crop yields in 1977 have 
been kept at the same levels. Demand in 1975-76 can vary 
between 345 000 and 415 000 litres, a variation coming from 
possible export orders. For 1976-77, demand has been given
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a wider range, from 300 000 litres to 450 000 litres 
(Table 5.14).
As indicated, the problem revolves about purchasing 
apples under the final year of the contract. Two types of 
cost must be evaluated. The first is the cost of increased 
stocks, composed of capital invested in stainless steel 
tanks, and interest on funds invested in the concentrated 
juice. The second is the final cost per litre of juice for 
purchasing and processing fruit. This may off-set the 
inventory costs and for both years under the three outcomes, 
expected costs have been listed in Table 5.15. Within the 
decision tree framework, we can derive values for the 
decision criteria.
TABLE 5.15: COST EXPECTATIONS UNDER VARYING SUPPLY CONDITIONS
($ per litre)
Supply Conditions
Contractual Arrangement for 1976
Honour Break
1976 Crop normal 0.2 0.2
II glut 0.2 0.18
II short 0.2 0.225
1977 Crop normal 0.25 0.275
ll glut 0.25 0.250
II short 0.25 0.3
Note: The minimum price for processing fruit is set by the
Tasmanian Fruit Board. The prices set out in this 
table are meant to reflect changes in the juice yield 
per tonne of fruit rather than in price paid to 
growers.
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If Bulmer honour the contract, with a carry-over stock 
of 270 000 litres, juice stocks can vary during 1975-76 from 
185 000 to 475 000 litres but would most likely be about 
370 000 litres. But the benefit of a sound processor-grower 
relationship, one of Bulmer's original aims, will be that 
the company can expect a reliable supply of high yielding 
fruit. This implies an attractive cost per litre of juice.
If they break the contract, then the first year advantage 
is lower inventory costs. However, the cost of juice could 
be higher in 1975-76 and considerably higher in .1976-77 
(Table 5.15).
The problem is set out in Figure 5.11 and covers two 
years -- 1976 and 1977. This is a suitable time-horizon, 
for the critical decision must be made about the 1976 crop.
If the contract is broken, branches expand through supply 
and demand outcomes for two years making a possible eighty- 
one outcomes. If the contract is honoured then supply for 
1976-77 can be ignored. Stocks will only need a small 
supplement to meet possible demand volumes. This strategy 
offers a possible twenty-seven outcomes. Joint probabilities 
for all outcomes under each strategy have been calculated 
together with the payoffs and are listed in Figures 5.12 
and 5.13. Each payoff is the estimated profit from juice 
sales for each outcome and accounts for inventory costs 
and the range in fruit prices. Unlike Gow, Bulmer are not 
faced with a possible loss.
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F i g u r e  5 . 1 1  B u l m e r ' s c o n t r a c t u a l  c h o i c e  d e c i s i o n  t r e e .
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1976 1977
TASMANIAN DEMAND DEMÄND EVENT PAYOFF
CROP
(0.6) 0.216 1 . 1.1
2
3
2.1
2
70 350 
74 000 
77 850
71 225 
74 975
(0.6) 0.3 0.108
(0.6)
0.36 (0.1) 0.036
0.108
(0.3) 0.054
OTTB 0.Ü10 3 78 725
0.036 3.1 72 100
(0.1) 0.018 2 75 850
0756 0.006 3 79 600
0.072 2.1.1 [53 0751
0.036 2 11 350
0.12 0.012 3 80 180
0.036 2.1 63 570(0.2) 0.018 2 77 310
0.06 0.006 3 81 058
0.012 3.1 74 107
0.006 2 78 183
0.02 0.002 3 B1 9301
0.072 3.1.1 68 125
0.036 2 71 875Ö 7 Ö 1 7 3 75 625
0.036 2.1 69 000
(0.2) 0.018 2 72 750
0.006 3 76 500
0.012 3.1 69 875
0.006 2 73 625
0.002 3 77 375
Figure 5.13 Decision tree for honouring the contract.
53 075
81 930
Note: Range in payoffs shown thus
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The Estimated Monetary Value (EMV) for each strategy 
has been calculated and together with other decision 
criteria, is set out in Table 5.16. EMVs are marginally 
different, and this shifts the emphasis to the range in pay­
offs and to the most likely payoff. By honouring the contract, 
Bulmer is more likely to gain a higher profit consequently 
this is their best strategy.
TABLE 5.16: ESTIMATED MONETARY VALUES AND EXPOSURE TO GAIN
AND LOSS: BULMER AUSTRALIA
Strategy EMV
$
Payoff
Range
$
Most Likely 
$
Break the contract 
Honour the contract
69 439
70 930
76 400 
44 225
81 930 
53 075
55 900 
70 350
THE VALUE OF DECISION THEORY
By using decision theory Bulmer's problem was concisely 
considered. The difficult over-stock situation aggravated 
by the 1976 contract commitment emerged as the better of two 
alternatives. Bulmer did honour the contract, stocks rose 
rapidly but late in 1976, demand far exceeded expectations.
The 1976 South African and French apple crops failed and 
Bulmer Australia were one of the few processors able to export
142
quality juice. Consequently stocks were cleared in time 
for the 1977 Tasmanian apple crop (Bulmer, pers. com.).
For R.M. Gow, decision theory offered an improvement 
in 1973-74. Actual results were estimated at $53 000 whereas 
if the modelled strategy had been implemented, the payoff 
would have increased to $68 000. In 1974-75, neither Gow 
nor the model took sufficient account of the fall in demand. 
Actual payoff was $35 000 versus $38 000 for the model 
(adjusted for the unexpected fall in demand).
Apart from these financial considerations, decision 
theory is important in two ways when evaluating problems 
and alternative strategies. Firstly, when differences 
between relative decision criteria are small it is necessary 
to re-evaluate possible events, the probabilities of 
outcomes, and the calculation of payoffs. Clearly the 
decision-maker's experience is crucial in the formulation 
and re-evaluation of problems. In this respect decision 
theory constitutes an approach which is systematic in 
determining the relative importance of some factors; and it 
may lead to the recognition of vital influences which have 
hitherto been ignored. This is a useful form of sensitivity 
analysis.
The second benefit also rests upon the decision-maker's 
skills and information requirements. 'Rule-of-thumb' 
decision-making is the norm in the processing industry,
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principally due to the short time available to evaluate the 
problem. The more refined the decision process, the more 
expensive it is likely to be. Since all decisions are made 
under conditions of imperfect information, elegant calcula­
tions may offer no improvement upon 'rule-of-thumb' models.
As Baumöl and Quandt (1964: 23) indicate, it is not difficult 
to derive the appropriate marginal condition for an optimally 
imperfect decision.
However, there are other techniques for evaluating 
decision-making strategies under conditions of uncertainty.
In the following Chapter, we will combine the simple normative 
decision theory with an optimizing model. This approach 
allows us to expand the decision environment and compare 
the conduct of H.J. Heinz with that of R.M. Gow and Bulmer
Australia.
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CHAPTER SIX
TOWARDS CERTAINTY; ADDING AN OPTIMIZING 
MODEL TO DECISION THEORY
In the previous chapter, decision theory offered some 
help towards lessening uncertainty. There are, however, 
shortcomings inherent in the technique. The examples of Gow 
and Bulmer revolved about forward estimates over two years 
with re-assessments occurring at arbitrary intervals. What is 
required is an iterative approach offering a regülar feeding- 
back of results. Such an iterative mechanism can be incorpor­
ated into decision theory but the technique does not visually 
display the problem as a network of sources and sinks.
Among the range of heuristics and optimizers available 
which meets this requirement is one which has proven suitable 
in the context of uncertainty, and in particular, coping with 
supply, storage and demand restrictions. This is the Out-of- 
Kilter algorithm; when combined with decision theory, it 
provides a useful and practical approach for lessening 
uncertainty. H.J. Heinz provides a suitable example which 
focusses on purchases of tomatoes and tomato paste.
NETWORK PROBLEMS AND OUT-OF-KILTER 
ALGORITHM SOLUTIONS
The Out-of-Kilter algorithm (OKA) was initially developed
by Fulkerson (1961). It is simply an algorithm for solving
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least-cost flow problems in a network which has capacity 
constraints. In its basic form it is not a dynamic model 
as it can only solve problems within the network as 
structured, and the structure represents the researcher's 
view of a particular problem. The OKA has been used by 
Gauthier (1968) to analyse Brazilian transport networks and 
by King et at. (1971) in an investigation of coal movements 
in the Great Lakes region of North America. Sinclair and 
Kissling (1971) have used the OKA in an iterative application. 
They demonstrated how a particular network structure could 
represent the storage of a commodity at specific locations 
(apples in cool stores), which had to be available in subse­
quent time periods. Supplies of fruit from the orchards 
and the overseas shipping schedule were known. Past data 
were used to compare actual movement patterns initiated by 
the New Zealand Apple and Pear Board, with those which the 
optimizing procedure (OKA) produced. The problem is fully 
discussed by Sinclair (1969). Stochastic variations in 
fruit production and shipping schedules have since been 
introduced by Kissling (in press). With given information and 
estimates of future movements, the user can quickly test a 
company's 'rules of thumb' by observing the simulated 
results at each period and adjusting the next 
period's flows. The result compares the company's costs 
with the optimized minimum calculated by the OKA in an 
ex-post facto environment. The objective is to develop an aware­
ness that a seemingly expensive movement in time (t) may
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avoid a more expensive move in time (t + n). While this 
approach does not develop prescience, the player can cost 
out alternative procedures and have some appreciation of 
what may result.
Rather than adapt this gaming framework to the Australian 
situation, the problems of uncertainty within the context 
of H.J. Heinz Company Australia Ltd will be observed by 
using a simple and more controlled approach. The basic 
OKA formulation is applied in such a way that each month's 
input, stocks, and output for three years establishes flows 
through a network of nodes and arcs representing the Heinz 
operation. A set of alternative import strategies is then 
formulated, costed with the OKA and combined with decision 
theory to determine a set of decision criteria.
The basic Out-of-Kilter algorithm
Before examining this approach a brief outline of the 
Out-of-Kilter algorithm is necessary. The algorithm solves 
the problem of finding the minimum cost path through a net­
work of arcs and nodes where the flow is limited by upper 
capacities. Every node is linked to the network by at least 
two arcs, for any entering flow must be able to exit. Each 
arc has a specified cost per unit-moved which may be a com­
posite of transport and storage costs, purchase price and 
value added. In addition to cost, each arc has an upper and
lower capacity; the upper establishing the maximum volume 
allowed to flow along the respective arc while the lower 
specifies the volume that must pass along it.
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The objective of the OKA is to determine the pattern 
of flows through the network which has the minimum total 
cost (cm j_n) within the capacity limitations. This function 
can be expressed as
C . = £ c . . x . .m m  13 13
for all i and j , where c_^ is the transport cost on the 
i-jth arc and x ^  the flow, subject to the constraints,
L . . < x . . < U . . 13 - 13 - 13
for all i and j , where  ^ and  ^ are the lower and upper 
capacities on the i-jth arc, and
Z • x . . - £ . x . . 3 J1 3 13
This final constraint implies circularity. What flows into 
a node must exit and the destination nodes must be linked 
back to the origin with dummy arcs to complete the network.
A feasible solution yields the information as to which nodes 
ship to capacity, less than capacity, or not at all, and 
which arcs are fully or partially used. This will not be 
apparent in the Heinz model for the principal purpose here 
is to develop alternative strategies.
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The Heinz network
The network in Figure 6.1 is a schematic representation 
of Heinz Australia's manufacturing operation. The number 
of supply and demand nodes has been limited to allow our 
interest to concentrate on flow fluctuations. Supply nodes 
are prefixed with an S and demand nodes with a D. Between 
these sources and sinks is a set of storage and processing 
nodes. As tomatoes are supplied to the network, they are 
processed in a primary operation converting fruit to paste 
concentrate (node PI in Fig. 6.1). From this node, paste 
can be moved directly to the secondary processing of sauce 
(P2) , or into two intermediate stores (0S1 0S2 and
DS1 -> DS2) . Both have been given upper capacities so that 
flow can be forced further along the network toward the 
demand nodes, or to waste (W) . Dandenong storage (DS1 -> DS2) 
is attached to the factory and has been constrained to an 
upper volume of 5C0 tonnes which, if exceeded, would force 
a flow of paste to the more expensive outside storage 
(OS 1 -v 0S2) . A third storage facility is the product ware­
house (MWl -> MW2) supported by the metropolitan distribution 
centres. These are capable of absorbing excess stocks of 
product, but at a penalty cost. Every storage point has 
two nodes. The connecting arc ensures that stock held in 
the dual storage nodes has an inventory charge. In addition 
to the conventional entry and exit arcs, the storage nodes 
also have 'dummy' arcs (signified by dashed lines in Fig. 6.1).
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These dummies contain opening and closing stocks for each
period and with every iteration stock held in the 
storage nodes is shifted along these arcs so that a storage 
cost is calculated. Demand in states can be serviced either 
through direct links (MW2 -* DNSW) or through the metropolitan 
distribution centres (SDC2 -* DNSW) . Victoria and Tasmania 
have direct deliveries. Finally, total demand is linked 
back to total supply to close the network.
Heinz supplied information on volume and source of 
inputs, stockholdings and sales of all material moving 
through the Dandenong factory. From this wealth of data 
tomatoes and tomato products were used to seek improvements 
in the decision-making process. The flows moving through 
the Heinz system had been recorded in many forms which were 
converted to tonnes of tomato paste concentrate.
The network consists of sixty-six arcs and thirty-two 
nodes but many of the arcs remain inactive until the 
capacity of less costly alternative arcs is reached. The 
cost structure of the network is listed in Table 6.1. As 
with material flows, costs have been standardized to the 
equivalent of paste concentrate. In constructing the costs 
several assumptions have been made. The first is that the 
price of processing tomatoes is constant. It is set by 
negotiation between processors and the Victorian Farmers Union 
and is therefore excluded from the network costings. The
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second assumption is that tomatoes from Finley in New South 
Wales have a higher yield, but this bonus is countered by 
the cost of border inspection for disease and fumigation of 
empty containers. A third is that the unit cost of transport 
decreases the further the fruit is moved, a well-established 
scale economy. Finally, it is assumed that because of 
seasonal constraints imposed on the closer growing areas, 
fruit from the distant areas, while expensive to transport, 
is harvested early. Such a geographic spread prolongs the 
intake period helping to lessen capital outlay on processing 
plant.
Moving from Supply in Table 6.1 to Processing and 
Storage, two types of costs are used; a movement cost and 
a debt-servicing cost. For example, with arc DS1 -> DS2 
(the Dandenong paste store) monthly interest on the inventory 
is set at $4 per tonne. The cost of moving concentrate from 
the primary processing plant to this store (PI -> DS1) and 
on to the secondary process (DS2 P2) is $3 per tonne for 
both arcs (Table 6.1). A higher set of costs is used for 
outside storage to introduce a penalty when in-plant capacity 
for storage is exceeded. This concept is carried into 
distribution where product moving through any capital city 
distribution centre costs more than for delivery direct from 
Dandenong. These differential costs encourage flow along 
the most direct route from grower to customer until upper 
constraints are reached on some of the arcs, causing more
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TABLE 6.1: NETWORK COST STRUCTURE
SUPPLY
Supply node Distance Transport
to primary (centroid) to Dande- cost Commentsprocess.(PI) nong (km) $/tonne
SG Ma £ f ra 230 1 025 Few transport problems, 
late season.
SK Koo-wee-rup 100 553 High yield area with strong 
competition from other horticul­
tural crops.
SGV Tatura 170 820 Reliable region but sometimes 
subject to unseasonal rain.
SF Finley, NSW 270 1 435 Reliable dry region with high 
yielding crop. Price adjusted 
down for this and up for border 
inspection and fumigation.
SS Swan Hill 340 1 435 Early season allowing greater 
time span for fresh intake.
SM Mildura 550 2 255 Earlier still with dry, reliable 
climate.
SI Mi' Imported paste - 1 000
PROCESSING AND STORAGE
Area Description Cost$/tonne Comments
PI - P2 Primary to secondary 3 Paste concentrate to final
processing. product.
PI - DS1 Primary processing to in- 
plant concentrate store.
3 Input to concentrate stocks.
PI - W Primary processing to 3 000 Penalty for waste.
waste.
TS - DS1 Opening stock. 0
DS1 - DS 2 Internal storage movement. 4 The cost of servicing the
inventory.
DS2 - TD Closing stock. 0
PI - OS1 Primary processing to out- 6 Input to concentrate stock when
side concentrate store. in-plant store capacity exceeded
TS - OS1 Opening stock. 6 A penalty cost for outside 
s toratje.
OS1 - OS2 Internal storage movement. 4 The cost of servicing the
inventory.
OS 2 - TD Closing stock. 0
DS 1 - OS1 Additional excess capacity 6
link.
DS 2 - P 2 Concentrate stock to final 3
process.
OS 2 - P 2 Outside concentrate stock 
to final process.
6
P 2 - MW 1 Final product to main 3
warehouse.
TS - MW 1 Opening stock. 0
MW1 - MW 2 Internal storage movement. 12 The cost of servicing the in-
ventory reflecting the value 
added.
MW 2 - TD Closing stock. 0
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PRODUCT DISTR1 RUT ION
A res Descript ion Cost $/tonne Comments
MW2 - DTAS Direct to Tasmanian 
customers.
133
MW2 - DV1C Direct to Victorian 
cus tomers.
37
MW2 - DNSW Direct to NSW customers 1 11
MW 2 - S DC i Product to the Sydney dis­
tribution centre.
111 A small distribution centre 
with emergency stockhoIding.
TS - S DC 1 Opening stock. 0
S DC 1 - S DC 2 Internal storage movement. 9 The cost of servicing this small 
invenLory.
SDC2 - DNSW Distribution to NSW 
customers.
40 The transport cost for local 
deliveries in a congested city.
SDC2 - BDC 1 hmcrgency arc for product 
to Brisbane distribution 
cunt re.
111
S DC1 - TD Closing stock. 0
MW2 - DODD Direct to Qld customers. 228 Reflecting the cost of distri­
bution to north (Queensland.
MW2 - HOC 1 Product to Brisbane dis­
tribution centre.
228
TS - BDC1 Opening stock. 0
BDC 1 - BDC2 Internal storage movement. 10 The cost of servicing the 
inventory.
Reflecting the cost of dis­
tributing small orders in a 
large state.
BDC2 - DOLD Distribution to (Queensland 
customers.
45
BDC2 - TD Closing stock. 0
MW 2 - DSA Direct to South Australian 
c us Lome r s.
132
MW2 - ADCl Product to Adelaide dis­
tribution centre.
132
TS - ADC 1 Opening stock. 0
ADC 1 - ADC2 Internal storage movement. 9 The cost of servicing the 
i liven tor y .
ADC 2 - DSA Distribution to Soutli 
Australian customers.
48 Reflecting small orders travelling 
considorablc d is tances.
ADC 2 - PDCl emergency link to Perth 
distribution centre.
455 An artificially high price for the 
OKA solution for time t^ which is no 
accounted for in time t^+n.
ADC2 - TD Closing stock. 0
MW2 - DWA Direct to West Australian 
customers.
4 50
MW2 - PDCl Product; to Perth distribu- 
Lion cent re.
4 50
TS - PDCl Opening stock. 0
PDCl - PDC2 Internal storage movement. 10 The cost of servicing the inventory.
PDC2 - DWA Distribution to West 
Australian customers.
45 Reflecting small orders travelling 
considerable distances.
PDC2 - TD Closing stock. 0
H o u r a c i  a) Arc definition from discussion with Heinz.
b) Costs calculated from accounting records and adjusted to a standardized commodity; 
tomato paste concentrate.
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expensive paths to be used. In this manner, the network 
offers a good measure of realism. It must be stressed, 
however, that the network shown in Figure 6.1 and the costs 
in Table 6.1 do not exactly replicate the Heinz system.
Heinz, for instance, would rarely resort to outside storage, 
but with this example it is used extensively because the 
problem is encountered by other firms. The network shown 
in Figure 6.1 would approximate all of the processors 
visited in the early stages of this study.
RESULTS FROM THE OUT-OF-KILTER ANALYSIS
The OKA was used thirty-six times in the initial 
analysis, each subsequent iteration modelling that month's 
flows. This developed a familiarity with the model, the 
network, and its flow variations. The initial iteration 
began with the actual stockholding and subsequent change 
was limited to tomato and paste input, and demand for product. 
Resulting flows, stocks and costs are listed in Table 6.2. 
There is little that was not expected from the analysis 
although some interesting changes occurred to various stocks. 
Whenever possible, the model preferred to move final product 
from the main warehouse rather than processing paste from the 
penalty-costed outside store. Movements from the small dis­
tribution centres occurred only when the main warehouse was 
empty or direct distribution arcs were filled to capacity. 
Metropolitan distribution centre stock was replaced on only
155
TADLE 6.2: MONTHLY RESULTS OF THE INITIAL OKA ANALYSIS
JULY 1972 TO JUNE 1975
Supply Opening Stockholding
Period Australiantomatoes Pas to imports Paste
Sauce
Main
warehouse
Distribution
Centres
Demand Logistics Cos t
tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes $
1972 
J u ly 1 497 1 334 200 34 3 78 599Aug 1 497 1 023 168 191 61 867
Sep 1 497 807 200 273 61 600
Oct 1 497 5 36 198 134 38 638Nov 1 497 402 200 58 26 815Dec 1 497 344 200 68 27 262
1973 
J an 27 1 497 276 200 109 85 940
Feb 315 1 497 194 200 92 439 016
Mar 423 1 497 420 200 168 417 822
Apr 694 1 497 675 200 356 701 584
May 90 1 497 1 051 162 204 147 452
J une 3 1 497 937 162 244 61 838
J uly 1 497 696 162 320 66 768
Aug 1 497 396 142 239 52 854
Sep 1 497 99 200 200 4 3 267
Oct 153 1 396 0 200 250 354 583
Nov 1 299 0 200 77 22 793
Dec 1 222 0 200 152 32 481
19 7 4 
J an 1 070 0 200 87 22 131
Feb 105 983 0 200 69 139 614
Mar 24 1 983 36 200 182 216 292
Apr 232 983 95 200 4 16 286 148
May 28 963 0 131 133 35 811
J une 177 858 0 131 226 216 775
July 90 809 0 131 305 230 672
Aug 18 608 0 117 141 60 058
Sep 186 500 0 . 117 803 417 530
Oct 213 402 0 109 176 454 413
Nov 552 439 0 109 101 1 124 051
Dec 500 390 109 95 71 948
1975 
J an 3 500 346 109 127 31 449
Feb 112 500 222 109 94 231 641
Mar 9 38 500 240 109 293 1 007 936
Apr 1 130 738 653 103 586 1 172 709
May 899 1 168 870 50 172 873 234
J une 1 367 1 426 22 200 52 260
Sourcci Based upon data supplied by H.J. Heinz Australia, altered to maintain
confidentiality, and converted to the equivalent in paste concentrate for 
standardized results.
Quantities of stock and logistics costs as calculated by the OKA model.
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three occasions and at the end of the three-year period only 
twenty-two tonnes remained in Brisbane. This is the result 
of the particular time sequence and could well have been 
different had other than monthly intervals been used.
The results shown in Table 6.2 have been summarized in 
Table 6.3. What emerges from this initial analysis is that 
in the model, Heinz began with excessive stocks. In the 
following year, 1973-74, when fresh input was scarce, they 
were able to draw upon these stocks for continuity of sales. 
At the end of the three years, stocks were only half that 
of the first year, yet the fresh intake had been extremely 
high with additional strain coming from the high volume of 
imports. Sales increased by 15 per cent on 1972-73 volumes 
partly absorbing excess input in this final year. But what 
the monthly averages in Table 6.3 hide, however, is that in 
the period September-December 1974 stocks were down to 
the equivalent of three months' sales and had to be bolstered 
with a massive transfusion of imported paste (Table 6.2).
COMBINING THE OUT-OF-KILTER ALGORITHM 
AND DECISION THEORY
The fluctuating stocks, and high volume of imported 
tomato paste in 1974-75, prompt consideration of how Heinz's 
modelled activities can be improved. The OKA provides a set 
of minimum costs within a given network but, with a number of
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possible strategies, little guidance to strategy choice.
By developing a decision framework for the period 1974-75 
and 1975-76 the costing of alternatives using the OKA and 
then using decision theory, an import strategy can be 
selected. Within this framework the objectives are to 
maintain a lower level of stocks and minimize imports.
To attain these objectives the 1974-75 results must be 
improved and demand estimates developed for 1975-76; a 
period in which actual flows are unknown.
We shall begin by establishing an acceptable stock 
level for the end of the period, June 1976. By ensuring 
sufficient stock, anticipated demand can be met up to when 
the 1977 crop is harvested. Shortfalls in domestic tomato 
supply can be made up from imports under the Department of 
Customs by-law. Stocks at July 1974 will be used as the 
opening stock (Table 6.1). Possible strategies must satisfy 
the objectives and cope with alternative supply volumes 
over two years. Demand will be considered stable and 
follows the pattern of the initial analysis.
Strategies can be developed by using the decision tree 
approach in Chapter 5. The unknown variable is crop yield 
and possible results can range from glut to normal to poor 
harvests. With this range in supply and an assumed stable 
demand with a known opening stock it is possible to identify 
a set of strategies for importing paste. These strategies
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are shown in Figure 6.2. By following tree branches to 
Event 1.1 (the right-hand column in Fig. 6.2), we can see 
how quantities for the respective strategies were estimated.
If the Australian crop in 1975 has a normal yield -- quantity 
harvested equal to that anticipated -- then supply is similar 
to expected demand. Contracting carefully for supplies pro­
duces this balance which is the desired result. Only 290 tonnes 
need be imported early in the year to compensate for the 
1974 shortage of tomatoes (Tables 6.2 and 6.3). Closing 
stock for 1974-75 would be 1 237 tonnes, sufficient to carry 
production over to the next harvest. To ensure continuity 
of production eighty tonnes of paste should be imported.
If the 1976 crop is normal, closing stock for 1975-76 will 
be 1 317 tonnes. This amount will be sufficient to maintain 
production until the 1977 crop is harvested.
Another possibility is seen by following the branches 
to Event 2.2 in Figure 6.2. This is the cumulative effect 
of two consecutive gluts. Again 290 tonnes must be imported 
in 1974-75 to overcome the 1974 crop shortage. The final 
closing stock is 2 510 tonnes. This is too high but there 
is no alternative to accepting the contracted fruit, except 
consigning the excess to waste or processing it for later 
sale.
Another outcome could be two consecutive shortages as 
in Event 3.3, Figure 6.2. Over 1 500 tonnes of imported 
material would be needed in 1974-75 and 1 610 tonnes in
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1975-76 to achieve an acceptable stock level at the end of 
the period. Nine outcomes have been shown in Figure 6.2 
but an additional six will be considered in the complete 
analysis. These cover the curbing of imports as well as 
consigning excess requirements to waste in periods of over­
supply. The additions highlight an advantage of the OKA. 
Alterations to inputs, stocks or demand can be quickly costed. 
This is particularly important with respect to penalties 
from high cost emergency storage and funds invested in 
over-stocks of both paste and final product.
Establishing the cost of the alternative strategies
Results of the fifteen possible outcomes are shown in 
Figure 6.3. Logistics costs for 1974-75 range from 
$3 600 000 for a normal intake, to $5 020 000 if a shortage 
occurs. The higher cost comes from importing 1 540 tonnes 
of paste if the Australian yield is low (1974-75 column in 
Fig. 6.3). Looking at 1975-76, the results in Figure 6.3 
have been partitioned into three groups. The first partition 
shows costs for nine events where imports have been minimized. 
Costs range from $2 112 000 to $4 459 000. Closing stock 
for three events -- 1.3.1, 2.3.1 and 3.3.1 —  are below an 
acceptable level and need to be increased with imported paste, 
as discussed when developing alternative strategies and 
outcomes. These results are shown under the second partition 
in Figure 6.3 -- Closing Stock Too Low; Increase Imports.
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For Event 1.3.2, imports have been lifted to 1 613 tonnes 
in 1975-76 and logistics cost has risen by $3 319 000 to 
$5 500 000. This is a substantial increase but if the 
crop is short and Heinz want to continue selling sauce, 
there is no alternative. The third partitioning of results 
covers wastage. Where closing stocks for the 1975-76 
period are excessive, some input is consigned to waste.
This incurs a penalty of $3 000 per tonne and in all three 
examples -- Events 1.2.2, 2.2.2 and 3.2.2 in Figure 6.3 —  
this additional cost is too high. It is cheaper, to store 
excess input.
In summary, the nine outcomes initially developed in 
Figure 6.2, were expanded to fifteen by either not 
importing additional paste, or sending excess tomatoes to 
waste. Acceptance or rejection of these outcomes is shown 
in the right-hand column of Figure 6.3; the original nine 
have been accepted. The six alternatives were either too 
expensive or closing stocks were too low.
Merging the OKA with decision theory
Armed with the logistics costs for nine acceptable 
outcomes, a decision must now be made on the quantity of 
paste to import before the 1975 and 1976 tomato crops are 
harvested. Over the two-year period Heinz can adopt one 
of three strategies which hinge upon combinations of possible 
crop yields. These are:
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Strategy A: A normal 1975 Australian crop with
supplementary imports of 290 tonnes 
to make up the 1974 shortfall, followed 
in 1976 by a range of crop outcomes 
and paste imports;
Strategy B: A glut of tomatoes in 1975 still
requiring supplementation of 290 tonnes 
of imported paste, again followed in 
1976 by a range of yields and imports; 
and
Strategy C: A shortage in 1975 requiring 1 540 tonnes
of imported paste to carry production 
through to the 1976 Australian harvest.
The strategies are set out in the decision tree in Table 6.4 
with occurrences having the same identification äs in 
Figure 6.3. Probabilities in the tree have been developed 
for illustrative purposes only. Payoffs, however, are based 
upon demand. Sales over the two years have been held at a 
constant 5 070 tonnes of paste. This has been converted to 
sales revenue and the difference between this amount and the 
individual logistics costs has been used as each event's 
payoff. These payoffs are simply for demonstration but the 
relative changes accurately reflect different profit or 
loss magnitudes.
From the tree in Table 6.4, decision criteria have been 
calculated and are summarized in Table 6.5. As with both 
Gow and Bulmer the choice of strategy is governed by resource 
base and attitudes to loss. Estimated monetary values (EMV) 
range widely from $631 000 for Strategy A to minus $20 440 
for Strategy C. The range in payoffs also varies widely and 
in the case of Strategy A, the possible loss of $420 000 is
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TABLE 6.4: DECISION TREE OF IMPORT STRATEGIES, 1974-76
1975 AUSTRALIAN CROP 1976 AUSTRALIAN CROP
OCCUR­
RENCE
JOINT
PROBA­
BILITY
EST IMAILÜ 
PAYOFF
A Q - Normal P ° 0 .6
Im port 290t 
EMV $631 000
Normal P = 0 .6  
Im port  8 0 t
G lu t  P = 0 .2  
Im port  50 t
S hort  P = 0 .2  
Im port  1613t
1. 1.0
1 . 2. 1
1 .3 .2
0.36
0 . 1 2
0.12
1 686 000
621 000
-420 000
B r r __ -G lu t____ P ■ 0 .2
Im port  290t
EMV $174 520
Normal P = 0 .6
G lu t  P » 0 .2
S hort  P = 0 .2  
Im port  1044t
2 . 1.0
2 . 2.1
2 .3 .2
0.12
0.04
0.04
1 177 000
688 000
144 000
c D— ;Short  P “  0 .2Im port  1540t 
EMV $-20 440
Normal P = 0 .6  
Im port  50 t
G lu t  P = 0 .2
Short P = 0 .2  
im p o r t  1610t
3 .1 .0
3 .2 .1
3 .3 .2
0.12
0.04
0.04
479 000
•218 000
-1 730 000
: OKA calculations summarized from Figure 6.3.
Payoffs calculated for comparative purposes only 
and bear no known resemblance to H.J. Heinz's 
profits.
Source
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unattractive. Strategy C having the lowest EMV and the 
greatest possible loss is clearly a poor choice. As both 
Strategy A and B require the same initial input of imported 
paste in 1974-75, this should be bought and further decisions 
left until the results of the 1975 crop are known.
TABLE 6.5: EXPECTED MONETARY VALUE AND EXPOSURE
TO GAIN AND LOSS, 1974-76
Strategies EMV$
Range of 
Payoffs $
Most Likely Payoff 
$ Probability
A 631 000 1 686 000 
-420 000
1 686 000 0.36
B 174 520 1 177 000 
144 000
1 177 000 0.12
C -20 440 479 000 
-1 730 000
479 000 0.12
Revising the strategies
Armed with prior knowledge we know that there was a glut 
of tomatoes in 1975 (Table 6.2). Therefore, Strategies A 
and C are no longer relevant and the choice narrows to 
Strategy B. A revised tree, based upon the three branches 
of Strategy B has been developed. Again, the strategies 
revolve about possible 1976 crop yields, and possible outcomes 
and import activities are shown in Table 6.6. Imports of 
paste are needed only if the 1976 crop is short. The crop 
yield is unknown but given three possible outcomes the choice
lies between importing before the harvest or waiting until 
the yield is known. The respective EMVs for this revised 
approach are shown in Table 6.6 and summarized in Table 6.7. 
Two of the strategies -- Bl and B2 -- require no import 
action and simply outline alternative payoffs. The EMV and 
payoff for Strategy B3 clearly show that no import action 
should be taken before the results of the 1976 crop are known. 
Under these conditions the favoured decision is to wait 
until more information becomes available.
TABLE 6.6: DECISION TREE FOR ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES, 1975-76
1976 Australian Crop ImportingActivity Event Payoff
Bl Normal P = 0.6 No 2.1.0 809 500EMV $485 700 imports
T2 0 Glut P = 0.2 No 2.2.1 320 500n> Z EMV $64 100 imports
B 3 Short P = 0.2 Import 2.3.2 -223 500EMV $-44 700 1 044 t
TABLE 6.7: EXPECTED MONETARY VALUE AND EXPOSURE TO GAIN AND
LOSS, 1975-76
1975-76 Strategies EMV Payoff Probability
Bl 485 700
$
809 500 0.6
B2 64 100 320 500 0.2
B3 -44 700 -223 500 0.2
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THE BENEFIT FROM THE OUT-OF-KILTER ALGORITHM 
AND DECISION THEORY COMBINATION
From the decision analysis, either revised Strategy Bl 
or B2 could have been adopted by not importing until the 
1976 crop yield was known (Table 6.6). The outcome supported 
this approach and for the two years, 1974-75 and 1975-76, 
conformed with Strategy B.2.1.0 shown in Table 6.4 (1975 
crop glut followed by a normal crop in 1976). Monthly results 
for the period are listed in Table 6.8. In every iteration, 
demand could always be met from a reduced stockholding and 
minimum imports -- the original objectives. In 1974-75, 
stocks were reduced from a monthly average of 1 156 tonnes 
to 732 tonnes. Imports were also diminished by 769 tonnes 
to 290 tonnes. Both improvements offered a saving in 
logistics costs of $1 463 000 for the year -- $769 000 in 
direct importing costs and $694 000 from not having the 
material in the network (Tables 6.3 and 6.8 -- 1974-75).
The same comparisons are not possible for 1975-76.
Recognizing that the probabilities used in the decision 
analysis were based upon assigned estimates, the model 
offers improvements on Heinz's current decision-making 
practices.
Another important advantage from using the Out-of-Kilter 
algorithm was the opportunity to explore alternative possible 
outcomes. One of these modelled late tomato paste arrivals
TABLE 6.8: MONTHLY RESULTS OF THE OKA ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY B.2.1.0
1974-75 SUPPLY CONDITION: GLUT
Period
Supply Opening Stockholding
Demand
tonnes
Logistics
Cost
$
Australian
tomatoes
tonnes
Paste
imports
tonnes
Paste
tonnes
Sauce
Main
Warehouse
tonnes
Distribution
centres
tonnes
1974
July 90 809 0 131 333 235 347Aucj 593 0 104 198 32 598
Sep 395 0 104 264 40 731
Oct 200 131 0 104 193 429 119
Nov 138 0 104 81 13 064
Dec 57 0 104 109 18 842
1975
Jan 155 0 0 52 111 308 786
Feb 620 44 0 52 87 900 973
Mar 1 085 357 220 52 222 1 062 828
Apr 620 901 539 52 467 547 892May 620 887 705 53 175 612 351J une 889 1 147 54 230 62 534
4 265 065
1975-76 SUPPLY CONDITION: NORMAL
1975
July 939 871 50 351 66 887
Aug 939 50 50 208 41 409
Sep 939 312 50 278 48 021
Oct 939 34 50 203 37 017
Nov 770 0 50 86 17 521
Dec 684 0 50 114 20 670
1976 
J an 130 570 0 50 117 276 539
Feb 520 570 13 50 91 795 057
Mar 910 570 442 50 234 848 877
Apr 520 789 899 50 491 476 935
May 520 815 902 50 185 556 336
J une 830 1 222 22 242 53 153
3 238 422
Suui'cc: Based upon author's estimates of input, stocks and demand.
Quantities and costs as calculated by the OKA model.
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and subsequent congestion in the constrained network. This 
approach allowed rapid evaluation of changing supply and 
demand conditions. The simplicity of the Heinz model belies 
the algorithm's flexibility. It can be extended and refined 
in several ways. The size of the network can be greatly 
expanded by increasing the number of nodes and links while 
another refinement is Kissling's (in press) stochastic develop­
ment. These improvements to the Out-of-Kilter algorithm when 
combined with decision theory offer the decision-maker greater 
prospects for combating uncertainty.
Conclusions derived from modelling
Two conclusions can be derived from this work:
i) a comparison of actual occurrences and modelled 
results, based on assumptions about probabilities and supply and demand volumes, show that some 
improvements can be made to performance; and
ii) the Out-of-Kilter algorithm and decision theory 
can be combined in such a way that the decision­
maker is able to systematically appraise a range 
of possible strategies.
Decision theory and Out-of-Kilter procedures are applicable 
to any of the twenty-seven firms under review. However, 
lessons about conduct vary between groups which will become 
apparent in Part III.
PART III
After modelling the logistics conduct of the three firms 
in the Major Specialist group of fruit and vegetable pro­
cessors in Australia -- Heinz, Gow and Bulmer -- attention 
is switched to the lessons that can be drawn from the analysis 
(Chapter 7). These lessons are examined in terms of the 
remaining firms in the Major Specialist group; the other 
three groups comprising the Rural Co-operatives, the Diversi­
fied Conglomerates and the Minor Specialists, and the industry 
as a whole. The restructuring of conduct and the policy 
implications arising from this discussion are considered in 
the concluding chapter (Chapter 8).
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CHAPTER SEVEN
LESSONS FOR OTHER FIRMS, OTHER GROUPS,
AND THE INDUSTRY
It is now pertinent to investigate what wider lessons 
can be drawn from the detailed analysis of the three Major 
Specialists -- Heinz, Gow and Bulmer. As the modelling 
procedures can be applied to all twenty-seven firms, irrespec­
tive of group, their advantages are not considered further. 
However, the lessons derived from the logistics conduct are 
more specific in their application and will be discussed in 
terms of their relevance to the other Major Specialists, and 
the three remaining groups —  Rural Co-operatives, Diversified 
Conglomerates and Minor Specialists (Table 7.1). As improve­
ments to the performance of the Australian fruit and vegetable 
processing industry hinge upon changes being made in logistics 
conduct, action at an industry level has also to be considered.
Specific lessons from logistics conduct
After examining in detail the logistics conduct of 
Bulmer, Gow and Heinz it is clear that transport, inventories 
and purchasing are the key variables in supply and demand 
(Chapter 4). As transport influences are too 
broad to be altered by the conduct of one or two firms, 
interest is centred upon inventory and purchasing conduct.
Gow provided an example of inventory problems stemming from
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T A B L E  7.1: THE F R U I T AND V E G E T A B L E  I N D USTRY G ROUPS A N D  P R O C E S S O R S
G r o u p P r o c e s s o r
M a j o r  S p e c i a l i s t s
R.M. G o w  Pty Ltd 
B u l m e r  A u s t r a l i a  L i m i t e d  
H.J. H e i n z  C o m p a n y  A u s t r a l i a  Ltd 
C a m p b e l l ' s  S o ups (Aust.) Pty Ltd 
B e r r i  F r u i t  J u i c e s  C o - o p e r a t i v e  Ltd 
K r a f t  H o l d i n g s  Ltd 
U n i g a t e  A u s t r a l i a  Pty Ltd 
M a s t e r f o o d s  A u s t r a l i a  Ltd
R u r a l  C o - o p e r a t i v e s
M o u n t a i n  M a i d  F o ods C o - o p e r a t i v e  Ltd 
K y a b r a m  P r e s e r v i n g  Co. Ltd
A r d m o n a  F r u i t  P r o d u c t s  C o - o p e r a t i v e  Co. Ltd 
R i v e r l a n d  F r u i t  P r o d u c t s  C o - o p e r a t i v e  Co. Ltd 
L e t o n a  C o - o p e r a t i v e  L i m i t e d  
S PC L i m i t e d
D i v e r s i f i e d  C o n g l o m e r a t e s
The N e s t l e  C o m p a n y  (Australia) Ltd 
P i c k - M e - U p  F o o d  P r o d u c t s  Pty Ltd 
E d g e l l  D i v i s i o n  of P e t e r s v i l l e  
C o t t e e s  G e n e r a l  F o ods Ltd 
C e r e b o s  (Australia) Pty Ltd 
G o l d e n  C i r c l e  C a n n e r y  
H e n r y  J o n e s  (IXL) L i m i t e d  
R o s e l l a  F o o d s  Pty Ltd
M i n o r  S p e c i a l i s t s
J u s f r u t e  L i m i t e d  
W a t t i e - P i c t  L i m i t e d  
C l e m e n t s  and M a r s h a l l  Pty Ltd 
P. M e t h v e n  and Son Pty Ltd 
W e s t e r n p o r t  C a n n e r i e s
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supply uncertainties while Bulmer and Heinz demonstrated 
how purchasing can curtail fluctuations in supply and demand.
Basically, four lessons can be derived from the conduot 
of the three firms:
i) the planning of short-term futures based on
budget procedures permits a degree of certainty 
in supply and demand;
ii) contract purchasing of supplies can lessen 
uncertainty;
iii) the strict control of inventories can alleviate 
fluctuations between supply and demand;
iv) innovatory conduct has been used to lower 
inventory costs although these were not as 
critical as initially assumed.
Such lessons have a varying impact upon the other Major 
Specialists and the three remaining groups. The differences 
are discussed for each group in turn before examining their 
importance to the industry as a whole.
The Major Specialists
The lessons derived from the logistics conduct of Bulmer, 
Gow and Heinz can be applied to all members of this group, 
with the minor exceptions of Kraft and Masterfoods. Kraft 
have a small specialized jam-making operation while Masterfoods 
work in a diverse manufacturing environment producing a 
specialized range of food. The Major Specialists carefully 
plan at least one year ahead. This planning encompasses 
various methods of budgeting which, while no different in
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concept from that used by other groups, combines with the 
small number of products to generate good short-term forecasts.
As most of these processors purchase by contract direct from 
growers, the Major Specialists exercise a strong control over 
supply. This direct supplier contact offers considerable 
information advantages during the growing season, including 
increased certainty of price as against open market buying.
The Berri Fruit Juices Co-operative is an exception. It is 
owned by a consortium of South Australian grower co-operatives 
who consign surplus citrus to Berri for juicing.• Because 
citrus is a biennial crop, Berri usually accepts all fruit 
offered and carries the surplus juice stock through to the 
following year when supply is short.
In the realm of inventory control the Major Specialists 
must maintain a buffer stock to balance the fluctuations 
between supply and demand. Contrary to the initial conclusions 
developed from the ex-post facto considerations of their conduct, 
both Gow and Bulmer managed their inventories well. This was 
principally due to storage innovations. The Major Specialists 
can part-process fresh material which offers two benefits.
One is that inventory costs are less. Funds invested in 
part-processed product are lower than in the final product.
The second benefit comes from processing the final product 
nearer to the demand period. This minimizes capital invested 
in machines used to process the large volumes of fresh input 
into final product in a short lived peak.
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Rural Co-operatives
The lessons derived from the Major Specialists show that 
the Rural Co-operatives could improve their performance, but 
not without major changes in their logistics conduct. The 
six co-operatives listed in Table 7.1, are committed to pro­
cessing quantities of fruit supplied by their grower share­
holders. This obligation limits the control exercised by 
the Rural Co-operatives over purchasing. Some of the benefits 
of certainty from contractual arrangements are shared between 
the Rural Co-operatives and growers but these processors have 
been unable to curb supply in periods of low demand. Hence 
they cannot effectively practice short-term planning.
This lack of control is also apparent with inventory 
management. As 35 per cent of the Rural Co-operatives' 
sales are to a world market, demand fluctuates widely com­
pared to the other groups of processors. Consequently, the 
wide variation between supply and demand coupled with a non- 
responsive supply sector means that the Rural Co-operatives 
have little control over inventory size. Apart from the cost 
of maintaining a large stock of final products, their per­
formance is severely restrained by cash-flow problems. To 
pay supply and manufacturing costs they need bridging 
finance, usually borrowed from the Rural Credits Department 
of the Reserve Bank of Australia. These loans must be repaid 
within twelve months which makes the Co-operatives keen to
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clear stocks at the end of each season. Even though the 
wholesale price of canned deciduous fruit is set by the 
Australian Canned Fruits Board, these processors are sometimes 
forced to drop prices, stimulate sales and pay their debts. 
Faced with lower profit margins and the certainty of rising 
costs, the Rural Co-operatives are in a self-perpetuating 
downward spiral. They cannot alter this trend until their 
purchasing conduct is more responsive to demand.
Adding further to their problems, the Rural Co-operatives 
cannot use innovations in inventory storage as have the 
Major Specialists because of their product's nature. The 
canning of fruit pieces in sugar syrup prohibits intermediate 
processing or storage. Fresh fruit must be processed into 
final product and packed in the ultimate container and stored 
until sold. Unless the Rural Co-operatives can develop pro­
ducts which cost less to store little improvement can be 
made to this aspect of their logistics performance.
Diversified Conglomerates
The processors in this group share some similarities 
with the Major Specialists but the very diversity of their 
products limits the value of the lessons. The Diversified 
Conglomerates exercise strong budgetry control in their short­
term planning. Such planning is essential and is relatively 
accurate due to their reliance on the domestic market. As
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demand is fairly constant the uncertainty in the logistics 
sector stems principally from the supply of raw materials. 
Continuity in marketing the large range of products requires 
a constant supply of many inputs. Often these are in small 
quantities and present the Diversified Conglomerates with 
purchasing problems. They must carry stocks of critical 
ingredients. When large volumes of material are supplied 
from multiple sources, purchasing is under reasonable control. 
Although contract purchasing is common the volume supplied 
is less than that required by the Major Specialists.
As with planning, the Diversified Conglomerates exercise 
strong inventory control in trying to balance supply with 
demand. High inventory costs for the many products have 
prompted this control. In recent years these processors 
have reduced inventories of final products, and only service 
expected demand. This change is important for no longer can 
customers expect to obtain requirements two or three months 
prior to the new season's processing. This behaviour demon­
strates a difference between the logistics conduct of the 
Diversified Conglomerates and the Major Specialists. By 
developing cheaper inventory controls the Specialists can 
effectively hold larger stocks. The diversity of products 
manufactured by the Conglomerates prevents them copying 
this conduct. They are in a similar situation to the Rural 
Co-operatives; they cannot use major innovations to improve 
performance without further changes in conduct. But a change
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in conduct for these firms means restricting the range of 
products -- a strategy that strikes at the heart of their 
competitive activity.
Minor Specialists
This group of five firms gains little from the logistics 
behaviour of the Major Specialists. The strength of these 
smaller processors, listed in Table 7.1, comes from their 
ability to shift resources from one surplus variety to another. 
In this respect they operate conventional plant manufacturing 
conventional products. They are effective planners but often 
the time horizon is weeks rather than the more usual twelve 
months. Wattie-Pict is the only member extensively using 
contracts for purchasing, but as indicated previously this 
processor was classified more for the reluctance to supply 
information than compatability with the other Minor Processors.
Because these firms process surplus varieties to meet 
a known demand, their control of inventories is good. Stocks 
are held for the customers' convenience rather than as a 
buffer between fluctuating supply and demand. As a result 
the innovations developed by the Major Specialists are not 
applicable. While it was stated that this group's strength 
lay in its processing flexibility, it is vulnerable to 
any major change and owes much of its success to other groups 
not wanting to be involved in minor production runs.
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The Industry
What can the industry as a whole learn from these 
observations of the logistics conduct of three processors 
and four separate groups of firms? The Major Specialists 
use all four methods of logistics control while two groups 
partly use them. But the Rural Co-operatives have not and 
cannot benefit from these lessons until they change their 
logistics conduct. Consequently, the principal result of 
these findings in their application within the industry, is 
that an increased understanding of logistics conduct is 
required. Industry participants -- growers, processors, 
retailers -- and government agencies must develop an appre­
ciation of the impact that this conduct has upon performance. 
The four lessons discussed concern planning, contract 
purchasing, inventory control and inventory innovation. As 
indicated in Figure 7.1 planning and inventory control are 
used by most members of the industry but with varying degrees 
of success.
Planning methods help to establish a range of expectations 
thus lessening some of the uncertainty in logistics. Pro­
cessors can then implement that integral component of 
planning -- inventory control. The Rural Co-operatives are 
excluded due to their unique supply circumstances and their 
particular product. If most members of the industry can 
improve their information base and go beyond annual forecasting
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their performance will be improved. But most of them lack 
the necessary resources to collect and analyse a fully- 
fledged data bank.
Only the Major Specialists use large scale contract 
purchasing arrangements. Benefits from this form of conduct 
for the industry would reflect greater certainty in the 
planning horizons of both growers and processors. Growers 
could make better investment decisions and both parties 
would be more certain of costs, volumes and profits. This 
does not lessen the impact of weather or insect activity 
but minimizes the financial loss from speculative growing.
There is always a continuing hope amongst growers that supply 
will be short and market price high. For processors, a glut 
sometimes focuses attention upon their product-pricing tactics. 
Consequently they seek reasonable supplies at low prices. 
However, while price speculation continues to be fostered, 
contracts will play a lesser role in fruit and vegetable 
marketing.
The fourth lesson in logistics conduct, inventory inno­
vation, cannot be used by the industry without some re­
structuring of activity. These innovations have eased the 
Major Specialists' finance and space needs but this is a 
function of their specialized production. Hence the pursuit 
of product diversity in an effort to spread fixed costs and 
gain some economies of scale is offset by the industry's 
inability to employ intermediate storage techniques. Changes
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in logistics operations such as improved materials handling 
techniques and rationalization of distribution facilities 
are useful but insufficient.
Within the industry, changes in logistics conduct are 
occurring. Several of the Rural Co-operatives and two 
Diversified Conglomerates have reduced their five distribution 
networks to two in an effort to lower costs. In addition, 
there is increased competition in the domestic market as the 
Rural Co-operatives introduce different products to challenge 
the Diversified Conglomerates. Paradoxically, a third change 
is being forced upon food manufacturers by retailers. Although 
there is no direct evidence referring to the fruit and 
vegetable industry, a trend has been established by retailers 
offering fewer food products (Woolworths Ltd, pers. com.).
But these three changes have only a minor influence upon 
industry performance and in no way decrease uncertainty in 
corporate logistics. Neither problem can be improved without 
the type of structural changes in the industry's conduct 
discussed in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
INFORMATION AND POLICY; ELEMENTS OF CERTAINTY
Uncertainty plays a critical role in conditioning the 
logistics conduct of the Australian fruit and vegetable pro­
cessing industry. The inability of participants in the 
industry to control uncertainty has contributed to a decline 
in both the number of enterprises and establishments within 
the industry. While the Commonwealth Government may find it 
attractive to use market forces to contract the industry, 
such action is unlikely to be sustained because of social 
disruption in rural communities. These effects have always 
been severe, forcing the Commonwealth Government to intervene, 
on occasions, and assist the Rural Co-operatives. Such action 
is prompted more by the need to cushion the deleterious 
effects of recession rather than by any desire to create 
greater certainty. Thus government influence may be a potent 
factor in inducing further uncertainty.
On the basis of this study of the processing industry's 
logistics sector it seems that the Commonwealth
Government has two alternative policy instruments for inducing 
greater certainty. It can opt for industry restructuring or 
improve the quality of information upon which the industry's 
decisions are based. However, it is unlikely that the 
Government will accept the responsibility for reconstruction
185
hence attention is concentrated on improving the quality 
of information by developing a logistics information system.
A LOGISTICS INFORMATION SYSTEM
The requirement of an information system for the 
Australian fruit and vegetable processing industry is to pro­
vide data on the key components of logistics. The framework 
shown in Figure 8.1 identifies these components. Broadly, 
they are elements of distribution, processing and supply.
Within distribution, information is needed on short and long­
term demand. Information for processing comes from the 
factors of production while for supply, it concerns fluctua­
tions in the volume of material. Once this information is 
forthcoming processors can specify material requirements, 
plan processing strategies and seek supplies from alternative 
sources.
If such a system is to become a reality there is need 
for co-operation between fruit and vegetable processors, 
grower associations, like the Northern Victoria Fruit-Growers 
Association and Commonwealth Government agencies, such as 
the Department of Primary Industry. Before attempting to 
forge this diverse group of interests into an organization 
responsible for producing a logistics information system, 
it is important to emphasize its potential use to these bodies. 
This task is undertaken by examining the distribution, pro­
cessing and supply components of the system in more detail.
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Distribution
If greater certainty is to be achieved in the industry 
a series of measures is needed which reflects variations in 
both short-term and long-term demand. As shown in the budget 
formulations in Chapters 5 and 6, short-term requirements 
involve collecting data on sales history, market promotion 
and competitors' activity (Fig. 8.2). However simple or 
sophisticated the estimation process is, the three variables 
are basic requirements for annual forecasts. Essentially, 
these estimates must be developed by individual processors.
Measures of long-term demand involve three influences:
i) demographic, social and economic observations;
ii) yield changes in competing countries; and
iii) technical change, and capital and labour 
efficiencies which reflect upon price.
The information is available but there is a reluctance for 
increased resources to be directed into analysis in depth.
For example, the purchasing conduct of the Rural Co-operatives 
demonstrates their poor use of demand information. They have 
been unable to convert aggregate demand forecasts into a policy 
designed to maintain their existence as grower-owned processors.
Processing
The processing component in the information system offers 
the best opportunity for achieving certainty. The factors of
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production shown in Figure 8.1 are widely used by other 
manufacturing industries. Thus considerable information 
is readily available, not only from material suppliers but 
also other manufacturers. Small-scale fluctations occur in 
the supply of materials but they are rarely serious. If 
the volumes for distribution or supply change abruptly in 
the processing industry, the factors of production are least 
affected. Orders for material can be quickly increased or 
cancelled.
Supply
The possibility of inducing increased certainty for the 
supply sector draws attention to the organization of informa­
tion (Fig. 8.3). Much data has been gathered by various 
agencies. But it has yet to be adequately disseminated on 
a national scale in a form where it can influence industry 
participants and policy makers. Consequently, supply details 
listed in Figure 8.3 must be considered in a national context.
National supply forecasts are available for wool, beef 
cattle, dairy produce, cereal grains and oil seeds but not 
for horticultural crops. Forecasting has concentrated on the 
activities which make large contributions to agricultural 
production. Short-term forecasts for selected fruit and 
vegetables are developed by the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics (BAE) for discussion at the annual National
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Agricultural Outlook Conference (BAE, 1974). While these 
forecasts are useful their effect is restricted by limited 
circulation.
The critical variables which influence the domestic 
supply of horticultural crops are listed in Figure 8.3.
These are already used in formal and informal procedures 
for volume estimation. For example, Hackett and Rattigan 
(1977) use weather and area cropped by growing region to 
forecast yields as part of a national potato logistics model. 
Similarly Heinz use all of the domestic variables to develop 
short-term forecasts of tomato yields. Both examples generate 
information on supply and have demonstrated their usefulness. 
Freebairn (1975: 26) contends that the current state of 
agricultural forecasting is capable of generating annual pro­
jections subject to errors of 5 per cent and five year 
predictions with a variance of 20 per cent. As a 5 per cent 
error is considerably less than the annual fluctuations in 
horticultural crops, such forecasting would be valuable for 
both processors and growers.
Supply cannot be considered without the effects that 
imports have upon both domestic prices and lagged grower- 
processor responses. Measuring the distortion in flows 
caused by imports has yet to be developed on a national scale, 
but we have seen how the four variables listed in Figure 8.3 
affected the decisions made by Gow and Heinz.
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As it is important for industry participants, associa­
tions and the Commonwealth Government to understand that 
action is necessary, the responsibility for collecting 
information is specified by agency (Fig. 8.2 and 8.3) .
While the collection of better information is essential, 
of greater importance is the development of policy for the 
future of the industry. Such work cannot be carried out by 
one body because it needs co-operation between all partici­
pants and organizations involved in the industry. In this 
respect, greater involvement by the Commonwealth- Government 
would be useful.
TOWARDS A NATIONAL HORTICULTURAL 
LOGISTICS POLICY
While representations are made to the Commonwealth 
Government to combat uncertainty, it is itself a major source 
of uncertainty. As there is no existing rural policy beyond 
the Green Paper on The Principles of Rural Policy in Australia 
(Harris, et al., 1974), growers and processors must guess at 
principles and procedures underlying its formulation and 
implementation. The only reference to the impact of informa­
tion on uncertainty centres upon the role of prices (Harris, 
et al., 1974: 59). In these circumstances the plans and 
activities of both growers and processors can be distorted 
by uncertainty created when either Commonwealth Government 
support of free market forces is supplanted by intervention,
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or the Commonwealth Government states its intention to 
intervene and fails to do so.
As it is likely that the Commonwealth Government will 
continue its flexible policy stance, attention is switched 
from existing rural policy considerations to a framework 
within which future developments in logistics policy can be 
considered. Such a framework shows the relationship 
between grower, processor and consumer, and government 
agencies engaged in policy-making (Fig. 8.4). If these 
policies are to be more sensitive to industry needs the 
policy framework has to be extended to encompass adminis­
trative departments of the Commonwealth Government. This 
move could be readily made within the areas of price 
guidance, stability of policy and the dissemination of 
information. Examples of government influence in price 
guidance are seen in the operations of such bodies as the 
Fruit Industry Sugar Concession Committee, the Australian 
Canned Fruit Board or the Apple and Pear Corporation. In 
Queensland the Committee of Direction For Fruit and Vegetable 
Marketing and the State Canneries Board exercise considerable 
control over the horticultural industry. In particular, 
the move to incorporate universities would provide a valuable 
link between theoretical developments and application of 
policy. Such a move should highlight the locational impli­
cations of policy initiatives -- the places and social groups 
that would be advantaged and disadvantaged.
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Envoi
After analysing logistics decision-making under 
uncertainty in the Australian fruit and vegetable processing 
industry we are in a better position to see location patterns 
as the. product of location processes inherent in the 
logistics conduct of individual firms. Yet, the perspective 
has been limited. If we are to comprehend more fully 
spatial repercussions of corporate decision-making, as the 
basis of policy, subsequent studies need to examine the inter­
relationships between logistics conduct and the other com­
ponents of the corporation -- production, marketing and 
finance.
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ENDPAPER
ELABORATION OF METHODS, RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Within the body of the preceding work, several areas 
need some amplification. These concern: details on
strategies of a longer term than the three to five years 
considered; the failure of the study to follow a traditional 
geographic path; the reason for in-depth concentration of 
the successful firms; and the value of the methodology for 
considering location, investment, marketing and restructuring 
strategies.
LONG-TERM STRATEGIES
Within the Australian fruit and vegetable processing 
industry long-term strategies are rarely considered. No 
evidence was forthcoming to demonstrate that any firm 
considers its place within, or impact upon, the industry 
five years hence. The most consuming strategy is that of 
remaining in operation enjoying a stable or increasing 
profit. There are, however, long-term effects which can 
be loosely construed as corporate strategies. These may 
be best considered in terms of the location of supply, 
processing and demand points, rather than examples of 
barriers to entry of conglomerateness.
Supply
Long-term changes in the supply of fruit and 
vegetables depend entirely upon the longevity of the 
variety. The location of tomato supplies can alter 
annually whereas pears are still bearing high yields 
forty years from planting. As noted on pages 11-27 there 
has been little locational change in the supply of tree
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fruits and in the future it is anticipated that the only 
major change will be a contraction of supply areas and 
number of growers.
With annual plantings, however, a strategy for long­
term change can be said to exist. Tomatoes grown for 
processing in Victoria have shown a change in supply 
locations from the Koo-wee-rup area to a much wider range 
in supply areas and climatic conditions. The uncertainty 
of weather and insect damage has prompted processors to 
spread their risks from East Gippsland to Mildura. This 
not only minimizes the risk of losing the entire crop but 
also extends the season for both growing and processing, 
thus lessening the peak input problems.
Processing
Whenever location of plant was discussed, it was never 
couched in terms of strategies. However, it was generally 
conceded that existing locations were sub-optimal. This 
situation is not unusual and is a function of changing supply, 
processing and distribution technology. One problem for all 
Melbourne based processors is the increasing requirement for 
cleaner effluent. This is an expensive task and as other 
costs rise, so Melbourne becomes less attractive. New 
distribution techniques associated with attempts to cut 
costs have forced processors to consider their locations 
in terms of distribution advantage. But no one anticipates 
shifting their plant in the short term and anything that 
occurs in the long term can be considered as a natural 
re-location process rather than a strategy.
Demand
The most important long-term effect in the demand
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sector has been the concentration of buyers into a small 
but powerful clique. This has been a long-term strategic 
exercise by the wholesalers and retailers and was, in part, 
encouraged by the processors. But this concentration of 
buyers has left marginal processors in a weaker marketing 
position while forcing stronger firms to counteract by 
creating an increased demand for their products. ^his, 
then, removes the initiative in price negotiation away from 
the buyers. Consequently, only in this area could it be 
considered that processors are developing long-term strategies 
and these are couched more in a marketing thrust than in 
locational considerations.
Structural adjustments
The methodology concentrated upon the short-term 
logistics aspects of the industry yet one of the major 
problems is its structure. It is inevitable that 
restructuring will occur as this has been a constant thread 
throughout the history of the industry. Current 
restructuring takes two forms; concentration and 
diversification. Aspects of concentration have been 
discussed on pages 29-46. Diversification has been 
prompted by the static or falling profit margins in the 
food manufacturing industries. R.M. Gow and Company are 
shifting more production resources into household cleaning 
agents as they feel there is a more lucrative market share 
to be won from the vulnerable big two producers. Heinz 
have shifted resources into fish canning and winemaking. 
Again, these examples of strategy are aimed more at market 
share than locational advantage.
The problem of the Rural Co-operatives needs some
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amplification. Of the six surveyed, only two could not 
be considered marginal operators. These were Letona and 
Mountain Maid. The three Victorian co-operatives have 
excess manufacturing capacity and a dwindling market. A 
severe social problem exists in the Goulburn Valley which 
will undoubtedly increase unless relief is forthcoming from 
the Commonwealth Government. This crisis highlights the 
lack of any coordinated policy regarding industry 
restructuring.
THE DESCRIPTIVE DECISION-THEORY APPROACH 
VERSUS TRADITIONAL LOCATION ANALYSIS
Personal experience in the corporate environment has 
fostered a feeling that the traditional emphasis upon 
location analysis does not sufficiently contribute to an 
understanding of decision-making processes. This became 
evident after observing and measuring the impact retail 
store locations had upon sales revenue. Location took a 
very minor role to such attractions as store size and its 
concomitant range or variety of goods, as has been 
demonstrated by Huff (1960) and Revzan (1968), among 
others. The changing tradition from describing location 
patterns to the behavioural aspects of both industry and 
the individual corporation has been sketched early in this 
study (see page 1).
Consequently, it was felt that more insight into the 
corporate decision-making could be gained by adopting a 
descriptive approach and through direct contact with the 
respective executives. For this reason no hypothesis was 
advanced. This was a useful experience and coupled with 
the attempts to model the decision environment, a tentative
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contribution has been made to geographic literature.
In Figure 0.1, the corporate aspects of distribution 
have been set out and it is clearly impossible to look at 
the geography of the corporation without a resulting 
potpourri of information. Because of its breadth this 
information would have little significance. It is 
important to comprehend that the rationale for this study 
is to attempt an understanding of corporate decision-making, 
particularly with reference to logistics. For this reason, 
the traditional geographic analysis of location or flows 
could not help in providing the insights that have been 
gained. It is from this study that some hypotheses can 
perhaps be generated and tested. Indeed, this work 
complements Wadley's (1974) study of corporate decision­
making during recession and with increased examination, a 
fresh understanding of the corporation may emerge.
THE CHOICE OF THE MAJOR SPECIALISTS
When determining which group to involve in the 
second stage of the study, a simple criterion of performance 
was used to differentiate between those groups that 
appeared to be successful and those groups which did not 
(see pages 73-76). This criterion was based upon group 
returns on investment, and of the four groups of firms, both 
the Major and Minor Specialists were considered to be more 
successful than the other two.
From the very beginning of the study, it was felt 
that little could be gained from determining why firms 
failed. This happens with monotonous regularity. A 
contribution could be made to both the successful and 
marginal processors by isolating the factors leading to
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successful decision-making in the logistics sector. This 
consideration has been justified by the results.
A number of problems which may have proved detrimental 
to continuing the thrust of the project inhibited the 
selection of another group. Had the Rural Co-operatives 
been chosen, four firms would probably have closed before 
the relevant data could be collected. This would have 
meant working with only two co-operatives or changing to 
another group. With the first alternative, the study would 
have been narrower than with the use of three successful Major 
Specialists. Had the second alternative been pursued, then 
both financial and manpower resources would have been 
wasted. This decision was useful in helping to frame a 
mental environment for decision-making within the industry.
Two groups other than the Major Specialists were left; 
the Minor Specialists and the Diversified Conglomerates.
The Minor Specialists -- consisting of four specialists and 
one deviant (Wattie-Pict)-- were not considered suitable for 
a study of corporate decision-making, particularly in the 
logistics sector. The four firms were too small and subject 
to severe seasonal fluctuations; when Methven closed, this 
group was rejected.
The opposite problem was faced with the Diversified- 
Conglomerates. They were too diverse to offer the potential 
for an inter-firm study of decision-making with regard to 
product flows. Their product range was very large but in 
terms of volume, each product was small. Golden Circle was 
an exception but investigating a monopoly control of 
pineapples would offer few contributions to the industry.
The Diversified Conglomerates were also in a process of
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restructuring. Henry Jones (IXL) Limited linked with 
Cottees General Foods Ltd to distribute frozen vegetables. 
Cottees themselves were seeking to withdraw from the food 
processing industry because of continuing losses.
Consequently, the Major Specialists offered stability of 
operation as well as the opportunity to investigate two 
major commodities with fluctuating supply and demand.
Rural Co-operatives
It is necessary to dwell again upon the Rural 
Co-operatives. Their underlying problems stem from a 
history of poor management, poor marketing intelligence 
and an inflexible supply. Very few co-operatives demonstrated 
the business acumen observed within the other processors.
For firms in a proven marginal situation depending on 
Commonwealth Government support, there was a conspicuous 
display of executive perquisites. Another point was that 
principal executives were constantly travelling overseas, 
yet it was obvious that they were poor market trend 
analysts. How else could their determination to stay in 
canned decidious fruits be construed in the face of a 
declining market ? Finally, grower-shareholders have 
maintained a strong boardroom control leading to minimum 
response from the supply sector. Growers never became fully 
aware of their precarious existence because of strong 
political support from respective governments. The 
co-operatives in this study -- excepting Berri Fruit Juices 
and Golden Circle -- are manufacturing anachronisms.
THE METHODOLOGY AND LONG-TERM STRATEGIES
The methodology has concentrated upon short-term 
micro aspects of corporate logistics, yet one of the major 
problems facing the industry is its structural future. Decisior
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theory combined with the Out-of-Kilter algorithm can 
assist in developing restructuring alternatives but the 
need is for a broader view to be taken. There is little 
point in developing an elegant structural model of the 
industry when the methodology ignores social implications 
of restructuring. This aspect of the industry's future 
was not considered because of the need for a much broader 
view. The field surveys accentuated the acute problem 
faced by the industry, particularly the Rural Co-operatives. 
Constraints on the scope of the study meant that only micro 
aspects of logistics could be studied.
In these early stages of logistics decision-making 
analysis, it is possible that the techniques used in an 
attempt to understand the decision-making process could 
be transferred to consider long-run strategies. Decision 
theory and the OKA, especially when combined as in the 
Heinz example, certainly offer good prospects of assisting 
firms to appreciate the implications of long-term location 
and logistics processes. Indeed, this may prove to be a 
technique which encourages processing executives to develop 
a series of long-term strategies. But only by returning 
to the industry and conducting a five to ten year study 
could one be sure that these techniques can cope adequately 
with a longer-term approach.
204
APPENDIX ONE
CLASSIFTCATION TECHNIQUES
An agglomerative polythetic procedure embodied in 
the MULTBET program was used to classify the twenty-seven 
firms into four groups. It included a centroid sorting 
strategy which defines the distance between two groups as 
that between their centroids in Euclidean space which is 
minimized upon fusion. It also incorporates the Shannon 
type information statistic as the similarity measure, 
details of which are reported upon in Lance and Williams 
(1967) .
MULTBET will accept mixed data and is self-adjusting 
for missing values. Attributes can be in ordered or dis­
ordered multistate forms as well as the more conventional 
qualitative and quantitative measures. A multistate 
attribute has a range of measures where one value may be 
exclusive to an observation, or where several values are 
present in a non-exclusive form. Examples of the four 
types of attributes have been shown in Table 3.1.
MULTBET was supported by GROUPER, a diagnostic program 
which dissects the relationships between the groups 
generated, and states for each comparison the attribute 
means and contributions to the similarity measure used.
The opportunity was also taken to apply a principal
components analysis as part of the programming suite.
We have seen that the twenty-seven firms are diverse 
when constrained within the conventions used to define 
an industry. Principal components have often been used 
successfully to unravel the commonalities underlying a 
structure which may remain obscured in the 'raw' information. 
GOWER is an ordination program which undertakes a principal 
components analysis of a similarity matrix computed in 
MULTBET and adjusted to the user's requirements (Gower,
1966).
As stated in Chapter Three (page 47), the classifi­
cation variables were selected to reflect four facets of 
the industry's structure. These were corporate structure, 
manufacturing size, location and flow and product 
differentiation. The data for the thirty-nine variables 
could be in one of four forms: qualitative (binary),
quantitative (numerical), dis-ordered and ordered multi­
state (numerically restricted). In Table A-l, the variables 
have been listed in this order together with a description 
of the range in values and the period which they cover.
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TABLE A.1: MULTBET VARIABLES AND THE TYPE OF MEASURE USED
T y p o V a r i a b l e M e a B u r o
Q U A L I T A T I V E
1 O r i g i n  of c a p i t a l  funds.
2 G o v e r n m e n t  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  w i t h i n  p a s t  10 years.
3 G r o w i n g  l and o wned.
4 G o v e r n m e n t  f r e i g h t  rebates.
5 E x c h a n g e  of p r o d u c t s  w i t h  o t h e r  p r o c e s s o r s .
6 E a c t o r y  l o cations.
F o r e i g n  ■ 0 A u s t r a l i a n  - 1
No ” 0 Y o b  - 1
N o “ 0 Y e s ■ 1
No - 0 Yes " 1
No - 0 Ye s  - 1
Rural - 0 M e t r o p o l i t a n  - 1 (whore m u l t i ­
p l a n t  firms ha d  a l o c a t i o n  mix, l o c a t i o n  
was w o l y h t o d  by v o l u m o  of  raw m a t e r i a l  
i n p u t ) .
N U M E R I C A L
7 O p e r a t i n g  factories.
8 P r o d u c i n g  in n u m b e r  of A u s t r a l i a n  states.
9 F a c t o r i e s  closed.
10 Raw m a t e r i a l  input, 1974.
11 P r o p o r t i o n a l  i n v o l v e m e n t  in p r o c e s s i n g  industry.
12 E x p l o y e e s .
13 P r o d u c t i o n  o u t put, 1974.
14 P r o d u c t  i n v e n t o r y  at factory.
15 E x p o r t s :  fruit pro d u c t s .
16 E x p o r t s :  v e g e t a b l e  p r o d u c t s .
17 D i s t r i b u t i o n  c e n t r e s  owned.
18 D i s t r i b u t i o n  c e n t r e s  o p e r a t e d .
19 P r o p o r t i o n  of d i r e c t  d i s t r i b u t i o n /
20 -25 Costs.
26 -32 Sales.
N u m b e r  of s e p a r a t e  f a c t o r i e s  o p e r a t i n g  
in 1975.
As at 1975.
In the c o m p a n y ' s  life up to 1975.
T o n n e s  a c c e p t e d  w i t h i n  the c o m p a n y ' s  
o p e r a t i n g  year.
D e t e r m i n e d  us a r a t i o  of p r o c e s s i n g  s a les 
to total Halos.
Ilecauso of s e a s o n a l  v a r i a t i o n  the m e a n  for 
12 m o n t h s  of e a c h  c o m p a n y ' s  o p e r a t i n g  y e a r  
s p a n n i n g  1974 was used.
G r o s s  tonnes; p r o d u c t  p lus p a c k a g i n g .
T h e  r a t i o  of st o c k s  at f a c t o r y  to total 
st o c k s  o v e r  the d e c a d e  up  to the 1974 
o p e r a t i n g  year.
) R a t i o  of e x p o r t  s a l e s  to total sales.
, I n t e n d e d  to s how d e p e n d e n c e  o r  i n d e p e n d e n c e  
in d i s t r i b u t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s .
R a t i o  of sal e s  d i r e c t  f r o m  f a c t o r y  to tot a l  
s a l e s .
T o  m a i n t a i n  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ,  r e s p o n d e n t s  
w e r e  a s k e d  to p r o v i d e  the p r o p o r t i o n  of 
total c o s t s  for the six c o m p o n e n t s  o v e r  the 
1 9 7 4-75 f i n a n c i a l  year.
T h e s e  w e r e  e x p r e s s e d  as a p r o p o r t i o n  for 
e a c h  S t a t e  and the N o r t h e r n  T e r r i t o r y .
D I S O R D E R E D  
M U L T I - 
S T A T E
33 T y p e  of firm.
34 C o u n t r y  of o w n e r s h i p .
35 C o n t r o l .
36 Row m a t e r i a l  o r igins.
37 P r o d u c t  range
C o - o p e r a t i v e  - 1, C o r p o r a t i o n  - 2, P r i v a t e  • 3 
L o c a t i o n  of m a j o r  s h a r e h o l d i n g .
L o c a t i o n  of p o l i c y  c o ntrol.
A u s t r a l i a  - 1 F o r e i g n  - 2
E i g h t  m a i n  p r o d u c t s  f r o m  w i t h i n  tho c o n f i n e s
of tho p r o c e s s i n g  industry.
O R D E R E D  
M U L T I - 
eTt a t e
38 S e a s o n a l  flu c t u a t i o n s .
39 C o n t r o l  of m a r k e t i n g .
R a n g i n g  f rom l ittle f l u c t u a t i o n  “ 1, to 
v ery m a r k e d  f l u c t u a t i o n s  - 4. A s u b j e c t i v e  
v a r i a b l e .
R a n g i n g  f rom n o  c o n t r o l  - 1, to tot a l  
c o n t r o l  - 3.
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APPENDIX TWO
THE VALUE OF PERFECT INFORMATION
By using decision theory, it is possible to establish 
the value of perfect information. Although this is an 
unfeasible state of knowledge the value can be used as a 
yardstick to gauge the cost of gathering additional informa­
tion (see Newman, 1971: 23-27, and Winkler, 1972: 296-325 
for a detailed discussion). If Gow had perfect fore­
knowledge on the performance of shipping, they could make 
the best decision for each of the three possible alternative 
shipping arrivals. In Figure 5.4 under the column 'Shipping 
Arrival', EMV sub-totals are shown for each strategy at each 
shipping branch in the tree. These sub-totals have been 
transferred to Table A.2 where the highest value for each 
strategy is listed under 'Maximum EMV'. For example, the 
$35 998 from Strategy B if the ship arrives on time indicates 
which strategy Gow would adopt if they were certain that the 
.ship would arrive on time. As we have seen from the decision 
tree in Figure 5.4 and the summary in Table 5.6, the highest 
EMV under the condition of imperfect information is that for 
Strategy B. The difference between this total amount and 
the sum of the maximum EMVs in Table A.2 is $628, the value 
of perfect shipping information. Should Gow spend more than 
this on gathering additional information, the excess will 
yield a negative return. As the shipping outcome can never
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be known in advance it is advisable to spend less than $628 
on improving information. This form of information valuing 
can be extended to other factors of influence by rearranging 
the decision tree and recalculating the respective EMVs.
This will not be pursued with the Gow example for we are 
seeking to explore a decision process rather than complete 
a thorough ex-post facto analysis of a particular period.
TABLE A.2: THE VALUE OF PERFECT INFORMATION ABOUT SHIPPING
PERFORMANCE
Shipping Performance Strategy Branch EMV Maximum EMV
Arrives on time A 34 574
B 35 998 35 998
C 31 628
Arrives one month late A 6 357
B 9 019 9 501
C 9 501
Arrives two months late A 3 464
B 4 045 4 191
C 4 191
49 690
Total for Strategies A 44 395
B 49 062
C 45 320
Value of Perfect Information 49 690 - 49 062 = 628
2Q9
APPENDIX THREE 
THE FJFr,D SURVEY
Information on the industry, apart from the 
official data collected by the Bureau of Statistics, 
was gathered during two field trips. The first, between 
November 1974 and March 1975, involved visiting thirty- 
one processors. In every case, the first contact was 
with a senior executive (see Table A.3) . Full co-operation 
was always offered which, in part, was a benefit of a 
retailing and distribution background. Most of these 
people were business aquaintances. In a few cases,
KOMPASS, a directory of business firms and personnel 
published by Isaacson (1973), provided contact names.
During this first stage of the field survey the 
objective was simply to compile information on the 
industry. This information was based on four themes; 
location and flow, manufacturing size, corporate structure 
and product differentiation (see Table 3.1). An expanded 
version of this information matrix is shown in Table A.4. 
The principal problem encountered was the comparison 
of inter-firm data. Some firms included the cost of 
inwards transport in the price paid for raw material; 
some considered the volume of inwards material as units 
of containers while others measured the flow in tonnes. 
Because metrication was still being introduced, all figures 
had to be converted. However, none of these problems was 
serious enough to hinder the project or distort the data.
The second survey involved only three processors,
R.M. Gow Pty Ltd, Bulmer Australia Limited and H.J. Heinz
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TADLE A. 3: PROCESSORS AND PERSONNEL SURVEYED TO CONSTRUCT A PROFILE OF THE INDUSTRY
PROCESSOR PERSONNET, TNTERV1 EWED
1. Golden Circle Cannery Managing Director 
G e n e r a 1 M a n a g e r 
Distribution Manager
2 . U.M. Gow Pty Ltd Managing Director 
Marketing Manager 
Distribution Manager 
Product Development Manager 
FDP Manager 
Cost Accountant
3. Cottees General Foods Ltd General Manager 
Marketing Director
4 . Pick-Me-Up Food Products Pty Ltd General Manager
5. P. Methven and Son General Managor
6. The Nestle Company (Australia) Ltd General Manager 
Production Director
7. Cerebos (Australia)Ltd General Manager 
Sales Director 
Distribution Manager
8. Edgell Division of Petersville General Manager
9. Bulmer Australia Limited Managing Director 
Marketing Manager 
Accountant 
Production Manager
10.Masterfoods of Australia Pty Ltd General Manager 
Production Director
11.Letona Co-operative Limited Goner a 1 M a n a q <; r 
Accountant 
Production Manager
12.Jusfrute 1. imited Manager at both Leeton and Griffith
13.Mountain Maid Foods Co-operative Ltd General Manager 
Production Manager 
Distribution Manager 
Marketing Manager
14.Henry Jones (XXL) Limited General Manager 
Sales nirector 
Personnel Manager 
Distribution Manaqer
15.Rosella Foods Pty Ltd General Manager 
Production Manager
16.I1.J. Heinz Company Australia Ltd Managing Director 
Marketing Director 
Marketing Manager 
Planning Director 
Purchasing Manager 
Agriculture Manager 
Finance Director 
Budget Controller 
Records Clerk
17.Kraft Holdings Finance Director 
Production Manager
18-Wattie Piet Limited General Manager 
Accountant
19.Unigate Australia Pty Ltd General Manager 
Accountan t
20.Westernport Canneries Pty Ltd General Manager
21.SPC Limited General Manager 
Cost Accountant 
Production Manager 
Distribution Manager
factories
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Company Australia Ltd. This survey was undertaken over 
five weeks in late 1975 and early 1976. Because R.M. Gow 
acted as the pilot firm for this extended survey it was 
necessary to visit Brisbane twice. As noted in the 
discussion on industry logistics and group conduct (page 81), 
the intention was to include Berri Fruit Juices Co-operative 
Ltd and Campbell 1s Soups (Aust) Pty Ltd in the second 
survey. HoweveryBerri were disturbed that the data on 
sales would not remain confidential and declined to be 
involved any further. This fear is common among processors 
and in a competitive environment, quite valid. Campbell's 
Soups were involved with the problem of converting the 
excess of imported tomato paste into sauce and allied 
products and hence avoid paying customs tariff. Under 
these harassing circumstances, their reluctance to be 
involved in the study was understandable. Consequently 
only three firms were surveyed in any depth.
At no time while working with the three firms were 
data held back. The volume of information handed over 
from old accounting reports, marketing reports and other 
sources was often overwhelming. All executives questioned 
answered with candour and were always ready to give advice 
should data not be readily available. Considering that 
little could be offered to these three firms, and indeed 
they stood to lose should their confidence not be 
respected, their co-operation was gratifying. The success 
of the work is largely due to their help.
The information collected from these three firms 
was centred upon flows of material into, through and out 
of their plants. This entailed sorting through product 
lists and volumes sold to establish the important products
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from the total range. For example Heinz imports Chiquita 
Banana Pulp from Honduras but in such insignificant 
quantities that it was never seriously considered. After 
some discussion with the Purchasing Manager, it became 
apparent that tomatoes constituted the major input; for nearly 
every product had some tomato base. Because of the problem 
already encountered by other processors over the import 
tariff by-law, it was considered that the reported problem 
would centre upon tomato flows for both Gow and Heinz.
Data have been collected on other commodities processed 
by these two firms but never used. Bulmer presented less 
of a dilemma for their only input was apple juice together 
with a small quantity of apples for pulping. The quality 
of the data kept by these three firms was much higher than 
anticipated and apart from minor problems in converting 
each firm's units of measurement into a comparative base, 
no improvements in measurement were needed.
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